ASSISTING THE SOLOMON ISLANDS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERVENTION

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This paper represents the author’s views alone. It has been drawn entirely from open sources, and has no official status or endorsement.
Abstract

In 2003 the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was dispatched to the Solomon Islands. The mission has been seen by some as providing a model for future interventions in the South Pacific. However, it is doubtful whether this is either desirable or readily reproducible given the limitations of regional governments and the diverse character of security threats faced by South Pacific states. After looking at RAMSI and the conditions for its success, this paper provides a brief survey of security issues across the region and examines the possibility of RAMSI-style interventions elsewhere. While RAMSI is a significant development in regional security cooperation, and in particular Australia’s policy towards the region, the author concludes that targeted measures will continue to be the norm of regional development and security assistance.
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Assisting the Solomon Islands: Implications for Regional Security and Intervention

James D. Stratford

The multinational intervention force deployed to assist the government of the Solomon Islands in mid-2003 experienced considerable early success in the first twenty months of operations. However, it is doubtful whether the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) model would be either readily reproducible or even desirable across the South Pacific Region (SPR) more broadly. Security challenges experienced across the region vary enormously both within and between states and, in so doing, reflect the cultural and geographic range which exists throughout this vast area of the globe. This paper shall address the nature of security challenges in the SPR and the possibilities for intervention in the light of the RAMSI deployment. The first section will look at the particular challenges presented in the Solomon Islands and the make-up of the intervention force. This section will also detail some of RAMSI’s main achievements to date and the conditions that enabled desirable outcomes. The second section deals with the security challenges faced by other states and societies in the region. In particular, a distinction is drawn between the incidence of armed struggle in the sub-region of Melanesia and the broader ‘non-traditional’ threats to security faced both across the region and in the Pacific islands. The third section then looks at the possibility of RAMSI-style intervention elsewhere in the region and the possibilities for, and benefits of, ‘cosmopolitan’ policing in the region. Finally, the continued significance of targeted assistance is discussed.

Challenges and Achievements

When the first elements of RAMSI arrived in Honiara in July 2003, they found a traumatised population, and an incapacitated government that had been brought to its knees by years of civil violence in and around the capital Honiara and throughout the island of Guadalcanal. Years of conflict exposed the mismatch between inherited Western institutions and ‘indigenous micro-polities’ and highlighted the inability of the national government to manage the pressures of urbanisation and internal migration. At the heart of the conflict was the migration of Malaitan islanders, their subsequent domination of the labour market in and around the capital, Honiara, and the influx of predominantly Malaitan squatters on traditional
lands on Guadalcanal. During the mid-1990s, elements within the Guadalcanalese population, most notably the Istabu Freedom Movement (IFM), began to collect firearms and to forcibly remove Malaitan settlers.

The first wave of actual fighting erupted between IFM militia and the rival Malaita Eagle forces (MEF) in 1998 and continued until the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) on 15 October 2000. During this period at least 100 people were killed, some 30,000 (over half the Guadalcanal population) displaced and major commercial interests, including SIPL and the Gold Ridge Mine, closed down. The initial conflict also took a direct toll on the state when, on 5 June 2000, MEF fighters and members of the Malaitan dominated police force (who had looted the Rove police arsenal) seized control of Honiara and deposed the Malaitan Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu at gun point. Though initially ending hostilities, the TPA did not succeed in obtaining the surrender of all firearms from either the MEF or IFM, and allowed the situation to continue as a ‘low-grade insurgency’. Hopes of the situation being brought under control by the newly-elected government of Sir Allan Kemakeza continued to be undermined by top-level corruption, particularly in relation to Taiwanese funded compensation to privileged Malaitans, including ministers and the Prime Minister himself. The situation in the Solomon Islands continued to generate dire forecasts. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) warned in early 2003 that, ‘in the absence of effective government, our neighbour risks reverting, not to a pre-modern tropical paradise, but to a kind of post-modern badlands, ruled by criminals and governed by violence’. Kemakeza, like his predecessor, made a request for external assistance. Like the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT), this request was then sanctioned by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) under the Biketawa Declaration, which provided for a collective Pacific Island response in the event of a request for assistance from a member state.

The Australian-led RAMSI intervention was given a mandate to ‘reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities … and ensure respect for the constitution and implementation of the laws’. The task of restoring law and order was given to a 302-strong multinational Participating Police Force (or PPF). While Australia provided a core of 208 officers, numerous PIF states contributed officers (New Zealand sent 35, as well as the Cook Islands (2), Samoa (10), Fiji (15), Tonga (12), Vanuatu (12), and the tiny states of Nauru (3) and Kiribati (5)). RAMSI also had a strong deterrent capability in the military contingent of 1,400 Australian military personnel, which was able to get ‘[the militants’] attention and … convince them of the need to cooperate’. The second branch of the mission was given the
challenge of restoring core government functions, by placing mainly Australian civilian personnel into in-line positions in areas including Finance and Justice among others, making it possible to restore good governance by stabilising financial controls and ensuring the short-term functioning of the justice system. While the restoration and improvement of the Solomon Islands’ Government institutions is a long-term commitment, the initial phase of the intervention made significant achievements. These included: peacefully disarming militants; obtaining the surrender of Weathercoast militant leader Harold Keke; the arrest of over 50 former militants, many of whom had become gangsters; and the general cleaning up of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), with over 50 arrests and over 400 sackings. Crucially, the international force was also able to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of local people. In one report, a woman named her son Nick Warner after the Special Coordinator of the Mission whom she considered responsible for disarming the militants ‘and ending the terrible life we had been experiencing under Keke’s rule’. In another instance, on the Weathercoast a child was named RAMSI.

Before assessing the likelihood of similar interventions in the South Pacific, it is necessary to look briefly at the conditions necessary for RAMSI’s success to date. Nick Warner sums this up very neatly: ‘RAMSI has been a success because it was the right plan at the right time and we had the right team with the right approach with the right level of political backing and resources.’ An important aspect of the timing of the intervention was that it did not come at the height of ‘ethnic tensions’ when such an intervention would have risked further polarising the community along existing fault-lines. Timing and political support from within the Australian Government, the Solomon Islands and other regional governments, as well as the Pacific Islands Forum, were of course fundamental. For many Australian commentators, RAMSI was a clear and forceful articulation of a paradigm shift in the government’s ‘hands-off’ approach to the Pacific. While the ‘paradigm shift’ assertion has been debated, it was clear that this was a major shift back to the security-oriented policies of the 1970s and 1980s, most notably the Evans doctrine of ‘constructive commitment’, and a major change in gear for the Howard Government in particular. Only six months earlier, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, rebuffed suggestions of a deployment stating that ‘sending troops to the Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme’. Downer’s sentiments were echoed in the Defence Update released in early 2003, which forcefully proclaimed that, ‘The Australian Government should not be expected to solve the problems of the Solomon Islands, and anyway cannot do so. It is
only the people and their leaders who can end the violence and give the Solomon Islands the stability necessary to address its economic and political problems.’30 Indeed, the Australian Government had consistently rejected calls for assistance by the Solomon Islands Government over a period of some five years, including those from the besieged Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alulu before the civil ‘take over’ in 2000 in which the Prime Minister was removed at gunpoint.31 Rather than assisting the embattled government, maritime assets were deployed to evacuate Australian and New Zealand citizens.32

On 11 September 2001 and 12 October 2002, events transpired that highlighted the vulnerability of states to the threat of international terrorism. Weak states were now seen to be particularly vulnerable to exploitation by transnational criminal networks, or to provide suitable basing or transit points for terrorist organisations seeking to target Western interests. The potentially catastrophic risk posed by unrestrained non-state actors and network operations utilising the cover of failed states had already been witnessed in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.33 Nonetheless, until the RAMSI deployment, the Pacific figured primarily as part of the Australian Government’s so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ for the offshore detention and processing of asylum seekers.34 State ‘failure’ in the Pacific was not seen as a reason sui generis for intervention; rather, it was something to be protected from or insulated against. It was this continued reluctance of the government to intervene which prompted ASPI’s calls for action.35

Ultimately then, while 11 September 2001 and Bali are typically cited as catalytic events for the intervention, it is important to recognise the degree of resistance within the Australian Federal executive even in the wake of the Bali bombings. It is more instructive to look at RAMSI against the controversial invasion of Iraq in March 2003, as it was in the wake of the invasion that the Australian Government finally decided to make a commitment to assist the Solomon Islands. For the Australian Prime Minister John Howard, in the post-Iraq context, this was now ‘our patch’.36 Moreover, as Ian Scales asserts: ‘without Iraq, Solomon Islands would still be crying out for assistance and the ASPI report gathering dust.’37 Of course, it is impossible to say whether or not Australia would have deployed RAMSI without Iraq, however, arguably, the unpopular Iraqi campaign created the political need for a decidedly positive operation to satisfy both domestic critics and international interests. Crucially though, it was in this context that the continuing deterioration of law and order in the Solomon Islands, and the subsequent request for assistance from Kemakeza, was taken more seriously than on previous occasions. It was finally recognised that allowing a situation to
emerge in the Solomon Islands for thugs, criminals and terrorists to exploit presented an unacceptable risk.

**Security Challenges in the South Pacific**

Most countries in the SPR face major political and economic problems. However, such is the sheer size of, and diversity within, the region that its difficulties cannot be painted with the same broad brush. Similarly, oversimplifying the challenges presented across the region runs the risk of generating inappropriate responses, which may either serve to escalate existing crises or fail to make a meaningful impact where targeted, even ‘surgical’, measures are required.

Security challenges in the SPR are, almost by definition, internal matters; the risk of inter-state conflict or armed invasion by an out-of-region power is incredibly low. Few states within the region possess functioning armed forces and intervention by foreign powers is largely carried out through the use of economic statecraft rather than military force. Within the SPR, concerns over traditional internal security matters, including widespread armed violence or civil war, tend to be limited to the sub-region of Melanesia, which lies along the southern reaches of the ‘arc of instability’. The decades since the decline of post-colonial rule within the region have seen frequent violence and instability in the majority of Melanesian states, including Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji.

Papua New Guinea (PNG), while not a ‘failed state,’ has seen a very costly full-blown civil war which lasted a decade on the resource-rich island of Bougainville. PNG itself continues to suffer from widespread law and order problems, both in the main cities and in the Southern Highlands areas where regular tribal and criminal violence takes a direct toll on both the civilian population and commercial infrastructure. Regular rumours of military coups continue to be fuelled by wantokism and the PNG Government’s reliance on the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) to assist in internal law and order. While the likelihood of a successful coup is reduced by poor communications, ethnic diversity within the ranks of the armed forces, and the use of electoral politics by senior military to gain power, the level of risk within PNG generally creates an unattractive prospect for much needed capital investment and tourism.

Vanuatu is also seen as a major site for potential state failure and internal conflict as a result of rising ‘social pressures, rising expectations, corruption and the gap between rich and poor’. Vanuatu has also seen two unsuccessful ‘palace coups’ in 1988 and 1995, and ‘severe insubordination by the paramilitary Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF)’. Since before the pre-
Independence Santo rebellion (which was met with the deployment of British, French and PNG troops), domestic uprisings have been a recurring feature with which the paramilitary police have found it increasingly difficult to cope. Fiji also saw two coups in less than fifteen years: one successful operation mounted by the then Colonel Rabuka in 1987; and the unsuccessful attempt made by George Speight in 2001. Economic problems and the complex and divisive legacy of colonial land policy continue to exacerbate divisions between the Fijian-Indian and the indigenous Fijian population. Unlike PNG or the Solomon Islands, however, the Fiji military has continued to maintain its monopoly over the use of armed force.

While each of these situations are quite distinct in terms of the causes of conflict, it is worth noting some particular features common to the Melanesian island states which appear to have contributed to the degree of violence and instability witnessed. Fraenkel notes the importance of access to resources and the ability for large peasant populations to withdraw from state-controlled markets, thus being able to bypass the ‘lame leviathan’. Conversely, Fraenkel points out that there is less scope for this type of retreat in the generally much smaller and often resource-poor Micronesian and Polynesian territories. However, it is this resource wealth that has provided fuel for rapid urbanisation in places such as Port Moresby and Honiara, with which the local economies have been unable to keep up. The inability of local economies to absorb the steady flow of youth into the labour force has created situations where jobless, poor, disenchanted and disenfranchised youths roam the streets.

Related to the resource wealth of Melanesian states are key geographic characteristics that have been exploited by militants in recent conflicts. Unlike the majority of Micronesian and Polynesian islands, which are separated by vast swathes of ocean, the sheer size and mountainous terrain of Bougainville, the PNG Highlands, or the Weathercoast have typically afforded local militias with valuable protection from government forces. In addition, the proximity of the islands within the Melanesian archipelagic rim has enabled the effects of conflict on one island to have a follow-on effect on others. During the Bougainville civil war, 8,000 refugees fled to the Solomon Islands. At the same time, links were able to be forged between fighters from the Guadalcanalese IFM and Bougainville guerillas. While the majority of serious violent conflict has been seen in Melanesia, the most common security concerns across the South Pacific are much broader. Indeed as Rolfe states, ‘[for the Pacific Islands] security comes through resource sustainability, the state of the environment and other ‘non-traditional’ security issues, all of which directly affect their economic
viability’. In PNG, the high incidence of HIV and AIDS risks crippling the economy as the virus spreads through the heterosexual community. Dobell warns that while official estimates indicate 0.6 per cent of the population has been infected, the figures could in fact be several times higher, as AIDS deaths are often reported as tuberculosis or pneumonia.

The Pacific islands are also particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Throughout the South Pacific islands, rising water temperature has been linked to rises in the incidence of diarrhoea among children and ciguatera in tropical fish stocks. At the same time, rising sea-levels have also raised the incidence of natural disasters and threatened freshwater supplies. While not attacking the structures of state directly, the indirect but often combined costs of disease and natural disaster have a very real impact on state and society alike. Callick notes the catastrophic costs of Cyclone Uma, which struck Vanuatu in 1988, leaving 55 dead, and costing 150 per cent of GDP. Significantly, however, Callick observes that natural disasters tend to be followed by large increases in aid, investment and remittances, resulting in net gain. Conversely, coups in Fiji were followed by dramatic falls in the level of capital investment.

The underdevelopment of many Southern Pacific economies has seen them caught in the wake of global forces. The power of global economic forces threatens to undermine states’ attempts to exercise economic control, and play an active role in international processes. Callick states: ‘[Pacific Island states’] currencies, their market niches, their modest skills bases, provide pitiful protection against a global downturn.’ A particularly worrying twist, regarding the dangers of economically weakened states gaining much attention, concerns the possibility that economic vulnerability may be manipulated by opportunist criminal and terrorist networks. At the 2001 meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum, the Forum Communiqué noted that, ‘there is clear evidence of serious transnational crime moving into the region and posing serious threats to the sovereignty, security and economic integrity of Forum members’. Similarly, the ASPI report on the Solomon Islands saw the potential for the breakdown of law and order in the Solomon Islands to be exploited by transnational criminal operations, including ‘drug smuggling, gun-running, identity fraud and people smuggling ... and perhaps even terrorism’. According to Mick Keelty, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, evidence has yet to be found that would confirm terrorist activity in the SPR; however, he has suggested that ‘Pacific Island states may be used as transit points or ... as staging points to commit crimes, not only in Australia but in other countries within the region’. However, there are also good reasons why terrorists would not use Pacific Island
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states as forward staging or transit points. Ron May points out that the ‘arrival and presence of outsiders in the small, personalised societies [of the South Pacific] is generally very obvious’.69 This, combined with major logistic difficulties, would make the small Pacific island states even less attractive. More realistic is the possibility that weaknesses in the banking sectors of Pacific states may be exploited. Anecdotal evidence suggests that offshore banking registers on Nauru may have been used by terrorists to launder funds.70 Such problems are exacerbated by the limited capacity of many states in the SPR to monitor people movements; thus creating the potential for the effects of lawlessness to spread. It is important to add, as Dobell points out, that the exploitation of porous borders works in several directions, as the reciprocal flow of guns and drugs between northern Australia and the PNG highlands has shown.71

The possibility of RAMSI-style intervention elsewhere

The early success of the RAMSI intervention in its initial phases has caused some to see it as a model for future regional engagements.72 At the same time, however, it has been acknowledged that the situation in the Solomon Islands was a special case requiring a tailored response. Nick Warner has been careful to point out that RAMSI does not provide a template for future operations.73 However, the Solomon Islands case may provide an ‘index’ by which future challenges can be gauged. One of the most instructive elements of the RAMSI intervention in this regard is the significant policing component. As discussed earlier, the type of violence that characterises the South Pacific is rarely on a scale that would justify full-scale military action. As Hanson observes: ‘Meeting small-scale, localised rioting and tribal infighting with heavily-armed combat soldiers is not only inappropriate, but is likely to cause a reactionary escalation of the violence.’ While the ability to provide a military deterrent is obviously valuable when faced with well-armed militants as in the Solomon Islands, a robust and highly visible policing role has the advantages of being less provocative and considerably less expensive.74

It is significant that, within the first six months of the RAMSI deployment, the Australian Government started planning a major operation to improve police and law and order in PNG, known as the Enhanced Cooperation Program, or ECP.75 While different to RAMSI, most notably in the absence of a military role, the ECP also places a major emphasis on the long-term improvement of the PNG police force, by providing for the placement of Australian police officers into in-line positions. However, the ECP differs considerably from RAMSI in that it is an Australian mission rather than a regional one. This, combined with the comparative lack of consultation
with the host government, meant that the mission initially lacked the full cooperation of the PNG Government, resulting in delays in deployment.

While it is possibly too early to identify trends as such, RAMSI and the current ECP are instructive in that they have highlighted the readiness of regional governments, and especially the Australian Government, to become involved in internal security matters. It is useful to consider this shift in the light of Kaldor’s model of ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’,76 which she puts forward as a compromise between traditional United Nations peacekeeping and coercive peace enforcement. In particular, Kaldor points to the need to create a new ‘soldier-cum-policeman’.77 The success of such an endeavor would be reliant on a serious rethinking of issues ranging from equipment and tactics to command and the transformation of doctrine and training.

In the first phase of operation Helpem Fren the military contingent, though only supporting police, outnumbered the multinational police force by six to one. The creation of a specialised regional cosmopolitan police task force would greatly diminish the need for such an emphasis on force protection in the future. The creation of a force with members from several PIF states, especially those in Melanesia, could contribute significantly to member states’ own policing capabilities, while making their contributions to policing efforts more valuable and more interoperable with other regional units. While Australia and New Zealand would have to provide the bulk of any such force into the foreseeable future, regular interaction with officers from regional states would provide a valuable forum for skill-sharing and long-term capability-building.

RAMSI could indeed provide the basis for such future cooperative endeavours and regional capacity-building. Properly utilised, the combined experiences of Australian police officers and their Pacific Island counterparts in RAMSI have the potential to provide a valuable basis from which lessons may be learned that may be useful in future policing missions. The broad base of regional policing represented in the Solomon Islands provides an excellent opportunity for the sharing and enhancing of skills across regional units. In turn, this may have positive outcomes not only for the Solomon Islands, or other future states requiring assistance, but also for the ability of the contributing states to effectively handle local law and order issues in their home countries. Fundamentally though, the utilisation of collective policing capabilities in RAMSI would have been impossible without the initial political will and the ability of states to recognise the value of acting collectively to tackle serious law and order crises when called on to do so. This political capital is clearly a valuable asset which needs to be
strengthened and utilised, both in support of, and sometimes instead of, bilateral measures.

**The continued significance of targeted assistance**

More relevant to addressing the complexity of security challenges in the South Pacific generally will be the provision of security safeguards to deal with issues related to people movement, disease transmission, and assistance to regional government administrations. The RAMSI case is instructive in this regard in the prominent role played by RAMSI advisers within the Solomon Islands Government. Targeted measures will continue to be used to address particular weaknesses within Pacific island security structures. The Australian Government has been active in the reassessment of security arrangements in regional shipping facilities to assist states in meeting compliance standards of the International Maritime Organisation’s Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Efforts are also being made to address vulnerabilities within regional airports.

One of the benefits of looking at RAMSI a little further down the track is that we are afforded a degree of perspective which was less obvious in the first months. In the first phase of operations, understandably, RAMSI’s security function was dominant. While the effective reestablishment of security is always a precondition to later phases, the biggest commitment to the Solomon Islands and the main focus of RAMSI is the long-term assistance it will provide to the Solomon Islands Government. Providing that political support remains, it will emerge as the dominant feature of the assistance package, rather than images of Australian troops and multinational police officers. With this perspective, the question of how relevant RAMSI is for intervention in the South Pacific can be approached from a different angle. It is possible to see broader applications across the South Pacific, from strife-ridden Melanesia to the relatively peaceful, yet economically troubled, Polynesian and Micronesian states. Such strategies will require long-term commitments, as will be the case with RAMSI, for which political and logistic preparedness will be critical in maintaining the required support both domestically and across the region. To this end, the leadership and capability provided by regional powers, namely Australia and New Zealand, will be vital. However, there are real limits to the capacity of these nations to deal with all the problems faced by regional states. Long-term measures involving large deployments of police and civil servants will not be sustainable, except in cases of dire need and where Australia’s strategic requirements are threatened. The provision of targeted assistance through regional aid budgets, and the improvement of port facilities, will remain
vital in filling the gap in the short term. Ultimately, however, the main thrust of regional engagements will be to enhance the ability of states to better manage and provide for their own security.

The Solomon Islands Government obviously required assistance to restore law and order on the ground. However, the requirements of long-term capacity building should make us think more broadly about how such assistance is delivered. The practice of sending Australian and New Zealand bureaucrats to Honiara and Port Moresby is neither desirable nor practicable in the long-term. Alternative strategies, such as the establishment of training and departmental exchange programs, need to be seriously considered. Such arrangements would limit the strain on Australian personnel, while enabling assistance to be provided to a number of states at any one time, in a highly specific manner. While placements in the main departmental hubs of Canberra would play an important part, many would also benefit from working in smaller offices in regional and country areas where resources are scarcer. Effectively, this would involve a reversal in the direction of in-line placements that we have seen in both the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and the Enhanced Cooperation Program.
Notes


11 Hegarty, *Monitoring Peace in the Solomon Islands*, p. 4. David Hegarty, the Leader of the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) from February to July 2001, writing after twelve months in the Solomon Islands, reported that over 500 modern weapons remained unaccounted for, with some being held illegally by police, criminals and militants and ‘key political players’.


14 Elsina Wainwright, et al, Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the
Solomon Islands, ASPI Policy Report, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

15 Hegarty and May, Rebuilding State and Nation in Solomon Islands: Policy Options for
the Regional Assistance Mission, p. 1, and Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding
the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 1.

16 Hegarty and May, Rebuilding State and Nation in Solomon Islands: Policy Options for
the Regional Assistance Mission, p. 1.

17 For details concerning the PPF and its achievements in its first year of operation,

18 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 7.

19 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 8.

20 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, pp. 2–3.
During the three week amnesty, 3,700 guns were handed in, including 700 military-
style weapons.

21 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 3.

22 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, pp. 4–5.


24 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 7.

25 Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 8.

26 Greg Fry, The ‘War Against Terror’ and Australia’s New Interventionism in the Pacific,
State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project. SSGM Conference: Foreign
Policy, Governance and development: Challenges for Papua New Guinea and
Pacific Islands, 22–23 March 2004, Madang, PNG, p. 3, and Paul Kelly in Sinclair
Dinnen, Lending a Fist? Australia’s New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacific,
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Australian National University, Canberra, March 2004, p. 2; Wainwright et al,
Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands, p. 6; and
Hegarty and May, Rebuilding State and Nation in Solomon Islands: Policy Options for
the Regional Assistance Mission, p. 1. See also, Fergus Hanson, ‘Promoting a Pacific
Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands, p. 7.

27 Fry, The ‘War Against Terror’ and Australia’s New Interventionism in the Pacific, p. 3.

28 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 90’s,
‘Australia and the South Pacific: the Rationalist Ascendancy’ in Seeking Asian
Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991–95, eds James Cotton and John


39 Fraenkel, ‘The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the ‘Africanization’ of the South Pacific Thesis’, p. 10. In the South Pacific, only PNG, Fiji and Tonga have military forces, the latter being ‘an unswervingly loyal tool of the monarchist state’.


The arrest of the newly-appointed Police Commissioner in 2002 was followed by the arrest of the head of the VMF and the acting Police Commissioner who were charged with mutiny. Fraenkel, ‘The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the ‘Africanization’ of the South Pacific Thesis’, pp. 12–3.


Callick, ‘Pacific Islanders Resilient in Adversity’.


Callick, ‘Pacific Islanders Resilient in Adversity’.


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