Transformation or Stagnation?:
Rethinking Australia’s Defence

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Introduction

Since the tragic Bali bombing few would dispute the proposition that Australia’s security environment is in the midst of one of the most profound and far-reaching changes in recent history or that the emergence and intensification of a raft of transnational threats, especially international terrorism, is a principal cause. But there is little agreement on how to balance our response to the new transnational challenges with the long-standing requirement to defend against more traditional threats to our sovereignty and way of life. This tension is particularly evident in the widening debate over defence strategy. Traditionalists contend that the thirty year focus on defending Australia against military attack from a hostile state should remain the principal determinant of the structure and capability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). They argue that other tasks such as counter-terrorism, peace-keeping and operations other than war, while important, are second order issues for the ADF. And they reject as dangerous, and misguided, any attempt to alter the underlying tenets of strategic planning first laid down in the landmark 1986 Dibb Review.

In this review, defence academic Paul Dibb postulated the Defence of Australia (DOA) founded on a strategy of denial, highly capable maritime assets and layered defence. Its central aim was to defeat an attack on Australia by defending the so-called ‘sea-air gap’ to the north and east of the continent which Dibb saw as a formidable barrier to any enemy. As a result, the primary defence role was vested in maritime forces with the ability to strike hostile forces at considerable distance from the Australian mainland and to interdict their lines of supply, with the Army reduced to mopping up any hostile ground forces that made it to Terra Australis. This led to a substantial reallocation of resources to the Navy and Air Force and a serious hollowing out of Australia’s land forces over the subsequent decade and a half which some contend almost proved disastrous in the 1999 East Timor intervention.

More fundamentally, critics of the defence orthodoxy assert that our strategy is outdated and fixated on threats that are improbable and unrelated to the real world. Defence Minister Robert Hill lent considerable weight to this view in a seminal speech on defence and security to the Australian Defence College. Hill described a world in which asymmetric threats had
moved from an academic abstraction to “an appalling reality” revealing starkly “the new contours and fault lines of a very different strategic landscape.” The Minister conceded that many elements of the landscape were not new and modern, capable armed forces were still required for high-end warfare. And he reserved judgement on the question of whether or not the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the US was a truly transformational event. But Hill made it abundantly clear that geostrategic considerations should no longer define Australia’s military posture and priorities because security, like everything else, had become globalised. In a pointed reference to the map featured at the end of the Dibb Review, Hill remarked that “it probably never made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of diminishing concentric circles around our coastline, but it certainly does not do so now.”

The Minister made three other observations that ran counter to the prevailing view in his own department. First, the ADF is increasingly likely to be deployed beyond Australia because our security responsibilities are not confined to the region. Second, the ADF must be able to cope with a broader spectrum of threats including non-traditional challenges to security which have often been viewed by the military as “something of a side-show, a distraction from their core business of preparing for and conducting ‘high-end’ war-fighting.” Third, referring to the multiplying demands on defence and the more intense and diverse use of the ADF over the past decade, Hill directly challenged the orthodoxy by asserting that this had very significant implications for the way the ADF is structured and equipped.

Are these criticisms valid? I argue that Hill is fundamentally right. If anything, he may not have fully appreciated the extent of the mismatch between strategy, force structure and the emerging threats to Australia’s security. Our defence strategy is firmly rooted in the past having remained essentially unchanged since the Dibb Review almost twenty years ago despite the enormous transformation that has taken place in our security environment. Adjustments have been largely cosmetic, and at the margins of policy, as evidenced by the refusal of a succession of official defence white papers to countenance any significant revision of force structure. Our current strategy has four major deficiencies. It is based on a misplaced geographical determinism that ignores the diverse and globalised nature of modern conflict; it has shaped the ADF for the wrong wars; it gives insufficient weight to the transnational threats which confront us; and it fails to recognise that modern defence forces must win the peace as well as
the war. What Australia needs is a strategy for the future, not the past, and a transformed ADF structured to manage the very different security challenges of the 21st century.

**Geography and the global village**

For nearly three decades, the underlying assumption of our defence policy has been that proximity ought to determine strategic import. Traditionalists insist that geostrategic imperatives should shape strategy as well as force structure, an idea that finds visual expression in Dibb’s map of Australia and its radiating concentric circles. This linear view of defence holds that protecting Australia from conventional military threats must be the primary mission of our defence forces, a conceptualisation of Australia’s security dilemma that is heavily influenced by classical balance of power considerations. Our military strength is customarily measured against the capabilities of our Asian neighbours and acquisitions justified largely in terms of maintaining a strategic or technological edge over them. Geographical determinism also drives the argument that Australia’s preparedness to deploy the ADF ought to diminish in inverse proportion to the distance from continental Australia. The alleged virtue of this approach is that it disciplines defence spending, provides a coherent strategic rationale for capability planning and enables Australia to better deal with regional uncertainty because of the tight focus on defending Australia.11 At the same time traditionalists are quick to pour cold water on the idea that the ADF should structure for more distant contingencies beyond the ‘inner arc’ because, from their perspective, a hostile power could only seriously threaten Australia by establishing bases in the archipelago to our north.12

This is a surprisingly narrow and one dimensional view of strategy that has more in keeping with the world of Halford Mackinder than Osama bin Laden.13 In the age of globalisation and transnational threats, geography matters far less than it once did because of the compression of space and time. This is not to argue that geography has no impact on strategy. As long as the notion of sovereignty is embodied in territorial boundaries and physical variations in the land, water and sky affect human existence, geography will continue to exert an influence on the conduct of war. But as the world has become painfully aware, state and non-state adversaries can strike from great distances in conventional as well as unconventional ways. The arena of conflict is no longer defined by national borders or neat lines on a map. War like trade, information and money has been globalised and political, strategic and economic forces have become so potent and interconnected that the boundaries between domestic and international security are today seldom clear cut. One country’s political instability may
quickly become another country’s security crisis or a problem for the wider international community as East Timor, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Afghanistan and a host of other internal conflicts, many of them distant from Australian shores, remind us.

Despite traditionalists’ insistence that the ADF should be configured for the defence of Australia and its maritime approaches in reality, as Defence Minister Robert Hill observes, the ADF has been continuously deployed well beyond Australia’s shores on a wide range of missions and tasks for over a decade.\textsuperscript{14} If deployments beyond our immediate neighbourhood were occasional, or of a minor nature, it would be easier to sustain the argument that these should be viewed as ad hoc tasks that require no change to strategy or force structure. On the contrary, they have been the norm rather than the exception because Australia has important security interests that are not confined to our immediate region and may require the use of military force or defence resources. If the events of the past decade are any guide, ADF deployments beyond the sea-air gap will increase rather than diminish as coalitions of the willing are formed and re-constituted for a variety of tasks unrelated to the planning scenarios that have informed our strategy since Vietnam.

The great conceptual weakness of the Defence of Australia (DOA) doctrine and its associated maritime strategy is that it is based on a notion of threat that takes little account of the declining strategic relevance of geography and the proliferation of non-military, non-state challenges to security. The sea-air gap to the north, or Australia’s ‘moat’ as it is sometimes called, conjures up the image of a protective barrier that can be defended by military force and encourages us to believe that Australia “is a secure country thanks to our geography.”\textsuperscript{15} But this is a dangerous illusion in a world of technological profusion, protean crime, epidemic diseases, illegal migration and stateless enemies as the Bali bombing and other terrorist outrages demonstrate.\textsuperscript{16} DOA is analogous in its thinking to the ‘Maginot Line’ mentality that proved so disastrous to the French in the Second World War. In an interconnected world, drawing lines on a map is unlikely to deter agile, asymmetric foes and should not inform the structure or deployment of the ADF.

Moreover, the maritime strategy that underpins DOA is a maritime strategy in name only. A true maritime strategy, based on the use of substantial naval power to control major sea lines of communication, or to contain continental powers, is well beyond Australia’s capability.\textsuperscript{17} However, the real problem with the maritime strategy is that the so-called sea-air gap is not a gap at all. It is an archipelago occupied by numerous
islands of varying importance, size and population where any conceivable military operation would require the effective use of land forces including the means to transport and sustain them. For traditionalists who pride themselves on their understanding of the strategic importance of geography, the failure to recognise the archipelagic nature of the northern approaches to Australia is an inexcusable misappreciation. To assume that an enemy could be deterred or subdued primarily by air and naval power ignores the lessons of history in general, and Australian history in particular.

When Japanese forces advanced into New Guinea during World War II, they were prevented from attacking Australia by a vigorous ground campaign along the Kokoda Trail. Before the ink was dry on the Dibb Review, the Fiji coup of 1987 should have alerted Defence to the likelihood that the requirement for mobile, autonomous land forces able to deploy at short notice beyond the sea-air gap would almost certainly increase. Yet in committing so much of the defence budget to the Navy and Air Force at the expense of the Army, the “gatekeepers of strategic doctrine” pursued a policy that severely weakened the Army’s capacity for force projection in the mistaken belief that air and naval power would suffice. This flawed policy was maintained despite a dramatic increase in the Army’s operational tempo during the 1990s and in the face of professional, military advice. It was only towards the end of the decade that the Army was permitted to develop a limited capacity for littoral operations. But as East Timor showed, this shift was too little and too late.

**Against whom will we fight? Assessing risk**

A second, fundamental failing is that the ADF is structured for the wrong wars. DOA assumes that the most dangerous threat to Australia is a conventional military attack on Australian soil from a hostile, well-armed state. Interestingly, DOA advocates do not suggest that this is the most probable military contingency. On the contrary, they concede that a direct military attack is unlikely, or even “highly unlikely”, but that since a military attack would be a serious event, with potentially grave ramifications for Australia’s security, prudent decision-makers must consider outcomes as well as probability.

This curious inversion of strategic logic contradicts the first principle of risk management, namely that the consequences of an action must be carefully weighed against the probability of its occurrence. To argue that a highly unlikely event should command the lion’s share of an organisation’s resources or be the principal focus of its attention would not get past first base in the political or corporate world. It is certainly not the basis for a
sensible defence strategy given the diversity and immediacy of the security challenges now confronting the ADF. One could also question the wisdom and utility of capability based planning where strategy and force structure is developed in response to hypothetical and generalised threat typologies. This might have made sense in the benign 1980s when there were few visible storm clouds on Australia’s strategic horizons. But there are enough dangers in evidence today, many of them on our own doorstep, to predicate our defence strategy on real threats rather than imagined ones.

Furthermore, the assumption that a conventional military attack on Australia is necessarily the most serious security threat Australia could face, justifying placing most of our defence assets in the DOA basket, is fallacious. As the Japanese discovered in World War II, deploying a credible military force to Australia’s neighbourhood and sustaining it for any length of time would be an immense undertaking and beyond the capability of any state other than the US. This leaves only second order contingencies for the ADF to defend against of the kind identified in the Dibb Review. None of these, by definition, would be catastrophic or grave in the sense that they would threaten the survival of the state or necessarily result in large numbers of casualties. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), on the other hand, could wreak extremely high levels of death and destruction and this threat has become far more acute because such weapons may now be in the hands of terrorists. However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the WMD threat in our white papers in the mistaken belief that Australia is either largely quarantined from such attacks or else impotent to defend against them.

So who is going to attack Australia? Traditionalists tend to dance around this question without actually answering it. Sometimes they indulge in blatant threat inflation or suggest, more subtly, that a general deterioration in the regional security environment and growing levels of military capability could translate into a specific military threat to Australia. The alleged ‘arc of crisis’ to Australia’s north has been a convenient peg to hang arguments for increased military spending or to endorse a strategic posture that bears little or no relationship to the region’s underlying problems which are overwhelmingly economic, social and environmental. Often such notional threats are devoid of any plausible political context. A prime example is the assertion that a major power could lodge in the archipelago to our north and threaten Australia militarily from bases established there. But there is no accompanying explanation as to how this could occur without precipitating a major regional conflagration or drawing a countervailing US response.
Of course it is easier to invoke threats rather than dismiss them since there is always some prospect that they could materialise, if not now, then at some unspecified point in the future. However, like insurance brokers and political leaders, defence planners must gauge the probability of real dangers arising and not conjure up remote threat scenarios. To do otherwise makes a mockery of the strategic planning process and begs the question of why we have expensive, well-resourced intelligence agencies whose business it is to appraise risk. Divining the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries are the keys to assessing strategic risk. So, using these as our yardsticks, which states might conceivably threaten Australia militarily over the next decade and a half, the generally accepted time frame for long-term strategic planning? According to DOA theology, only a major power or neighbour would have the motivation and the capability. If fellow democracies and alliance partners, the US and Japan, are ruled out along with a weakened Russia, this leaves only India, Indonesia and China as genuine contenders.

Although India has occasionally featured in Australian threat assessments, notably during the late 1980s when the Indian Navy embarked on a short-lived and ill-fated expansion program, it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which India might contemplate military action against Australia. There are no deep-seated ideological differences, territorial disputes or historical grievances between us. On the other hand, there are many ties that bind, not least of which are a shared colonial heritage, common democratic institutions, membership of the Commonwealth and burgeoning trade links. Even if one could imagine a situation in which Australia-India strategic competition resulted in an outbreak of military hostilities, India does not have anything like the requisite power projection capability to seriously endanger Australia’s territory, trade routes or sea lines of communication. And it could not acquire the capability for at least a decade, even under the most pessimistic set of threat assumptions.

What about Indonesia? If bilateral relations were to deteriorate over Papua or East Timor, Jakarta might contemplate military action against Australian territory or the interdiction of trade routes passing through the archipelago that carry vital Australian exports to Northeast Asia. There have been several periods of acute tension in the past that, on two separate occasions, have led to confrontation between Indonesian and Australian troops in Borneo (1964-65) and East Timor (1999). And it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a hostile government could come to power in Jakarta intent on creating problems for Australia. Nevertheless, the probability of major military conflict between Australia and Indonesia must
be rated as extremely low. Even during the worst months of the East Timor imbroglio in late 1999, the channels of communication between Canberra and Jakarta were sufficiently well established to avoid serious clashes. Both countries accept that they would have much to lose politically and commercially because of their growing interdependence. The failure of Islamists in August 2002 to amend the constitution and allow the implementation of sharia law suggests that Indonesia will remain a moderate, secular state, albeit one prone to periodic bouts of domestic violence, lawlessness and Islamic militancy.

Those who argue that Indonesia represents a military threat to Australia ignore the parlous state of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Only about 35,000 troops in the 230,000-strong Army are capable of effective combat operations and TNI has a minimal and declining ability to operate beyond its borders because of the moribund state of the navy and air force. The Chief of the Indonesian Navy admitted, in July 2002, that none of his 113 ships were fit to fight, while another senior naval officer conceded that the Indonesian Navy was having extreme difficulty in maintaining enough ships on station to combat pirates due to the vessels’ age and condition. The Air Force is in little better shape operating under severe financial constraints with largely obsolescent aircraft. Out of a total of 222 aircraft only 93 are able to fly and one third of Indonesia’s air defence radars are not fully functional. The reality is that weak states, like Indonesia, do not have the resources to mount invasions or cut trade routes. They pose security problems of an altogether different kind in the form of internal instability and the proliferation of low intensity conflicts that may spill over and draw in Australians as peace makers and peace keepers. They also provide a favourable environment for terrorist and criminal activities that may necessitate an ADF response, but of a far different kind to that envisaged by our current strategy.

Indonesia aside, it is the middle-kingdom which casts the deepest shadow over Australia’s encircling moat, or so traditionalists would have us believe. Scratch the surface of Australia’s defence community and it is not hard to elicit concerns about China’s rising power, the acquisition of a blue water fleet and the purchase of advanced fighter aircraft and military technology from Russia. But why would China want to assault Australia militarily? More than two decades after senior leader Deng Xiaoping began the process of transforming China from a revisionist to a status quo power, Beijing is now a fully paid up member of the capitalist community, notwithstanding occasional rhetorical genuflections to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. China would have much to lose from any attempt to threaten
Australia, given our increasing importance as a trading partner and source of raw materials. Despatching the PLA to the sea-air gap would fundamentally challenge the existing balance of power, virtually guaranteeing a US military response as well as inviting global condemnation that would severely damage China’s international standing.

However, the real weakness of the China threat argument is that the PLA could neither deploy substantial forces to the archipelago in the timeframe under consideration nor sustain them for any length of time. To do so would require the construction of a blue water navy replete with the aircraft carriers necessary to provide air cover for amphibious forces. China could not acquire such a capability within the next decade. Currently, the PLA’s SU-27 fighter aircraft only have a loiter time of 30 minutes over the Spratly Islands from forward bases on the mainland. Even the acquisition of more capable SU-30s and aerial refuelling would not allow the Chinese Air Force to support naval and ground forces over northern Australia on a continuous basis.27

**What wars will we fight?**

None of this is to argue that Australia faces no military threats, only that those customarily posited are short on analysis and long on hypothesis. So what kind of wars will the ADF have to fight? It is commonly assumed that the ADF will be pitted against the armed forces of another state that are organised, equipped and trained to fight conventional wars. But such wars are increasingly unlikely. Iraq is the exception, not the rule. The massed tank battles seen in the final stages of the Gulf War was the last punctuation of a military era that began with the First World War and ended in the final triumph of the US military machine which now commands decisive battlefield superiority over all other states.28 More than a decade ago, the Israeli military historian, Martin Van Creveld, forecast that conventional military wars between the regular, armed forces of sovereign states would decline in frequency and duration while low intensity conflict within states conducted by warlords, criminals, insurgents, militias, terrorists and paramilitary groups would increase.29 He surmised that such conflicts were most likely to occur in the developing world. These predictions have been dramatically borne out in the decade since Van Creveld audaciously challenged the Clausewitzian universe.30

Separatism, ethnic struggles, guerrilla insurgencies, armed criminal challenges to the state and terrorism are today more frequent than interstate war and the security consequences no less severe.31 On the other hand, major wars between states over territory, ideology and power-balancing are
declining in frequency and magnitude. This is so because the incentives for resolving disputes or acquiring wealth through military force have diminished in post-modern societies while the disincentives have increased enormously.32 Countries fully integrated into global capital markets are unwilling to risk the economic disruptions that war inevitably brings, casualty aversion is rife and the pool of military recruits is dwindling. Global norms are changing too, making it more difficult to prosecute wars without incurring international opprobrium or inviting sanctions. Poorer, less developed states are preoccupied with the problems of governance and national survival. The Cold War era of proxy wars has passed into history. Without superpower patrons, developing states seldom have the means to fund expensive wars with neighbours.

The figures bear testimony to this shift. Of the 120 armed conflicts fought during the Cold War, most were between states and eleven accounted for more than 200,000 casualties each. By contrast, the great bulk of those recorded since 1989 have been internal, a trend that has intensified in recent years. Of the 15 deadliest conflicts globally in 2001 (those that caused 100 or more deaths), all were intrastate and 11 spilled over borders to destabilise neighbouring states.33 Australia’s own experience is illustrative. The ADF has repeatedly been deployed on international peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions that bear little resemblance to the kinds of wars anticipated or deemed worthy of serious consideration by a generation of Australian defence planners. There is, in fact, a worrying disjuncture between their fixation with war between states and the rise in intrastate conflict globally, especially in our own region.34

Moreover, organised violence is no longer the exclusive preserve of states. Some non-state actors have at their disposal resources and influence that may equal, or even exceed, those of many states. Many are neither benign nor reluctant to use force. The internationalisation of crime and the criminalisation of war have become key strategic issues underlining the complexity of the transnational challenge to security. The borderless world in which transnational criminal organisations operate offers numerous opportunities for the acquisition of illicit wealth. Based on its narcotics revenue alone, the Italian mafia is estimated to be richer than 150 sovereign states, while the Chinese triads and Japanese yakuza make profits that would be the envy of most large multinationals.35 War has been criminalised in many parts of the world including in the Asia-Pacific where transnational criminal groups have demonstrated a penchant for high levels of violence and a capacity for military action rivalling that of national defence forces.
In Burma, for example, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), dominates the Asian heroin and amphetamine trade and provides the military muscle and protection for the drug caravans that ply their trade in the tri-border region of Burma, Thailand and Laos. Its 15,000 to 20,000 troops are well armed and equipped with mortars, heavy machine-guns and Russian made SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, which makes the UWSA a formidable military force by any standard and arguably the most potent narco-insurgency in the region. In the Philippines, the criminal excesses of the Abu Sayyaf have fuelled Mindanao’s entrenched ethno-religious conflicts. Among the island states of the Pacific, random criminal violence as well as the activities of organised criminal gangs have become the principal threats to national and regional security.

Over all this hangs the menacing cloud of international terrorism and what Christian Reus-Smit calls “the revisionist violence of anti-systemic movements.” One does not have to see the attack of 11 September 2001 as a paradigm shift in international relations to acknowledge that the new age of terrorism has major implications for Australia’s national security and defence strategy. The reasons are threefold. First, 11 September and its aftermath demonstrated the global reach of al Qa’ida and its capacity to forge transnational, strategic alliances with like-minded groups far from the organisation’s home base in Afghanistan. Operating like a modern, transnational corporation al Qa’ida recruits from, or cooperates with, established indigenous movements that share common goals, values and ideology. In Southeast Asia, al Qa’ida networks with Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines; Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia; the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) and the now infamous Jemaah Islamiyah which has clandestine cells across the region. The existence of these extensive terror networks is historically unprecedented. While European anarchists and pre-modern terrorists occasionally joined together in common cause, their capacity for coordinated, international action was considerably less than that of al Qa’ida.

Second, today’s terrorists are far more likely to obtain and use WMD to achieve their political aims. While their capacity to wreak destruction does not yet compare with that of the Cold War when the world lived with the constant threat of nuclear war, terrorists are much more likely than states to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In effect, terrorists have lowered the WMD threshold, exploiting the dark side of technology to turn plough-shares into weapons and threatening what Neil Livingstone has labelled “mega-death.” In their 1993 attack on the Japanese subway system, the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) group demonstrated an impressive
capability to weaponise virulent biological agents. Other terrorist groups will seek to emulate them, perhaps aided and abetted by rogue states. Thus, contemporary terrorism can be distinguished from its historical antecedents by the magnitude of its effect as well as global reach.

Third, while terrorists and criminals have demonstrated an impressive and sometimes lethal capacity to perpetrate violence, they seldom do so in conventional ways. They have no armoured divisions, aircraft carriers or squadrons of advanced fighter aircraft at their disposal. But they fight asymmetrically, using surprise, deception, detailed planning, networking and the selected use of advanced technology as well as cruder instruments of violence to combat the generally superior firepower at the disposal of the states they seek to undermine. These are the classical techniques of guerrilla warfare adapted to the urban jungles of first and third world states. However, the prospect of the ADF having to engage in urban warfare barely rates a mention in the white paper although it is now exercising the collective minds of the best strategists in the US and Europe. This is despite the fact that Australia is one of the most urbanised countries in the world and other regional states are rapidly proceeding down the same path. In 1990, for example, 30 percent of Indonesians lived in large cities. By 2025, however, this will double to 60 percent. In fact, the vast majority of the region’s population will soon be living in urban agglomerations, which is a change of historic proportions for previously rural, agrarian Asia.

Of course, asymmetric wars will not only be fought by terrorists and criminals. Other armed groups, who inhabit the lower reaches of the threat spectrum, will fight hybrid forms of warfare where modern, conventional weapons systems may be of limited use. Somalia is perhaps the pre-eminent example of a conflict in which overwhelming US firepower was blunted by a canny warlord’s effective use of urban warfare and superior local knowledge to force a humiliating withdrawal. Mohammed Farah Aidid was also adept in the art of information warfare, allowing his jubilant followers to drag the defiled bodies of dead US special forces personnel through the streets of Mogadishu in front of a CNN camera, thereby turning a military defeat into a stunning political victory. Somalia, as James Adams has written, “was a salutary lesson for the military in the limitations of modern warfare.”

Experienced professionals, like General Charles Krulak of the US Marine Corps, believe that future wars may be the step-child of Somalia and Chechnya rather than the son of Desert Storm. Certainly, Australia’s own experience suggests that we should give a far higher priority to the very real possibility that future wars may have more in common with the tribalism...
and anarchic savagery of the Middle Ages than the structured conflicts of the Cold War. For conventionally armed and organised defence forces, like the ADF, the difficulty of responding to asymmetric threats is compounded by the need to retain capabilities to fight pre-modern as well as post-modern conflicts. The US Marine Corps has explicitly recognised the increasingly hybrid nature of contemporary conflict by conceptualising the notion of ‘three-block war’. Thus, “in one city block, a Marine will provide food, care and comfort to an emaciated child. In the next block you will see this Marine with outstretched arms, separating two warring tribes. Then, in a third city block, this same Marine will engage in intense house-to-house fighting with hostile forces.”

Three-block war is a far more realistic characterisation of the ADF’s future operational environment than the threat scenarios that underpin DOA. We sometimes forget that nearly 80 percent of the world’s people live in pre-industrial, marginalised societies that are prone to violence and endemic conflict. For both the US Marine Corps and the ADF, dealing with messy, chaotic third world conflicts involving peace-keeping and nation-building tasks is the real challenge ahead.

Our commitment to Somalia was very much in this vein as was East Timor, where the ADF was confronted by a rag tag band of anti-independence militia supported by elements of the Indonesian armed forces. However, East Timor was not in the script of any white paper, nor did it fit the preconceptions of our maritime strategy. In East Timor, Australia was forced to deploy, at very short notice, nearly half the Army’s combat force in a conflict where the enemy bore more than a passing resemblance to Aidid’s rapacious irregulars. The requirement was for boots on the ground, but the boots were in sore need of repair - not only boots but also many other basic military items. Camouflage suits, night vision goggles and water purification plants all had to be borrowed from the Americans as they were in such short supply.

But East Timor showed up far more serious flaws in our force structure and strategy. It is not generally appreciated what a near run thing East Timor was for our $14 billion dollar defence force. The ADF only just managed the INTERFET commitment because the government made the prudent decision to increase the size of the severely depleted Army by two battalions, and we were able to cannibalise other units to make up the numbers and provide our soldiers with the right equipment and support. Other serious deficiencies were directly attributable to an inflexible and increasingly out of touch strategy that privileges high-end warfare and pays insufficient attention to the force structure implications of intervening in internal conflicts within our region and beyond. It is true that some of the
deficiencies identified after East Timor are now being addressed. $3.9 billion of new capabilities are being allocated to the land force over the course of this decade and the 2000 White Paper belatedly acknowledges that the maritime strategy includes “a vital and central role for the land forces.” 48 But there has been no serious attempt to flesh out this new role or articulate in convincing fashion how the ADF’s repeated overseas deployments are consistent with a defensive maritime strategy. 49 And there is little sign of a willingness to make changes to a force structure that is still heavily reliant on expensive sea and air assets that cannot be easily adapted to contingencies other than DOA, despite claims to the contrary.

Core tasks – what should the ADF do?

A third problem is the inability of DOA to accommodate the plethora of new human security, border protection and constabulary tasks that have been levied on the ADF in recent years. Defence Minister Robert Hill’s list is instructive. “We have peace-keepers and monitors in East Timor and Bougainville. We have ground, air and naval forces in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf engaged in coalition operations against terrorism. Our warships are involved in surveillance and protection of Australia’s borders, intercepting boats carrying would-be illegal entrants in our northern waters and illegal fishing vessels in the storm-tossed Southern Ocean.” 50 Hill’s list is far from exhaustive. Other ADF tasks include Service Assisted Evacuation (SAE), Service Protected Evacuation (SPE), Special Recovery Operations (SRO), assistance in domestic crisis situations, international disaster relief and enforcement of international law as well as arms control and support of Australia’s humanitarian obligations. In aggregate, these new duties, none of which fit easily within the DOA mind set, now account for the majority of the ADF’s operational tasks. 51

Hill’s comments raise the obvious question of how much further the DOA strategy can be stretched to reconcile this diverse agenda before it completely loses conceptual shape under the stresses of its internal contradictions. Defenders of the status quo continue to aver that a force designed to defend Australia and organised for conventional war-fighting can adapt to the demands of the new agenda, including peace-keeping and military operations other than war (MOOTW). 52 Furthermore, there is a marked reluctance to accept that transnational threats to security – often misleadingly referred to as ‘soft’ security issues - have any relevance for the ADF’s structure, doctrine or training. Traditionalists tend to pose this dichotomy as a stark choice between structuring for ‘high end capabilities’ or the new security challenges implying that the ADF cannot do both without fatal compromises which would result in an ADF less able to prosecute
conventional war and meet the new security challenges. Reconfiguring the ADF for transnational threats, in their view, would effectively “downgrade” the Force, shift the regional balance and weaken Australia’s security.

Such thinking reveals a worrying inability to comprehend the way in which defence forces are being transformed by the new strategic agenda and underlines a fourth problem - a reluctance to recognise that transnational threats have moved along the threat continuum towards the traditional concerns of the ADF. Elsewhere in the world, Cold War notions of war fighting and winning military victories are giving way to a more sophisticated appreciation of what Basil Liddell Hart, the pre-eminent strategist of his era, has called the “art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy.” The central purpose of the military in the 21st century is not merely the application of lethal force. This is old thinking. Modern defence forces have to win the peace as well as prepare for war. The two are not the same. Winning the peace means that military personnel at all levels must be able to master the cultural, economic and political dimensions of a conflict and be discriminating in their use of lethal force.

Peace-keeping is a pertinent example. In 2001, there were some 51 multinational peace operations conducted around the globe and the ADF was involved in many of them. Indeed, complex peace operations encompassing peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building are now, by any objective measure, a major ADF activity. Yet the architects of strategic policy doggedly refuse to accept that complex peace operations are a core task for the ADF or that they should shape, in any way, the capabilities of the force. Thus, while the 2000 White Paper notes the requirement to participate in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions, it is careful to add the caveat that such roles ought “not to detract from the ADF’s core function of defending Australia from armed attack”. ‘Structured for war but adapted for peace’ is the often heard refrain from those who regard peace-keeping as a derivative or secondary task.

Traditionalists fear that shaping the military for peace operations will dull the sword and reduce the ADF’s war fighting capabilities. Similar attitudes permeate the US armed forces which, like the ADF, has historically privileged the warrior ethos. One senior US military officer was once famously heard to remark, “Real men don’t do MOOTW [military operations other than war].” Unfortunately, these sentiments betray a fundamental misappreciation of the place and importance of complex peace operations in conflict prevention and post-war reconstruction and nation building.
Peace operations are an integral part of a modern defence forces repertoire of core competencies enhancing, rather than degrading, war-fighting skills and capabilities since they are intrinsic to the task. This was a key finding of an eminent panel of 22 senior US military leaders which numbered among them Generals Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf and seven other four star commanders, who unanimously rejected the criticism that peace operations dangerously compromise war-fighting capability.62

So the choice is not between structuring for war or peace-keeping, as traditionalists falsely assume. The defence forces of the 21st century must be structured for both, but they cannot be effective peace keepers and peace enforcers if they do not specifically train for these tasks or possess the appropriate support and equipment. Similarly, if governments decide to use the ADF for non-military tasks such as operations against people smugglers, drug traffickers and illegal fishing vessels on a regular and continuing basis, then at some point changes to force structure and training will become inevitable. Ad hoc responses lead to sub-optimal performance and operational over-stretch, endangering lives and jeopardising mission objectives.

What others are doing

The inertia and complacency of much of what passes for strategic thinking in this country is strikingly evident when compared with our traditional benchmark countries, the UK, Canada and the US.63 Recent British strategic reviews and white papers unequivocally accept the need for transformation and changes to force structure. The watershed 1998 Defence Review, the most important for 30 years, articulated a post-Cold War middle power strategy based on a leaner, more mobile force specifically equipped and trained for distant operations, including peace-keeping. As described by the then Defence Secretary, George Robertson, British forces must be prepared “to go to the crisis rather than have the crisis come to us.”64 The UK has also identified a need for rapidly deployable reaction forces, in part to deal with terrorists and other emerging threats that “attack our way of life”, which may need to be despatched further afield and more frequently than had previously been envisaged.65

Canada has responded in a similar fashion to the UK. Driven by mission creep, a historically high tempo of operations and the demands of deploying 4,000 Canadians on a variety of complex, international operations, Ottawa is moving towards a more adaptable, multi-purpose force that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad. The Canadian military is working to develop “globally deployable combat capable forces” that can operate
effectively in multi-national coalitions. Canadian defence planning emphasises the protection and promotion of national interests and values rather than direct threats to the country’s well being and sovereignty. There is explicit recognition of the need for changes to the status quo in light of the dramatically altered strategic landscape, as well as a refreshing willingness to acknowledge the deficiencies of earlier white papers in not anticipating the higher tempo of operations and force projection requirements.

Even the US military has begun to recognise that while the great majority of its resources are still devoted to fighting against a symmetrical foe, it is increasingly unlikely that any adversary will seek to challenge the US with symmetrical force. This is a seminal change in thinking that has direct implications for the ADF. Those who doubt the cathartic effect of 11 September on the US defence establishment would do well to read a briefing given to the Washington press corps by US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, in June 2002. Rumsfeld made it abundantly clear that the war against terrorism is forcing the US to make substantial adjustments to its budget, organisation, acquisition programs and strategy. The US defence establishment, he said, was organised, trained and equipped to fight armies, navies and air forces but the problem is that global terrorist networks do not have armies, navies and air forces. “It's a totally different ball game.”

If the future is coalition operations with the US against asymmetrical foes in defence of regional and global order, then the lesson for Australia is that we need to acquire capabilities that are suited to this undertaking. Australian traditionalists are highly selective in the way they benchmark against the US military, extolling the virtues of interoperability at the high end of the conflict spectrum rather than looking at ways in which Australia can complement US military strengths in low intensity conflicts and peace operations. Of course, there is no immutable strategic logic which dictates that Australia must automatically follow the British, Canadian and American lead. To do so blindly would be folly and an abrogation of our responsibility to shape a force structured for Australia’s strategic environment and circumstances.

Equally, however, it would be a mistake to regard Australia’s security challenges as somehow unique or markedly different from those of our friends and allies. In fact, the probability of the ADF being deployed on complex peace-keeping, nation-building and low intensity warfare tasks is arguably greater because we live in a part of the world where failed states, weak states and hostile non-state actors are an integral part of the strategic landscape. Virtually all Western defence forces have accepted the reality that they must become smaller, multi-skilled, less platform oriented and
able to deploy highly capable forces, quickly over long distances, sometimes to the far corners of the globe. Yet while others transform for the conflicts of the future we, for the most part, remain wedded to strategic concepts that have long past their use by date.

**Transforming the ADF**

The key lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that the ADF is not optimally configured or trained for today’s conflicts, let alone for those of tomorrow. It is axiomatic that the ADF should be able to defend Australia against military attack. But DOA is too narrowly conceived and disconnected from the security challenges of the contemporary world to provide the necessary strategic guidance for an ADF in urgent need of transformation. No amount of ‘adaptation’ or creative language in official documents can disguise this failing. What is required is a defence strategy and posture that conceives war as more than just a state activity waged for clearly defined political, territorial or ideological purposes. As Mary Kaldor has written, the new wars are about identity politics rather than classical geo-politics. The contest is increasingly between those who support cosmopolitan, inclusive societies based on tolerance and freedom of expression, and those who favour particularist and exclusive identities characteristic of closed societies.\(^7\) Furthermore, transnational threats are arising that cannot be defeated by force of arms and cannot be located at a particular place or point in time.

It would be a mistake to characterise this call for strategic renewal as merely the latest incarnation of the long-standing debate between proponents of forward defence and continental defence. These tired old shibboleths reflect the linear thinking of a bygone era and shed little light on the essential defence and security problems for Australia in the 21\(^{st}\) century. Deploying force beyond our immediate neighbourhood is perfectly consistent with the defence of Australia’s vital interests and should not be construed as fighting someone else’s war or developing a costly, expeditionary force. In an interconnected world the ADF cannot be designed to defend a fictional moat by pulling up the drawbridge of fortress Australia when a threat suddenly materialises, for modern war is waged on a global battlefield and our enemies may already be within the castle keep. Nor can we afford the luxury of building a superstructure to withstand the once in a hundred year flood – a major military attack - as DOA advocates imply. Other, more effective mitigation strategies are available and the opportunity costs are simply too high given that the ADF is confronted by a multiplicity of here and now problems that are not being adequately addressed.
Transformation should not be seen as a prescription for radical change. There is much that we are doing right and a legacy force cannot be reconfigured overnight. It is worth recalling that the Blitzkrieg unleashed on Europe in 1939 to such devastating effect was accomplished by only a 13 percent transformed German Army. Transformation does not necessarily mean acquiring new capabilities. It can be achieved by “new ways of arranging, connecting, and using existing capabilities.” Nor does it mandate increased defence spending. Significant transformation can be achieved through a modest reordering of priorities and adjustments to existing programs. Since future conflicts will still require some high-end capabilities, Australia must retain a robust capacity for conventional war fighting whether in our own region or further afield. However, we have been slow to recognise that the ADF must also be capable of combating the irregular, low intensity conflicts that now predominate and to counter post-modern, hybrid threats which require a different repertoire of military skills to those of the Cold War.

A force designed for state-on-state conflict will struggle to manage the multifarious security challenges posed by neo-nationalist guerrilla movements, terrorists, new age mercenaries, pirates, people smugglers and global crime syndicates. The rhetorical acknowledgment of this wider strategic agenda in our white papers is superficial, lacks conviction and is belied by an obvious reluctance to consider changes to the ADF’s capabilities and training. Too often, the architects of strategic policy seem to regard force structure as written in stone, inviolable and sacrosanct. But such inflexibility is the antithesis of good strategy which results from measuring risk against probability and cost to determine capability.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to articulate a detailed force structure for the ADF which is properly the duty and prerogative of government. But its essential features can be charted. First, the ADF must possess a greater capacity for strategic reach and off-shore deployments beyond the confines of our immediate neighbourhood in support of Australia’s wider security interests. This includes defence of a stable, international system underpinned by what French President, Jacques Chirac, has characterised as “a few principles and a little order.” Forces earmarked for this role do not have to be large or necessarily able to operate independently, as they will almost certainly work in coalition with others, especially the US. Since the ‘core martial competency’ of the US military is global power projection, Washington should be asked to provide the heavy lift, superior battlefield knowledge and lethal firepower for more distant operations. For its part, the ADF needs to acquire more high-value, niche capabilities and additional
land forces equipped for a wide range of contingencies across the threat spectrum that can be despatched rapidly, with adequate force protection, sustainment and command and control.

Second, the ADF must be trained and configured for multi-faceted tasks, not just the defence of Australia from conventional military attack. Complex peace operations, counter terrorism, defence against WMD and designated non-military threats should be treated as core missions, not dismissed as secondary or lower order responsibilities. Hybrid threats encompass a wide spectrum of risks, so the ADF needs to be a far more agile, flexible, mobile, multi-skilled and innovative organisation than in the past. Cultural change is imperative along with a recognition that traditional war-fighting is only one part of the conflict spectrum to be mastered; that peace operations are often far from peaceful; and the ADF must prepare its personnel to be humanitarians and peace keepers as well as warriors.77 Greater emphasis should be given to littoral operations, urban warfare and countering asymmetric threats, especially from the plethora of non-state actors who are crowding onto the international security agenda.78

Third, while technological superiority is essential to the knowledge edge, it must be usable and appropriate, for the new wars as well as the old. Unfortunately, some of our existing systems fail this crucial test. Too much of the defence budget and our national treasure are spent on capabilities that lack versatility or are prohibitively expensive to maintain and run. The future is lower cost, modular, multi-purpose platforms equipped with miniaturised missiles and drones, lethal microbots and ‘dial-a-yield’ munitions supported by integrated C4ISR and real time sensor to shooter architecture.79 In the meantime, however, we have to manage the transition from the legacy force to one better structured for a world in which there may be no clear-cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organised violence, terror, crime and war. This is the real challenge for our defence planners and it is one they cannot afford to fail.

Notes

1 A revised version of this paper appeared as ‘Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence’ in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.57, no.1, April 2003, pp.55-76.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


12 The ‘inner arc’ refers to Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the small Pacific islands that encircle Australia to the northeast. The term made its first official appearance in the 1997 Strategic Review.

13 In 1904, Halford Mackinder delivered a seminal paper to the Royal Geographic Society in London arguing that European civilisation had been shaped by the struggle to repel a succession of Asiatic invasions. His conceptualisation of a pivot area, comprising central Asia, adjacent to an “inner crescent” of nations accessible by sea power privileged geography as the determining factor in world politics. But, like other geographical determinists, he neglected to make allowances for technological advances and the power of ideology. Osama bin Laden needs no introduction.

14 They include the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan to name a few.


19 In the wake of the coup, the ADF had considerable difficulty in assembling and deploying a task force to Fiji. Yet the weaknesses in helicopter and logistics capabilities identified at the time had still not been fully addressed a decade later. See Matthew Gubb, ‘The Australian Military Response to the Fiji Coup: An Assessment’, Working Paper No.171, Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, November 1988.


21 Thus, Paul Dibb asserts that “even if the risk of any armed attack on Australia is low, the consequences of misjudging it would be serious.” Paul Dibb, ‘Tinker with defence policy and risk attack’, The Australian, 30 October 2001, p.13. In similar vein, Hugh White avers that we should “eschew the superficial plausibility of the idea that we should give highest priority to the most probable outcomes.” Hugh White, ‘Australian defence policy and the possibility of war’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56 (2), July 2002, p.259.

22 In 1942, the General Staff of the Japanese Imperial Army estimated that it would require 12 fully equipped infantry divisions and 1.5 million tons of shipping for the Army alone to invade Australia which was assessed as a “reckless adventure” and “beyond Japan’s capability.” Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia’s Security: Their Nature and Probability Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981, Annex C, p.62.


24 The closest approximation in the Indonesian Army to our regular Army are the two divisions plus of the Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD). Along with the Special Forces (KOPASSUS), they are the only troops in the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) trained for modern warfare. However, KOSTRAD has virtually no organic logistic capability which severely restricts its capability to deploy overseas. For an excellent analysis of the structure and functions of TNI see Bob Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996, especially pp.85-115.


30 Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is widely considered to be the first modern strategist and one of the leading exponents of the view that war is rational, national and instrumental. He is best known for his dictum that “war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means.” Ken Booth, ‘The Evolution of Strategic Thinking’ in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975, pp.23-25.


34 Not only have interstate wars become relatively rare but internal conflicts have on the whole been much bloodier, featuring great ‘collateral damage’ to civilian populations caught up in the fighting or its immediate aftermath. Nearly 90 per cent of war-related casualties during the 1990s were civilian: Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch, *To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict*, PRIO Report 1/99 International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1999, pp. 7, 13–15.


38 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Lost at Sea: Australia in the Turbulence of World Politics’, *Working Paper* 2002/4, July 2002, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra,
Terrorists can be located within the broader phenomenon of groups who through violence and political organisation seek the dissolution of states, regime change or broader systemic ‘renewal’.

39 Jemaah Islamiyah’s links with al Qa’ida, and its home grown roots, notably through the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia (named after a religious school in Central Java), are well documented in ICG Asia Briefing, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia*, Jakarta, 8 August 2002.


43 In an abortive US special forces mission to capture Aidid and his senior leadership, 18 Americans lost their lives and 84 were wounded. Somali dead numbered 312 with 814 wounded, a kill ratio which would normally be considered a crushing victory. Brian Adams, *The Next World War: The Warriors And Weapons Of The New Battlefields In Cyberspace*, London: Hutchinson, Random House, 1998, pp.71-72.


46 Given its comparable size and tasks, the ADF is best compared with the US Marine Corps rather than the much larger and globally oriented US Army, Navy and Air Force.

47 This analysis is based on interviews of ADF officers with direct knowledge of Army deficiencies prior to and during the Interfet deployment to East Timor.


51 In SAE, the ADF would contribute specialists like air traffic controllers and military police to an essentially civilian operation, whereas in SPEs the ADF would provide the bulk of the resources. SROs would normally be carried out by special forces. The best treatment of the ADF’s new human security, border protection and constabulary tasks is Ian Wing, *Australian Defence In Transition: Responding To New Security Challenges*, Canberra: Australian Defence Force.

52 Paul Dibb, for one, believes the ADF has “demonstrated that forces structured for the defence of Australia and its approaches can meet all the tasks asked of it by the government”. Dibb, ‘Tinker with defence policy and risk attack’, p.13.

53 White, ‘Australian defence policy and the possibility of war’, p. 256.


58 Complex peace operations is a term that denotes any combination of peace-keeping, peace-enforcement or peace-building activities aimed at preventing or minimising conflict and promoting stability, especially in weak or failed states. It refers to operations governed by Chapters VI (pacific), VII (using all necessary means) and VIII (regional arrangements) of the United Nation’s Charter.


60 When Canada controversially amalgamated the three single services and began to focus on peace-keeping, Australian critics were quick to dismiss the Canadian Forces (CF) as a viable combat force and warned of the fate that would befall the ADF should it attempt to emulate the CF.


63 US and UK defence planners seem far more amenable to using and encouraging cutting edge strategic research, including that produced by civilian and military think tanks.

The exceptions might be China in the Taiwan Straits or a desperate North Korean regime in a last throw of the strategic dice. But such conflicts would be local, rather than global, and neither China nor North Korea could hope to prevail in a direct military confrontation with the US.
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