BURMA'S MUSLIMS: Terrorists or Terrorised?

Andrew Selth

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ABSTRACT

Burma’s importance in world affairs has long derived from its critical geo-strategic position. Another factor now attracting the interest of Western scholars and officials is Burma’s large Muslim population. Usually overlooked in surveys of Islam in the Asia-Pacific region, Burma’s Muslims have long suffered from discrimination, and harsh treatment at the hands of the country’s military government. This has prompted the creation of several armed insurgent groups. The increased attention now being paid to the Muslim community in Burma, however, is mainly due to its growing international connections, which in the case of one insurgent group at least includes direct links to pan-Islamic extremist organisations. While the relationships between some Burmese Muslims and international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah have often been exaggerated, and at times even deliberately misrepresented, they are likely to attract even greater interest from the US government and its allies. In this regard, the global war against terrorism launched in 2001 has become both a burden and an opportunity for the Rangoon regime.
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After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988, Burma's name was officially changed from its post-1974 form, the 'Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma', back to the 'Union of Burma', which had been adopted when Burma regained its independence from the United Kingdom in January 1948. In July 1989 the military government changed the country's name once again, this time to Pyidaungsu Myanmar Naing-Ngan, or the 'Union of Myanmar'. At the same time, a number of other place names were changed to conform more closely to their original Burmese pronunciation. These new names were subsequently accepted by the United Nations and most other major international organisations. Some governments and opposition groups, however, have clung to the old forms as a protest against the military regime's continuing human rights abuses and its refusal to hand over power to the civilian government elected in 1990.

In this study the better known names, for example Burma instead of Myanmar, and Rangoon instead of Yangon, have been retained for ease of recognition. Formal titles such as the Myanmar Police Force, however, have been used as appropriate to describe organisations created (or re-named) since 1988. Quotations and references have been cited as they were originally published.

Andrew Selth is the author of five books on international terrorism and contemporary Burma, including Against Every Human Law: The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy (Australian National University Press, Sydney, 1988) and Burma's Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (EastBridge, Norwalk, 2002). This paper represents the author's views alone. It has been drawn entirely from open sources, and has no official status or endorsement.
BURMA’S MUSLIMS: TERRORISTS OR TERRORISED?

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Introduction

Burma’s importance in world affairs has long derived from its critical geo-strategic position, but there is now another factor that is attracting the interest of Western scholars and officials. This is Burma’s large Muslim population. Usually overlooked in surveys of Islam in the Asia-Pacific region, Burma’s Muslims are now being accorded greater attention. This is partly because of the harsh treatment they are receiving at the hands of the country’s military government. It is also due, however, to their growing international connections, which in one case at least includes links to pan-Islamic extremist groups. In this regard, the global war against terrorism has become both a burden and an opportunity for the Rangoon regime.

Burma and Geopolitics

Burma is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia. It lies between the nuclear-armed giants of India and China, and at the crossroads of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. In Samuel Huntington’s terms, Burma also lies across the fault lines of the Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian civilisations. As a result, it has endured centuries of unwelcome attention from both its neighbours and foreign empires, including several invasions. During the Second World War it became a major theatre of operations. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Burma (now officially known as the Union of Myanmar) retreated into xenophobia and isolationism, and was largely ignored by the major powers. However, it re-emerged onto the world stage in 1988, when the Burmese armed forces (or Tatmadaw) ruthlessly crushed a massive pro-democracy uprising and took back direct political power. Immediately ostracised by a large segment of the international community, and faced with a range of economic sanctions, the new military government in Rangoon (dubbed the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC) abandoned decades of neutralism and started to develop strong ties with China.

Over the past 15 years, Burma’s relations with China have grown rapidly. Beijing is now Rangoon’s major arms supplier, selling its southern neighbour fighter, ground attack and transport aircraft, missile armed patrol boats,
armoured vehicles and artillery, and a wide range of other military equipment.\(^4\) China has also provided Burma with capital, aid and technical assistance, to develop both its civil and military infrastructure. So close did bilateral relations become that, in 1997, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) invited Burma to join the regional grouping. ASEAN members felt the need to re-focus Burma’s attention on their part of the world, lest the Rangoon regime become a stalking horse for China in the Asia-Pacific region. India too has changed its foreign policy towards Burma, largely out of concern that the hostile attitude it adopted after the 1988 democratic uprising would drive Burma further into China’s embrace. New Delhi also feared that, with China sharing close bilateral relations with Pakistan in the west, and developing defence ties with Burma in the east, India was in danger of being encircled by its nuclear rival.\(^5\)

These developments were of some interest to the United States (US). Indeed, a number of Western scholars have speculated that, with an eye to a future strategic competition with China, the US might soften its approach towards Burma.\(^6\) For several reasons, this would have been welcomed by Rangoon which, despite its close ties with Beijing, remains wary of its powerful northern neighbour. The US continues to harbour concerns about China’s longer term strategic ambitions, but this shift has not yet occurred. The US has resolutely held to its post-1988 policy of isolating and punishing Burma. On 16 May 2003, for example, President George W. Bush formally extended a 1997 Executive Order that prohibited new investment in Burma by US citizens.\(^7\) There was renewed criticism of Burma by the US in June 2003, after the regime instigated a violent demonstration against popular opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.\(^8\) A range of new sanctions is now before Congress. In defence of its tough position, Washington has cited the Rangoon regime’s refusal to hand over power to the civilian government elected in 1990, the harsh treatment accorded to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Tatmadaw’s long record of human rights abuses, and the Rangoon regime’s tolerance of narcotics trafficking.

In this political climate, closer ties between Burma and the US are unlikely in the near term. However, a new and unexpected development may provide the impetus necessary for links between Washington and the Rangoon regime (known since 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) quietly to improve behind the scenes. This development is the global war against international terrorism that was declared by the US and its allies after 11 September 2001, and in particular continuing US fears of Islamic extremism.
Religion in Burma

According to Burmese government statistics, almost 90 per cent of the country’s population of 50 million are Theravada Buddhists. For domestic political reasons, this figure has probably been inflated to disguise the number of non-Buddhists in the country, and any official census is likely to be distorted by the reluctance of many people to admit to following a ‘foreign’ religion. Even so, the figure for the proportion of Buddhists in Burma would be at least 80 per cent. This also includes a fair measure of animist belief. For, in practice, ‘popular Burmese Buddhism includes veneration of many indigenous pre-Buddhist deities called nats, and coexists with astrology, numerology, and fortune-telling’. At least four per cent of Burma’s population are Muslims. Another four per cent are Christians (mostly Baptists, but also some Catholics, Anglicans and Presbyterians). There is also a significant Hindu minority, as well as practitioners of traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. A very small Jewish community, numbering no more than 50 people, lives in Rangoon.

As noted by the US State Department, in Burma ‘there is some correlation between ethnicity and religion’. Ethnic Burmans, who make up about 68 per cent of the population, are almost entirely Theravada Buddhist. This is also the case among the Shans (nine per cent of the population) and the Mons (two per cent). At any one time there are more than 300,000 Buddhist monks (pongyis) active in Burma, or almost two per cent of the male Buddhist population. There are also a small number of Buddhist nuns. Christianity is the dominant religion among the Kachin, Chin and Naga ethnic groups, who live mainly in Burma’s mountainous west and north. Christianity is also widely practised among the Karenni (Kayah) and Karen peoples, who together make up about seven per cent of the population. They are found mostly along the eastern border with Thailand and, to a lesser extent, in the Irrawaddy Delta. There are, however, many Buddhist Karen. Hinduism is practised among the country’s ethnic Indians (mainly Tamils and Bengalis), while Islam is the dominant religion of the Rohingyas in Arakan State. Traditional animist beliefs still hold sway among many of the smaller ethnic communities scattered around Burma’s land frontiers.

Burma’s first Constitution, adopted in 1948 when Burma regained its independence from the United Kingdom, recognised the special position of Buddhism as the country’s majority religion, but granted ‘freedom of faith and worship ... to all persons’. Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Animism were also formally recognised as existing in the Union at the time. Burma’s most recent Constitution, promulgated in 1974, stated clearly that ‘every citizen shall have the right ... to freely profess any religion’.

Constitution stated that 'the national races shall enjoy the freedom to profess their religion, provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom does not offend the laws or public interest'. Following from this, the military government in Rangoon has always been keen to tell foreigners that Burma 'is a country which prides herself on the fact that all the major religions of the world flourish side by side in complete harmony and understanding'. The regime even claims to 'have encouraged and supported various religions so that their followers may profess their faith peacefully and freely'.

Yet such claims have never really been true since the Tatmadaw first seized power in 1962, and it is still far from the reality of the situation. While most adherents of Burma's religions are allowed to worship freely, they face certain restrictions imposed by the military government. Indeed, according to the US State Department, the Rangoon regime has 'frequently abused the right to freedom of religion'. These abuses include systematic efforts to regulate and restrict the activities of all Burma's religions, attempts to prevent pongyangis from promoting human rights and political freedoms, and the use of coercion to promote Buddhism over other religions (particularly in some ethnic minority areas). Some minority religions have been actively discouraged or even prohibited from constructing new places of worship. In 2001 and 2002 Burma was designated a 'Country of Particular Concern' by the US, for severe violations of religious freedom. In a 2003 report to Congress on the human rights situation in Burma, the State Department declared that 'Religious minorities (particularly Christians and Muslims) are discriminated against and any form of proselytising activity is actively discouraged'.

The military government's measures have been prompted in part by political concerns, but they also stem from a strong sense among most ethnic Burmans that, to be truly Burmese, one also has to be a Buddhist. Religions like Islam and Christianity are deemed by many to be foreign imports, and carry the suspicion that those following such religions owe their primary loyalty to other countries. In fact, Burma's non-Buddhist religions have long been largely insulated from wider religious movements, but the sense that foreign churches are in some way directing Burmese adherents to subvert Buddhism (and by implication the Rangoon regime) remains strong. Also, Christianity and, to a lesser extent Islam, are equated in the minds of some Burmans with the ethnic minorities of Burma and thus, by association, their numerous armed insurgencies against the central government. At the popular level, there have long been social tensions between the Buddhist majority and the Christian and Muslim minorities, largely due to colonial and contemporary government preferences. There is widespread prejudice
against Muslims in particular, leading to tensions that have often resulted in communal violence.

Muslims in Burma

Sixty per cent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims live in Asia. Two hundred million are found in Southeast Asia. In 11 countries they constitute an outright majority (the five Central Asian states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia). In six others (India, China, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Burma) they constitute a politically important religious minority.24

While often omitted from this list, Burma is home to a significant Muslim population. Estimates vary greatly, but most authorities agree that at least four per cent of the country's current population (ie 2 million people) are practising Muslims.25 Some scholars and expatriate groups place this figure much higher, a few even claiming that Muslims constitute 16 per cent of Burma's total population (or eight million people). Most statistics on Burma are unreliable, and these are no exception. In part, however, the wide differences in these estimates reflect the fact that a large number of Burma's Muslims are not considered citizens. Dismissed by the Rangoon government simply as illegal immigrants, they were not included in the last census in 1993 (or in official surveys before then). Also, the latter figure usually includes a sizeable expatriate population, possibly of 1.5 million Burmese Muslims, who are now living in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).26 Even if the lower figures are accepted as close to the real number, they easily place Burma alongside southern Thailand and the southern Philippines as the home of large Muslim minorities.27

Overwhelmingly followers of Sunni Islam, Burma's Muslims can be broadly divided into four distinct communities. Each has a very different relationship with the Buddhist majority and with the military government in Rangoon.28

The longest established Muslim group in Burma traces its origins back to the 13th and 14th centuries, when their forebears arrived in Burma as traders, court servants and mercenaries. Mostly of Arab, Persian and Indian ethnicity, these early arrivals often married local Buddhist women and settled down in Burma. Those who subsequently left the country were obliged to leave their families behind. From the 16th century onwards, following campaigns against the coastal kingdoms of Pegu and Arakan, successive Burmese rulers began to settle Muslim prisoners in Upper Burma, around Shwebo. (These villages still exist today). In return for service in the royal
army, other Muslims were given land in places like Sagaing, Yamethin and Kyaukse. A number subsequently attained eminence in the Burmese court, acting as administrators and interpreters. These Muslims and their descendants spoke Burmese, dressed as Burmese and considered themselves Burmese, but still followed Islam. Under the Burmese kings they were known as Pathi, or Kala. They later became known as Zerbadee, a term most often used to denote someone with a Muslim father and Buddhist mother. All these terms are disliked by modern Muslims, however, who reject the implication that, because of their religion, they are not truly Burmese. They prefer the name ‘Burman Muslims’, a term which was officially accepted by the colonial government in 1941.

There is also a small Chinese Muslim community in the northeast of Burma, known as the Panthay. Its members are remnants of a once-powerful Islamic Sultanate that was established in Yunnan during the mid 19th century. The presence of so many Muslims in south-western China probably stemmed from the settlement there of a large Muslim army, originally sent by the Emperor to help quell a revolt in Tibet in 801 AD. Later, Turkic Muslims arrived in the region with Kublai Khan (and played a decisive part in the Chinese invasions of Burma in the 13th century). Largely as the result of inept and capricious imperial rule, this Muslim community rose up against the Ch’ing government in 1856 and formed an independent state. The Sultanate even captured Tali, then the largest and most strategically placed city in the west. However, the Emperor defeated the Sultan’s forces in 1873, and celebrated this victory by slaughtering thousands of local Muslims. Many who escaped the massacres fled to Burma. Some joined bandit gangs in the Wa and Kokang districts while others settled peacefully in the Shan Hills, at places like Bhamo and Panglong. Panthay merchants and their mule caravans subsequently became an important part of the local trading economy, travelling as far south as Moulmein and Rangoon. However, their numbers have remained small.

A major influx of Muslims occurred after the United Kingdom annexed Burma in three wars, waged between 1824 and 1886. By making the country part of British India, the new government encouraged large numbers of immigrants, casual labourers, civil servants and merchants from South Asia. Most established homes and businesses in the colonial capital, in population centres like Moulmein, Pyinmana and Kyaukse, and along the main transport corridors. Before the mass exodus to India that followed the outbreak of the Second World War, there were more than one million Indians in Burma, out of a total population then of 16 million. More than half the population of Rangoon was Indian. At the time, Indian Muslims accounted
for more than one third of all those who followed Islam in Burma. They mainly spoke Urdu and Tamil, and ‘maintained strong links with the religious and cultural practices of their homelands’. Religious differences helped fuel economic and racial tensions, leading to large-scale riots against the Indian community in Rangoon in 1931 and 1938. Some Indians returned to Burma with the colonial administration in 1945, but their numbers never reached pre-war levels. When Ne Win’s military government nationalised the Burmese economy in 1963 and introduced tough new citizenship laws, several hundred thousand South Asians, including many Muslims, departed for India and Pakistan. However, a sizeable community remains in modern Burma.

The fourth and largest Muslim community in Burma today is that of the Rohingyas. These are Bengali Muslims who live in Arakan State, on Burma’s western coast facing the Bay of Bengal. A few Muslims trace their ancestry back to an independent Arakanese kingdom that existed in the region during the 15th and 16th centuries. Its rulers enjoyed mixed relations with Muslim Bengal but employed many Muslims as administrators and soldiers. The kingdom was conquered by King Bodawpaya and incorporated into a unified Burma late in the 18th century. (His army contained a unit of Burmese Muslims who later settled in Arakan). There has always been traffic between Arakan and Bengal, but most Rohingyas arrived with the British colonialists in the 19th and early 20th centuries. For many years Arakan was administered as part of the British Province of Bengal. There was another influx of migrants after the Second World War, and a number of large-scale population movements have occurred since, usually coinciding with economic or political crises in Bengal (which became East Pakistan in 1947 and the independent Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh in 1971). In 1986 Muslim Rohingyas were estimated to constitute about 56 per cent of the population of Arakan. By 1992, this proportion had risen to 70 per cent of the State’s estimated 4 million people.

A key difference between the Muslim communities of Burma, and those of other regional countries, is that Islam was not imposed by external actors. Despite periodic conflicts with its neighbours, Burma was never the target of any powerful Muslim state wishing to spread its religion. For better and for worse, the proximity of Muslim Bengal left its mark on Arakan, but Islam failed to reach the heart of the country. The British colonialists who later conquered Burma were largely Christian. Nor was there any missionary activity by Muslim preachers, aiming to create large numbers of converts, as occurred in the Malay Archipelago. As a result, Burma’s Muslim community developed mainly through immigration and exogamy, giving it a unique
character. According to Moshe Yegar, this was in part because of Burma’s forbidding geography, and because Burma did not present as attractive a conquest, militarily or commercially, as countries further east. More importantly, Burma was already strongly Theravada Buddhist by the 12th century and neither the royal court nor the general population were susceptible to new religions.\textsuperscript{45} Also, Buddhism became intricately woven into the fabric of Burmese politics, society and culture. This made it much more than simply a religion and, as later Christian missionaries discovered, largely impervious to outside influences.

**Treatment of Burmese Muslims**

Under the colonial government, Muslims held senior positions in the public service and civil society. Also, during the 1920s and 1930s, young Muslim nationalists were in the forefront of the fight for independence from the British. After the Union of Burma was created in 1948, a number of Muslims achieved high office in the government of devoutly Buddhist Prime Minister U Nu.\textsuperscript{46} Following the 1962 military coup, a smaller number of Muslims continued to serve under General Ne Win. A few even became senior officers in the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and the armed forces. Yet, despite the government’s official position (as described, for example, in the 1974 Constitution), and repeated statements by the military regime that it tolerated all religions, Burma’s Muslims have long suffered from both official and unofficial discrimination. According to Human Rights Watch, they have been ‘deliberately and systematically excluded from positions in government and the army’.\textsuperscript{47} Their position has deteriorated significantly since the armed forces took back direct political power in 1988. According to one contemporary observer, ‘among Myanmar’s oppressed religious and ethnic minorities, Muslims are the worst off under the military junta’.\textsuperscript{48}

While Burman Muslims and Chinese Muslims have now largely been assimilated, the country’s other two Muslim communities are still ostracised by the majority Buddhist population. They are not recognised as being truly Burmese and, after 1962, most were obliged to carry Foreigner Registration Cards (FRC) rather than National Registration Cards (NRC).\textsuperscript{49} A few Muslims who had been able to obtain NRCs were forced to return them in 1977. This official designation of their inferior status was reinforced by new citizenship regulations introduced in 1982, under which Burmese nationals were defined as those who could trace a direct line to forebears who lived in the country before 1823. This was just prior to the conquest of parts of Lower Burma by the British in the First Anglo-Burmese War. Only these ‘citizens’
enjoyed full political and economic rights. The 1982 regulations thus effectively disenfranchised most Muslims in Burma (whether they were formally classed as 'associate citizens' or 'naturalised citizens'), including those whose ancestors came to Burma from the sub-continent. Many of these families had been living in Burma for generations and considered themselves patriotic Burmese. Under the provisions of the 1982 law, however, they could not join the armed forces or police force, serve as the heads of government bodies or run for political office.

Muslims in Burma have also been subject to various forms of harassment and discrimination. For example, since 1962 Muslims have effectively been forbidden to build additional mosques, even in new townships. Some older places of worship have been destroyed, and replaced by Buddhist stupas. Muslim cemeteries have been bulldozed to make way for commercial developments, some of which seem to be sponsored by members of the regime or their close supporters. A number of madrassahs, or Muslim religious schools, have been closed. Muslims are also discriminated against when applying for jobs, and promotions. Like local Christians, Burma's Muslims have experienced severe difficulties in importing indigenous translations of traditional sacred texts. At times, the identity cards of Muslims have been confiscated by members of the police or armed forces, effectively preventing the Muslims from travelling around the country. Rohingyas, deemed by the regime to be illegal aliens, are required to get special permission even to cross township boundaries, and their children are denied access to state-run schools beyond the primary level. The number of pilgrims permitted to make the haj to Mecca has been severely restricted.

Also, over the years, the different views of Burma's Muslims have resulted in conflicts with the government and Buddhist majority. Of particular sensitivity have been issues like marriage and property laws, as well as the role of Islam in Burma's political life. There are occasional smear campaigns against Muslims, usually focussing on allegations of improper conduct at Buddhist shrines or the mistreatment of Burman women. One racist canard that emerges from time to time centres on claims that local Muslims plan to take over Burma by marrying Buddhist women. In 2001, for example, a pamphlet on this theme, entitled The Fear of Losing One's Race, was widely distributed around the country, often by pongyis. This harassment and racial vilification has often descended into physical violence. 'The fact that many Muslims are businessmen, shopkeepers and small-scale money changers means that they are often targeted during times of economic hardship'. Under both the U Nu and Ne Win governments, mobs have attacked Muslims, and destroyed their mosques, schools, shops and homes.
According to one source, ‘thousands of Muslims are believed to have died in bloody ethnic riots involving Buddhists and Muslims in 1958, 1961 and 1974’. There were also violent anti-Muslim demonstrations in both Lower and Upper Burma in the mid-1980s.

Despite the military regime’s heightened surveillance of the Burmese population since 1988, these disturbances have continued to occur under the SLORC and SPDC. At times, they appear to have had official blessing, or have been used to channel popular feelings away from the regime and its policies. In 1997, for example, the regime used anti-Muslim sentiments in Mandalay to deflect criticisms of Rangoon’s pro-China policies (and the influx of illegal Chinese immigrants into Upper Burma). In 2001 there was a sharp rise in anti-Muslim violence, with riots in Sittwe, Taungoo and Prome. Muslim property was destroyed and a number of Muslims were killed. The authorities did nothing to prevent the violence until a number of days had passed. In each case, there were accusations that the riots had been led by members of pro-government organisations, with some agents provocateur disguised as Buddhist monks. One riot seems to have been provoked by anti-Muslim pamphlets distributed by the military regime’s own mass Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Also, the destruction of the large Buddha images at Bamiyan by the Taliban in March 2001 inflamed religious feelings and, after 11 September 2001, many Burmese Buddhists began to worry about the threat of Islamic extremism. Some have vented their fear and anger on the local Muslim community. According to one source, since 1988 over 5,000 Burmese Muslims have been killed in religiously inspired civil violence.

The management of these diverse challenges to Burma’s Muslims is made more difficult by the fact that, at present, there does not appear to be one single representative organisation or group in the country that is recognised by both the regime and by the Muslim community as a whole. Indeed, there are currently a dozen or more separate Muslim organisations and social groups in Burma. Attempts to form a united front have been unsuccessful, although in the late 1990s six of these organisations joined together to form a committee to receive and use the small grants of money allocated to the community by the government, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. (Two of these groups, the Myanmar Muslim Organisation and the Muslim Central Fund Trust, were later de-registered by the SPDC). In addition to these six organisations, there are a number of other Muslim groups still permitted to exist by the regime. They are not directly political in nature, however, and tend to be focussed on issues like social welfare, the place of women in Islam, the care of Muslim orphans, Arabic language teaching.
and the study of the Koran.\textsuperscript{66} The activities of all these organisations, however, are carefully monitored by the military government through its various intelligence and security agencies. Accordingly, their members are very circumspect in what they say and do, for fear of government reprisals.

As a rule, Burma’s Muslims stay out of the political arena and try to maintain a low public profile. However, some look not to local religious bodies but to the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), and to the NLD’s General Secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi, for an eventual improvement to their position in Burmese society. There are a number of Muslims in the NLD, which advocates religious tolerance towards all. These Muslims recognise the prejudices found among the majority Buddhist population, but they feel that under a democratically elected civilian government, at least the official discrimination against them will cease.\textsuperscript{67} This open support for the NLD, however, and occasional public statements like ‘Muslims across Myanmar pray five times daily to God that Ms Suu Kyi somehow comes to power’, serves only to strengthen the military hierarchy’s suspicions about local Muslims and encourages further harsh measures against both them and the NLD.\textsuperscript{68}

From time to time, Burma’s Muslims have appealed to their co-religionists abroad to bring diplomatic pressure against the Rangoon regime, to end religious persecution.\textsuperscript{69} In 1980, for example, Burma’s Muslims presented their case to the International Conference on Muslim Minorities held in London. The conference did not give any immediate practical assistance but called for the Islamic world ‘to employ its material and moral resources, and its significant economic and political powers in order to ensure the protection of Muslim rights’.\textsuperscript{70} After a major military operation in Arakan State in 1991, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia made a rare departure from normal practice and openly criticised Rangoon for its harsh treatment of the Rohingyas. In 1992 the Organisation of Islamic Countries issued a statement accusing the Rangoon regime of persecuting Muslims. Every now and again there have been news media reports that non-military aid had been provided to Burmese refugees in Bangladesh by Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where about 400,000 Rohingyas now live.\textsuperscript{71} Yet none of these appeals seem to have had any real or lasting results. They have simply reinforced the Rangoon regime’s conviction that local Muslims cannot be trusted, and are prepared to ally themselves with foreigners against Burma. Resentment against the international community has been particularly strong whenever Rangoon has been criticised for its attempts to expel the Rohingyas from the country.
The Rohingyas

Despite their numbers (up to two million in the country), the Rohingyas have always been the poorest and least established of the four main Muslim groups in Burma. They have consistently been denied the citizenship status they have desired, as well as the schools, roads and hospitals that they have periodically sought from Rangoon. They have also been the most persecuted by the military government.

As in all matters relating to community sentiment, it is risky to generalise, but feelings between most Buddhists in Arakan State (who call themselves Rhakine) and the Rohingyas run deep.72 The Rhakine look back to the days of the Buddhist Arakan kingdom, which at one stage expanded westwards to drive the Muslims out of Dhaka. The Rohingyas, on the other hand, remember the strong Muslim influence exercised on the Arakan kingdom by Bengal. Both communities recall the chaotic British retreat from Burma in 1942, when Indians fleeing the Japanese were set upon by local gangs, and a ‘bitter internecine struggle for land and power’ broke out between the Buddhist and Muslim communities.73 As one writer later noted, ‘the result was one of the bloodiest communal riots in South Asian annals’.74 The British later recruited many Arakanese Muslims into ‘V’ Force, to gather intelligence and conduct raids against the Japanese and their Burmese allies. This ‘treachery’ has not been forgotten by the Rhakine. Also, while sharing many of the hardships caused by Rangoon’s neglect of Arakan over the years, the Rhakine still view Rohingya demands for increased government resources with suspicion. Any roads, schools or hospitals which are built to meet the needs of the Rohingyas are seen to be at the expense of facilities for the rest of the population.

Most Buddhists in Arakan do not see the growth of the Muslim community as a political or security threat, so much as an economic, social and cultural problem. This has still meant, however, that whenever the police and armed forces have launched pogroms against the Rohingyas, they have received enthusiastic support from many local Rhakine.75

It is estimated that successive Burmese governments have carried out at least 13 major armed operations against the Rohingyas since 1948.76 The security forces have brutalised community members in Arakan State, driven them off their land, closed their religious schools and burnt down their mosques. In 1975 about 15,000 Rohingyas fled into neighbouring Bangladesh to escape persecution. In 1978 a massive military operation, code-named Naga Min (Dragon King), forced another 200,000 Rohingyas to follow them. This operation included the forced relocation of Muslim
villagers and was accompanied by widespread looting, rape, arson and the desecration of mosques. The regime later blamed these depredations on 'rampaging Bengali mobs'. Many refugees, even some housed in the 20 or more recognised camps near the border and east of Cox's Bazaar, starved to death. The Dhaka government was later accused of denying the refugees adequate rations as a way of forcing them to return to Burma. On this occasion, the Rangoon regime bowed to international pressure and, after lengthy negotiations with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the SLORC reluctantly accepted the repatriation of all the Rohingyas who had fled. Many were later resettled in Arakan State, but similar operations were staged in 1989, 1991-92 and again in 2002. Once again, there were numerous reports of human rights violations by the security forces.

After the 1991 pogroms, about 250,000 victims sought refuge across the border in Bangladesh. On that occasion the plight of the Rohingyas sparked rare public comment from ASEAN’s three Islamic member states, some Middle Eastern countries and non-government organisations like the Mecca-based Rabita-al-Alam-i-Islami (Muslim World League). As a consequence, Rangoon was forced to cut another deal with the UNHCR and agree to take the refugees back. Since 1992 about 230,000 Rohingyas have been voluntarily repatriated to Burma under the auspices of the United Nations, but serious problems remain. There are still about 21,000 refugees in two camps south of Cox’s Bazaar, and even more in small scattered settlements along the border. They are fully dependent on the relief and protection provided by international aid organisations and the government of Bangladesh, but this has been insufficient to ward off malnutrition and disease. Many Rohingyas, including women and children, have died. The refugees have complained of violence and intimidation at the hands of the local camp authorities, many of whom have also been accused of corruption.

For those refugees able to verify their identity to the satisfaction of the Burmese government, and return to Arakan State, there are other difficulties. Without proper documentation, their situation remains precarious. They are frequently subject to extortion and theft from the security forces, and are usually the first to be called upon to perform forced labour. Also, the land that was formerly occupied by the Rohingyas has in many cases been taken over by the authorities and reallocated to local Buddhists. Many religious schools have been closed and permission for mosques to be rebuilt has been denied. At the same time, the Rangoon regime has greatly increased its security presence in Arakan State, including along the Bangladesh border.
In addition to new units from the Myanmar Police Force and the Tatmadaw, a Frontier Force (known by its Burmese language initials as the NaKaSa) has been established to help monitor the border areas and prevent the inflow of Muslims from Bangladesh. The Burma side of the border is now heavily sown with landmines to hinder unauthorised crossings. As noted earlier, Burma’s 1974 constitution guarantees religious freedom for all of its 135 ‘national races’ but, according to the military government, the Rohingyas do not fit into this category. Coupled with the harsh treatment periodically meted out by the security forces, this has led to deep antagonism towards the Rangoon regime, feelings which have periodically flared into armed resistance.

**Muslim Insurgencies**

Of all the countries in Southeast Asia, Burma has perhaps suffered the most from armed violence since the end of the Second World War. Since it gained independence from the British in 1948, no less than 115 insurgent groups have emerged to fight the central government (and themselves). Representatives of almost every ethnic group in the country have taken up arms at some time or another and, as Martin Smith has noted, for many insurgency became a way of life. While prompted mainly by political and nationality imperatives, a number of these insurgencies have had a significant religious component. The most obvious example of this was the revolt of the predominantly Christian Kachins against U Nu’s determination, in the early 1960s, formally to declare Buddhism as Burma’s state religion. The country’s Muslims were also very disturbed by this development, and the anti-Muslim riots of 1961 were directly related to the controversy over these measures. There have also been several specifically Muslim insurgencies, mostly in Arakan State.

After the Second World War, some Muslims wished for the northern part of Arakan, around Maungdaw and Buthidaung, to be included in newly created East Pakistan. Others known as Mujahids (or mujahideen) called for an independent Muslim state to be created in the area between the Kaladan and Mayu Rivers. These demands increased after Burma’s Independence in 1948, when most official positions were taken over by Buddhists. ‘Muslim religious leaders began preaching jihad (or holy war) against the Arakanese “infidels”’ and, initially at least, the main targets for attack by Rohingyas were local Buddhists rather than representatives of the central government. Largely as a result of Rangoon’s weakness at the time, and its preoccupation with more dangerous insurgent groups in Lower and Central Burma, the Mujahid revolt in Arakan grew rapidly. At one stage, most of the province
was in the hands of the Mujahids and other rebel groups. Armed conflict continued at a low level until the late 1950s, when it finally petered out. In 1961 a stronger central government and more capable Tatmadaw were able to negotiate a formal ceasefire. Rangoon also reached an agreement with Dakha on the regulation of their shared border. However, it was not long before repression by Ne Win’s new military government, problems over land tenure, competition for scarce resources and religious tensions in Arakan prompted fresh outbreaks of armed conflict.

The history of Arakan since the 1962 military coup is marked by the emergence, fragmentation and disappearance of numerous insurgent groups: Muslim, Buddhist and non-denominational.

Drawing on the Mujahid tradition (and some of its former members), the Rohingya Independence Force (RIF) was created in 1963, to protest against Ne Win’s military coup and the banning of Muslim organisations like the Rohingya Students Union and the Rohingya Youth League. Little is known about the RIF, but reports of clashes with the armed forces and the discovery of arms caches occasionally surfaced in the news media. Inspired by the rise of pan-Islamic movements elsewhere in the world, the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), a later version of the RIF, was created in 1974. When it was not trying to settle internal disputes, it sought the creation of an independent Muslim state near Bangladesh. It also championed the cause of the disadvantaged Muslims in Arakan, but had little real impact on events and later split into several factions. In 1982 a faction of the RPF founded the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), from which the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) broke away in 1986. Both were based in southern Bangladesh. They merged in 1995 to become the Rohingya National Alliance, and reformed again in 1999, to become the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO). The RSO name was then claimed by three factions which emerged from the break-up of ARNO in 2000.

There has also been Muslim insurgent activity in other parts of Burma. Following a series of anti-Muslim riots in Upper Burma in the mid-1970s, the Ommat (or Ummat) Liberation Front was set up in Mandalay by a Kachin Muslim in an attempt to create a national Muslim insurgent force. This effort, however, was short lived. Another series of anti-Muslim riots in Moulmein, Martaban and the Irrawaddy Delta in 1983 sparked the Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Force (KMLF). While it recognised that the Rohingyas suffered most under the military government, it too claimed to represent all Burmese Muslims. Assisted by the Karen National Liberation Army, this small group (of about 200 guerrillas) operated for some years along the Burma-Thailand border. In 1987, however, differences surfaced
between Sunni and Shiite members of the KMLF and it was disbanded. The following year its remnants formed the All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU). Also that year the Muslim Liberation Organisation of Burma (MLOB) was established by Arakanese Muslims who did not consider themselves Rohingyaas. This group was previously known as the Arakan Liberation Organisation. Very little is known about the MLOB, but it appears that independent Muslim units continued to operate for a period with the Karen insurgents along Burma’s eastern border.

These Muslim insurgent groups have waged an intermittent low intensity guerrilla war against the central government in Rangoon for more than 50 years. Some have had the professed aim of creating a separate Muslim state in western Burma, or recognition of Rohingya claims to Burmese citizenship, but most have simply wanted freedom of worship, guarantees against religious persecution, and the same political and economic rights for Muslims as other communities in Burma. However, these groups have tended to be fractious and fragmented. Indeed, it is not always clear whether new groups have emerged or old ones have simply adopted new names. Some have split and then reformed. Since the collapse of the Mujahids in the late 1950s, few of Burma’s Muslim insurgent groups have been very large or well armed. None have ever seriously threatened the country’s military government. As the Tatmadaw has become more powerful and better organised, particularly since 1988, these groups have become increasingly isolated and ineffective.

Occasionally, however, Muslim groups have cooperated with other opposition and insurgent groups in Arakan. These have included the Arakan Peoples’ Liberation Party (APLP) which lasted from 1945-1958, the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) which was established in 1960, the Arakan Independence Organisation (AIO) which was founded in 1970, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and its armed wing, the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), which were set up in 1972. The ALP/ALA later joined the National United Front of Arakan (NUFA), which was formed after the Tatmadaw crushed the democratic uprising of September 1988. In addition to these ethnic Rhakine groups, Arakan also experienced operations by the guerrilla armies of the Red Flag Burma Communist Party (which reached its height in the early 1950s), the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) which was established in 1956 after the defeat of the Red Flags, and the Communist Party of Burma (White Flag) which collapsed in 1989. All these communist groups included Muslims among their membership. After 1988, the NUFA absorbed five small groups based along the Burma-Bangladesh border, including remnants of the AIO, ALP, ANLP, CPA and a faction of the Tribal
Nationality Party of Arakan. The combined army was called the New Arakan Construction Army, but now ‘its presence in Arakan is negligible’. A small group calling itself the Arakan Army was formed in 1991 and currently operates in the Mergui Archipelago.

In 1975 and again in 1976, meetings were held between a number of Burmese insurgent groups in an attempt to coordinate their political agendas and military operations against the central government. In 1975 the Federal National Democratic Front was formed, and included the Arakan Liberation Party. After the 1976 meeting seven groups, including the ALP, formed the National Democratic Front, which waxed and waned until the early 1990s. After the democratic uprising was crushed in 1988, a Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was formed on the Burma-Thai border. Its 22 member organisations included the MLOB and ABMU. The DAB evolved into the Democratic Front of Burma in 1990. However, none of these alliances lasted very long, nor had any real impact on broader developments in Arakan State or the country as a whole. While espousing religious freedom as a broad principle, they were essentially secular alliances.

From time to time Burmese Muslim insurgent groups have sought material or moral support from Islamic countries and international organisations. Bangladesh has been prepared to turn a blind eye to the passage of insurgents across its border with Burma, and the establishment of training camps inside Bangladesh. In the 1970s, the Rohingya Patriotic Front was seen as a possible target for support from Islamic extremists, but little practical assistance seems to have eventuated. There have also been periodic calls for a jihad against Burma’s military government, to respond to the plight of the Burmese Muslims. For example, in the late 1970s, the Palestinian teacher and activist Abdulla Azzam, reputed to be terrorist leader Usama bin Laden’s mentor and inspiration, published a document entitled Defending Muslim Territory Is The Most Important Duty. In this widely distributed pamphlet Azzam called for the expulsion of the infidels not only from Afghanistan but also ‘all other lands that were Muslim’. Burma was included on the list. Over the last few decades there have been other calls for military action against Rangoon. For example, after a pogrom against the Rohingyas in Arakan State in 1992, a prominent Saudi Arabian military figure demanded international action against Rangoon, along the lines of the recently concluded operation Desert Storm against Iraq. In 1995, the All Burma Muslim Union called for a jihad against the SLORC, in retaliation for the persecution of Burmese Muslims.

In the past, these sorts of calls have appeared to fall on deaf ears, but there is now growing unease in Rangoon and other capitals like Washington
over reports that some radical Muslims from Burma have successfully tapped into the broader currents of Islamic extremism.

**International Terrorist Links**

Only a small number of Muslim groups in Burma advocate armed struggle, and few actively look for international assistance. Even fewer Burmese Muslims favour links with extremist pan-Islamic groups. Indeed, some local Muslim insurgent organisations have been at pains to refute any suggestion that they are in any way associated with radical movements of this kind. Over the past decade, however, at least one Rohingya insurgent group is reported to have developed connections with Muslim extremist organisations in places like Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This group is the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation.

The RSO was initially established to represent the interests of the refugees around Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar, but its formal aim is now the creation of an autonomous Arakan state uniting the Rohingyas of Burma and Bangladesh. Little hard information about the RSO is available, but it reportedly has several hundred active members, within a larger support base. It is not known how many of these guerrillas support the RSO’s radical faction, or its foreign links. RSO insurgents are usually armed with Chinese-made AK-47 automatic rifles, light machine guns, RPG-2 grenade launchers, landmines and explosives. However, the RSO has not conducted serious military operations in Burma since the early 1990s. The RSO seems to spend most of its time and gains most of its finances through criminal activity, in particular the smuggling of guns and drugs between Bangladesh and northern Arakan State. It has reportedly received funds from sympathetic charities in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, such as the Rabita-al-Alam-I-Islami. According to open sources, from the mid-1980s the RSO also began to receive assistance from Islamic groups in Bangladesh, like Jamaat-e-Islami and its radical, violent student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir. Both of these organisations exercise a strong influence in Bangladesh’s lawless southeast, and along the Burmese border, where the RSO mainly operates.

It is believed that, since establishing itself in Bangladesh, at least one faction of the RSO has fallen under the influence of the much larger and more radical Sunni Muslim organisation Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI). Founded in 1992 to assist Bangladeshi veterans of the Afghan war, HuJI ‘shares the hardline Wahabist and Deobandist teachings of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’, with which it has reportedly developed strong links. For example, HuJI is the main component of the Jihad Movement, established
by Al Qaeda as an umbrella grouping for radical organisations in Bangladesh. It would appear that HuJI has drawn recruits from among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and established close links with the RSO. It has even taken over some of the RSO’s facilities, including a camp at Ukhia. There have also been claims by the Rangoon regime that the RSO has been sponsored by Muammar Ghaddafi and that, in 1994, eight RSO members attended terrorist training camps in Libya. According to experts writing for Jane’s publications, the RSO ‘was also given assistance as early as the 1980s by Kashmiri/Pakistani organisations such as the Harakut-ul-Ansar (HuA), now known as Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). The radical Islamist Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami movement was another early sponsor of the RSO, a connection that seems to have helped some Rohingyas to develop links with other organisations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

There are about 350,000 Rohingyas in Pakistan, where a large number have attended madrassas. During the 1990s, some of these exiles found their way into the ranks of the Taliban. Other Rohingyas were recruited directly from Bangladesh and trained in Pakistan before being passed on to the Taliban, probably through the HuM network. In Afghanistan they were reportedly sponsored by the Jamiya-I-Islami of President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the Ittehad-I-Islami of Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf. Also, more than 100 members of the RSO are believed to have been trained at Hizb-e-Islami facilities in Khost, Afghanistan. According to one unconfirmed report, about 5000 members of the RSO had received some kind of training by the mid-1990s. Bertil Lintner has written that they were given religious instruction and trained as foot soldiers, mine clearance specialists and porters. However, they did not enjoy the same status as the Taliban’s Pakistani and Arab recruits, and were essentially considered ‘cannon fodder’. There were still Burmese mujahideen fighting with the Taliban when the US opened its military campaign against Afghanistan in October 2001. Some of those Rohingyas subsequently captured by the Northern Alliance and US-led coalition stated that they were trying to gain military experience before returning to free Burma and implement sharia law in that country. This group has included a few Pakistanis of Burmese descent who had never been to Burma. Even before the Taliban was defeated, however, there had been reports in the international news media that mujahideen who had fought in Afghanistan had turned up in insurgent training camps inside the Bangladesh border, and were instructing groups like the RSO in basic military techniques. During the 1990s, there was speculation that
the ABMU’s jihad against Rangoon might be joined by Arab and Pakistani mujahideen with experience in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{122} Also, the Pakistan/Kashmir groups Hizb-ul Mujahideen and HuA reportedly sent advisors into the Arakan mountains to train Muslim guerrillas, before they were expelled to Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{123}

Before 2001, these sorts of links were seen neither by Washington nor Rangoon as particularly dangerous, or to have any real importance beyond Burma. As far as can be determined, there was no significant increase in Muslim insurgent operations, nor any noticeable surge in terrorist activity, in Burma as a result of the RSO’s international links. However, after the attacks in New York and Washington that year, the significance of these connections has grown dramatically. In particular, fears have been expressed that Muslims from Burma are being drawn into the Al Qaeda international terrorist network, led by Usama bin Laden. Indeed, one US academic has made the highly unlikely claim, apparently based on a misreading of a BBC news broadcast, that ‘the largest Al Qaeda cell in Southeast Asia is said to be in Myanmar’.\textsuperscript{124} A similar statement has reportedly been made by a member of the CNN television network.\textsuperscript{125} These claims cannot be justified, but there have been some indications that direct links exist between Al Qaeda and at least one faction of the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation.

According to Jane’s publications, the recruiters from Pakistan who travelled around Bangladesh in the 1990s, trying to find Rohingya volunteers for military service in Afghanistan, were from Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{126} Also, in public statements and videotaped speeches shown on Arabic language television stations, Usama bin Laden has referred to the massacres of Muslims in Burma.\textsuperscript{127} For example, in a September 2001 interview he praised his supporters there, in what was seen as an oblique reference to the RSO.\textsuperscript{128} Al Qaeda videotapes and notebooks later seized in Afghanistan by the US-led Coalition referred to the struggle in Burma, and listed Burma among a group of countries which had Al Qaeda sympathisers.\textsuperscript{129} In addition, a reporter from the CNN network on assignment in Afghanistan managed to obtain what he described as a library of videotapes belonging to Usama bin Laden. The library apparently included a tape made by an unnamed Burmese insurgent group. Although it was suggested by journalists that this tape showed ‘al Qaeda members during operations in Burma’, it appears only to show the kind of basic guerrilla training that the group was undertaking around 1990.\textsuperscript{130} Burma expert Bertil Lintner, who is familiar with the Burma-Bangladesh border region, later stated that the tape was almost certainly filmed at RSO camps located in Bangladesh, not inside Burma, where the RSO does not have any permanent presence.\textsuperscript{131}
From time to time, other reports have emerged in the academic literature and news media of supposed links between Burma and extremist Muslim groups, including Al Qaeda. These reports are of varying credibility. Few are supported by hard evidence.

The Singapore-based academic Rohan Gunaratna has stated that a small Burma branch of The Islamic Party (Mahaz-e-Islami) has connections with Al Qaeda. A news media report has suggested that the RSO has joined with eight other radical Islamist groups, including HuJI and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, to form a new fundamentalist umbrella organisation known as the Bangladesh Islamic Association (Manch). This organisation is reputed to have ties with Usama bin Laden through the HuJI network. According to another press report, Muslim extremists linked to Al Qaeda have established a “league of holy warriors” in Southeast Asia to launch strikes against governments in the region. Burma is said to have been represented at meetings of the league held in 1999 and 2000. There were reports in 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists under investigation by the US for their links with Al Qaeda had sought refuge in Burma. These reports, however, were later proven to be incorrect. In early 2002 a ship sailing from Karachi to Chittagong was believed to have smuggled Al Qaeda and Taliban guerrillas who had escaped from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, where they reportedly joined RSO and HuJI militants. Later that year Usama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, was mistakenly reported to have sought refuge with Rohingya rebels in Burma. A Burmese man caught smuggling arms in Pakistan in 2003 was accused of being a member of Al Qaeda.

Also, Burma has reportedly been a target for the Al Qaeda associated terrorist group known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Based in Southeast Asia, it is believed responsible for the October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, in which 202 people died. According to the US scholar Zachary Abuza, ‘the senior-most Al Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia, Omar Al-Faruq, has admitted in interrogation, that the Jemaah Islamiyah had tried to establish links with Muslim militants in ... Myanmar’. Abuza did not say, however, whether these efforts were successful. Nor has any evidence been provided to support later statements to the news media, purportedly by US counter-terrorism officials, that JI had ‘cells’ in Burma. Similarly, there is no credible evidence to support the recent assertion in a US newspaper that a radical network of ‘al-Qaeda-related Muslim insurgents’ is ‘methodically spreading south along the Thai border towards indigenous Muslim areas in the Malay Peninsula’, assisted by Rangoon’s allies, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
The Indian news media has published several reports linking Burma with international terrorist groups, usually claiming at the same time that these groups are in some way associated with Pakistan. For example, one article expressed concern about the activities of the Tabliq, which was characterised as a radical organisation supported by Islamabad. Yet the Tabliq is a worldwide Sunni Muslim reform group that promotes Islamic teachings. It has some adherents in Burma, but they operate quite openly, holding study meetings and encouraging mosque attendance. While some Tabliq adherents around the world may support extremist groups, directly or indirectly, the sect itself does not have a philosophy of violence.

Another Indian newspaper has claimed that the extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), 'responsible for 60 per cent of terrorist killings in India', has acquired a global network rivalling Al Qaeda. The Times of India has reported that 'Intelligence inputs also indicate that LET is trying to spread its network in Asian countries like Myanmar (Burma) and Bangladesh'. No further information was given to justify this statement, beyond the claim that the group was secretly supported by Pakistan's powerful Inter Services Intelligence Directorate.

**Terrorism in Burma**

It has been claimed by Australian academic Peter Chalk that, despite the country's long history of insurgency and civil war, 'terrorist violence has not been as significant in Burma in the post-Cold War era as one might have thought'. This statement clearly does not address the 'state terrorism' practised by the military government since 1962, nor the uncompromising nature of the unconventional warfare waged between Burma's many insurgent groups and the Tatmadaw over the past 50 years. In the same article, there is also some confusion evident between terrorist violence and guerrilla operations during a civil war. Nevertheless, it is true that there have been surprisingly few examples in Burma of the kind of violent campaigns now popularly associated with modern terrorist groups. Over the past 15 years the US State Department's annual review of global terrorism, which includes a comprehensive list of terrorist attacks each year, has rarely mentioned any such incidents in Burma.

After the 1988 democratic uprising was crushed, some exiled students briefly considered launching a terrorist campaign against the SLORC. Treated with suspicion by most ethnic insurgent groups, and without the resources to establish a viable guerrilla group of their own, they saw no other way to hit back at the new military government. However, as a rule, Burma's armed dissident and insurgent groups have relied on traditional
guerrilla strategies to pursue their respective political agendas. They have placed a priority on winning the hearts and minds of the local population and protecting their supporters from indiscriminate violence by the regime, both aims which stand at odds with conventional terror tactics. In addition, with a few notable exceptions, Burma's insurgent groups have wanted the approval and support of the wider international community, goals that would be more difficult to achieve through a campaign of terrorist violence. Another reason why the number of terrorist and terrorist style attacks has remained low in recent years is that, since 1988, the SLORC and SPDC have managed to negotiate ceasefire agreements with most of the country's major insurgent groups. These agreements are fragile and some have already broken down, but only a few ethnic insurgent groups still conduct serious military campaigns against the regime.

Like other authoritarian states, Burma has also been able to reduce its vulnerability to terrorism through its massive security apparatus and wide array of restrictive legal instruments. Of key importance in this regard are the regime's intelligence agencies, which closely monitor local dissident groups and foreign visitors. Also, Burma's armed forces are some 400,000 strong and their influence pervades every aspect of Burmese life. There are about 75,000 members of the paramilitary Myanmar Police Force and another 500,000 at least in the Fire Brigades and Red Cross (all of which are considered part of the 'Defence Services'). The USDA counts more than 14 million members, but their allegiance to the regime is variable. In addition, there are regulations governing public meetings and travel within Burma. Checkpoints on all major roads and railways make the carriage of weapons and explosives a doubly hazardous undertaking. Anyone seeking accommodation must be reported to the authorities, a requirement which applies both to public hotels and private homes. Thus, it is difficult for strangers to escape notice for long. Members of the country's insurgent organisations have found it difficult to conduct operations outside their own (usually remote) home territories without being detected. Foreigners are identified and scrutinised even more quickly. As the historical record shows, it is not impossible to plant a bomb in the main population centres, but anyone wishing to conduct a concerted terrorist campaign in Burma faces a number of significant constraints.

From time to time, however, there have been attacks against civilian targets in Burma and Burmese targets abroad that most observers would describe as 'terrorist' in nature. Perhaps the most spectacular example occurred in 1983 when North Korean agents managed to plant a bomb in Rangoon that killed most of a visiting South Korean delegation. In that
case Burma was simply the venue for the attack, but there have also been cases of home grown terrorism. In 1985, for example, nearly 70 people were killed when a mine exploded under a passenger train travelling from Rangoon to Mandalay. In 1989, two student activists hijacked a Myanmar Airways aircraft near Mergui and demanded to be taken to Bangkok. In 1996, two bombs exploded outside Sule Pagoda in central Rangoon. In 1997, a parcel bomb was delivered to the house of Lieutenant General Tin Oo, the country’s fourth most powerful military officer, killing his daughter.152 In 1999, the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors seized the Burmese embassy in Bangkok and held its inmates hostage until the group was given safe passage to the Thai-Burmese border. The following year, members of a Burmese group called God’s Army took control of a hospital in provincial Thailand, until killed by Thai special forces. In 2002, letter bombs were sent to three Burmese diplomatic missions in Southeast Asia.153 Another bomb exploded in a cinema hall at Pyu in May 2003.154 Three bombs were planted in Toungoo the following month.155

Citing these and other incidents, the military government in Rangoon has long complained about the ‘terrorist attacks’ that ‘the Burmese people’ have had to endure at the hands of Karen, Shan and other insurgent groups. ‘Terrorist’ has become a standard term of abuse used by the regime to denigrate its opponents and their policies. Opposition political parties like the NLD and even individual political figures have often been described in this way. For example, in a clear reference to Aung San Suu Kyi, the state-controlled New Light of Myanmar described the parcel bomb attack against Tin Oo in 1997 as a ‘womanish and terrorist act’.156 Even the provision of non-military aid and other forms of humanitarian assistance by Western governments and non-government organisations to Burmese refugees and expatriate groups in Bangkok and along the Burma-Thai border have been described by Rangoon as ‘aiding and abetting terrorism’.157 After the attacks in the US in 2001, the SPDC was quick to portray itself as another victim of global terrorism. The embassy seizure in Bangkok and the despatch of letter bombs to other Burmese diplomatic missions were described as examples of ‘expatriate terrorism’. Burmese organisations based in Thailand were described as ‘dissident terrorist groups’.158

Rangoon and the War On Terrorism

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, Rangoon’s public attitude to terrorism has undergone a number of changes, as it has tried to balance its fear and dislike of the US with its felt need to be accepted by the Bush Administration as a member of the global anti-terrorism coalition.
The regime started its campaign badly, by initially refusing to issue a public statement condemning the 11 September terrorist attacks. The following day, after former President Ne Win had sent a letter to President Bush expressing his personal condolences on the loss of innocent lives, the SPDC did the same. However, in their letters neither Ne Win nor the SPDC actually condemned the terrorist attacks themselves. The 'extended public silence', and limited scope of the two Burmese letters were seen by many observers as 'an indication of the regime's hostility to Washington'. Yet President Bush's subsequent statements to the US Congress and the United Nations General Assembly, to the effect that the US would not only pursue international terrorists but also the countries which harboured and supported them, seems to have prompted a rapid re-evaluation of the SPDC's policy approach. Long fearful of a US-led invasion to restore the country's democratically elected civilian government, the Rangoon regime immediately acquired another reason to worry about Washington's determination and military reach.

Even before 11 September 2001, Burma had felt vulnerable to international action on this matter. For example, it had been severely criticised by Washington for its failure to take stronger action against international narcotics trafficking by the United Wa State Army, an ethnic insurgent group which had developed after the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989. The UWSA was listed by US scholars and officials as one of those paramilitary organisations that, through its extensive drug running operations, contributed to the unofficial financial flows which helped sustain transnational crime and international terrorism. In some quarters the UWSA was even described as a terrorist group. Yet the military government in Rangoon had not only signed a ceasefire agreement with the UWSA which encouraged the Wa to increase their narcotics production, but the SPDC has even used the UWSA as a proxy army to fight anti-Rangoon insurgent groups. Partly as a result of the continuing close linkages between Rangoon and the UWSA, and the Wa's narcotics trafficking, the US had formally closed off all but humanitarian aid to the regime. In a similar vein, Burma had been repeatedly criticised for its failure to comply with the standards established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental agency set up in 1989 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. After 2001, the FATF's criticisms of Burma took on increased significance.

After its policy fumbles in September 2001, however, the military government in Rangoon underwent a public change of heart. Over the past
two years the SPDC has been keen to show Washington, and the wider international community, that it too is concerned about the spread of international terrorism, and is doing its part to combat this menace. For example, the SPDC has publicly declared its full support for the US’s global campaign against terrorism and announced its own policy of ‘zero tolerance’ towards terrorists and their sponsors. The SPDC has emphasised the regime’s shared determination with the US-led coalition not to offer terrorists any sanctuary. It has also admitted to sharing intelligence with the US and other countries on terrorist issues.\(^\text{165}\) The regime has quietly allowed US military overflights of Burma en route to the Middle East, and taken steps physically to protect the vulnerable US embassy in Rangoon’s central business district.\(^\text{166}\) Also, in November 2001, the military government sent a letter to the UN Security Council in which it outlined a range of other commitments on this issue. A number of the measures cited were clearly designed to anticipate criticisms and forestall actions against Burma by the Bush Administration.

In its UN letter, the regime formally stated its opposition to terrorism and declared that Burmese government officials would not allow the country to be used as a safe haven or location for the planning or execution of terrorist acts. The letter also reminded the international community that Burma had signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism on 12 November 2001, and had provided all banks and government organisations in Burma with the names of those terrorists and terrorist organisations listed in UN Resolution 1333. Indeed, Burma had signed six of the 12 counter-terrorism conventions and was considering signing the other six. The SPDC’s letter also declared that the Burmese government would cooperate in criminal investigations of terrorism and bring terrorists to justice ‘in accordance with the laws of the land’. Drug trafficking and related organised crime were cited as additional challenges in Burma that presented terrorists with opportunities to exploit.\(^\text{167}\) The regime’s letter to the Security Council also included an assurance by the SPDC that, within Burma itself, there were no terrorists.\(^\text{168}\) This surprising statement, which ran counter to years of government rhetoric as well as the public record, was clearly aimed squarely at the US.

In the Southeast Asian context, Burma joined with other members of ASEAN, and on 5 November 2001 signed a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The Declaration included commitments by all member states to review their national mechanisms to counter terrorism and to increase international cooperation against terrorism in all fields. Significantly, it also included an undertaking ‘to reject any attempt to link
terrorism with any religion or race'. At the annual ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002, the Burmese delegation, no doubt with groups like the UWSA in mind, stated its official view that there was no evidence that funds from narcotics trafficking were being used to finance terrorist groups. The following week, Kuala Lumpur hosted the ASEAN Special Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, at which Burma stated that it was not necessary for it to join in the trilateral pact on anti-terrorism just signed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, in August 2002, when the US Secretary of State visited Brunei, Burma co-signed a US-ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation Against Terrorism.

The SPDC’s motives for cooperating with the US over the terrorist problem are complex. There is no reason to doubt that, after September 2001, the SPDC shared the concerns of many in the international community that it faced a dangerous new threat, in the form of global terrorism. This fear would have been encouraged by Burma’s own bitter experience of insurgency and terrorism since Independence, and its abiding sense of insecurity in the face of other challenges to military rule since 1962. Burma was home to a large and alienated Muslim population, some members of which had supported calls for a jihad against Rangoon. Also, as noted above, there was doubtless an initial anxiety by the military hierarchy to forestall any plans by the US actively to intervene in Burma and root out any international terrorist cells thought to be based there. The SPDC was probably keen to deflect further criticism of its toleration of the UWSA’s narcotics trafficking, and the regime’s slowness to take any action against money laundering by the UWSA and other groups. Already Burma has been identified by some US businesses as a ‘sponsor of terror’, commercial relations with which would be considered illegal under the new USA Patriot Act.

In addition, it appears that Burma’s military leadership hoped that, by being seen to cooperate with the international community on an issue so close to the Bush Administration’s heart, it might reduce the level of criticism it received from the US and possibly even win concessions in other forums. Sanctions against India and Pakistan were lifted as a reward for their cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts, and Rangoon seems to have been looking for similar treatment. For example, Burma still desperately needed the US to lift its opposition to loans from the world’s main international financial institutions. It also wanted to be accepted as a full member of the international community and not treated as a pariah state, like those listed by President Bush in his ‘axis of evil’ speech. While recent events in Burma have made such concessions politically impossible, at the time Rangoon’s
hopes were not entirely misplaced. Until forced by Senator Mitch McConnell and others to abandon the idea, the Bush Administration was apparently considering a sweeping proposal in September 2001 that would have allowed it to provide military aid to any country that joined in the fight against terrorism. The original proposal would have permitted the President to lift sanctions imposed by Congress against military aid to Burma.174

Relations between Burma and the US are now close to an all-time low. However, before the regime’s attack on Aung San Suu Kyi in June 2003, Washington had welcomed Rangoon’s undertakings, as outlined in its November 2001 letter to the UN, and in the US-ASEAN Declaration. Senior members of the Bush Administration were prepared to state publicly that ‘Burma has cooperated on the broader war against terrorism’, and to remind observers that ‘Burma has been the target of terror attacks’.175 The US has condemned those attacks and the groups that carried them out. The US even re-arrested one of the students who had hijacked the Myanmar Airways plane in 1989.176 Yet, to date, Washington has been cautious about openly embracing all the Rangoon regime’s official anti-terrorism policies. As David Steinberg and others have pointed out, ‘the meaning of “terrorism” varies according to political persuasion’.177 To the current Burmese government, all dissidents can be labelled terrorists, just as the democratic opposition and its supporters call the SPDC a terrorist regime. The military actions of both insurgents and the armed forces have been called acts of terrorism by those suffering their results. In particular, there seems to be some unease in Washington about the SPDC’s broad approach to the issue of Islamic extremism and the actions it has taken since September 2001 against Burma’s Muslim community.178

The attacks in the US and the global war on terrorism have given the Rangoon regime an added impetus to pursue Muslim insurgents in Burma. In particular, it has permitted the SPDC to draw public attention to the dangers of Islamic extremism, and to highlight the reported connections between some Rohingyas and international terrorist groups. For example, in August 2002 a spokesman for the SPDC used the capture in Pakistan of a Burmese member of Al Qaeda to draw attention to the training of Rohingyas by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and in ‘terrorist training camps’ in the Middle East. The regime spokesman said that the Burmese government had ‘vigorously confronted the activities of this group (sic) threatening the national as well as regional security’.179 However, the SPDC statement did not draw any distinction between the Rohingyas as a community, and those of its members who were opposed to the military government. Nor did it distinguish between the Muslim insurgents who had taken up arms against
Rangoon and the relatively small number of radicals who had allied themselves with foreign extremist groups. All insurgents based along Burma’s border with Bangladesh were characterised by the regime as ‘terrorists ... with connections to Taliban and Al-Qaeda’. Thus the name of all Rohingyas, and by extension all Muslims in Burma, was publicly blackened, and justification of a kind was given to a wide-ranging crackdown on Burma’s diverse and largely law-abiding Muslim community.

Even without this increased pressure from the military government, the war on terrorism could be expected to make Muslims in Burma feel ‘constrained and uncomfortable’. Many Burmese supported the US-led campaign against the Taliban which, after the destruction of the Buddha images at Bamyan, was seen as anti-Buddhist. These feelings have flowed on to local Muslims who are now characterised in racist literature as inherently evil and unpatriotic. However, the highly provocative approach taken by the SPDC has inflamed the feelings of the Buddhist majority even further and contributed to a number of anti-Muslim riots since 2001. The regime’s statements have prompted strong ripostes from Rohingya and other Burmese Muslim groups. Even some militants with an established record of armed struggle, like ARNO and MLOB, have issued stout denials that they are in any way associated with international terrorist groups. Some Western human rights advocates have also expressed concerns, not only about the treatment of Burma’s Muslim communities but also about the apparent willingness of the Bush Administration to cooperate with authoritarian regimes like the SPDC. To date, however, the SPDC’s crude suggestions that the country’s Muslims are inherently extremist have failed to spark any significant comment from the region’s three Islamic countries, or from any influential Middle Eastern governments.

A New Threat?

Naturally, reports of links between Burmese Muslims and extremist Islamic groups have caused concern in official circles, but some care must be taken in considering their implications. Such connections are notoriously difficult to verify. Some have been inaccurately described, some have been based on unreliable sources, while others may even be figments of a journalist’s or academic’s imagination. Even where these connections do exist, it is hard to identify their exact nature. In light of the heightened sensitivities following the September 2001 attacks in the US, any links between Muslim groups, no matter how faint or how innocent, run the risk of being seen as somehow terrorism-related. There are always the dangers of misinterpretation and over-reaction. A distinction needs to be drawn between Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim extremism. The actions of a
few radicals should not be seen as evidence of wider community sentiment, and the activities of Islamic extremists in Bangladesh should not colour perceptions of the situation within Burma. Also, there is some truth in the claim by Rohingya organisations in Bangladesh and Burma that, since 2001, the Rangoon regime has sought to use the rubric of the global war against terrorism to cloak a renewed campaign of discrimination against Burma’s Muslim population. It is also a useful means by which the military government can show the United States that it shares Washington’s security concerns, and should therefore be treated more leniently in other forums.

Yet, despite all these caveats, it seems undeniable that a relatively small number of Burma’s Muslims have found common cause with radical Islamic groups in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan and even the Middle East. It is possible that this problem may grow. The terrible living conditions found in the Rohingya refugee camps remaining in Bangladesh, and the deep sense of grievance felt by Rohingyas who have suffered at the hands of Burma’s military government, make them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist Islamic groups.185 If given access to the kind of specialist technical expertise and financial resources commanded by an international terrorist network like Al Qaeda, an insurgent group such as the RSO could become much more dangerous. Also, once in the radical fold, they can be used to conduct terrorist operations far away from Burma, and in support of causes with little connection to the situation faced by their co-religionists there. Already there have been unconfirmed reports that a few members of the RSO have been recruited to fight on Islamic battlegrounds like Chechnya and Kashmir.186 Their more Asian racial features could also be used to help extremist groups evade security measures implemented by the Western democracies, which tend to be more alert to possible threats from people of a Middle Eastern appearance.

The US is currently reassessing its approach to Burma in the wake of the regime’s latest attack against Aung San Suu Kyi and her subsequent imprisonment.187 At present, there seems little likelihood that the Bush Administration will seek closer relations with those whom the Secretary of State has described as ‘the thugs who run the Burmese government’.188 However, the global war against terrorism will remain a very high policy priority for the US for the foreseeable future. Faced with the possibility of increased links between some of Burma’s Muslims and the international terrorist network, the US may still see some benefit in eventually softening its current hardline position and getting closer to the Rangoon regime, even if only to share perceptions of a common strategic threat. Such an approach would be welcomed by the SPDC, but would bring little comfort to Burma’s oppressed Muslim population.
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Notes

1 See, for example, 'Myanmar: Anti-Terrorism War May Raise Strategic Value', Stratfor Global Intelligence Analysis, 18 February 2002, found at <http://www.burmaproject.org/021802 antiterrorism_war_raise_strat_value.html>. See also Kay Merrill, 'Myanmar: Muslims provide a new strategic focus', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol.29, No.5 (July 2003).


3 This was also a period of considerable communal strife. See, for example, Andrew Selth, 'Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945', in J.D. Le Sueur (ed), The Decolonization Reader (Routledge, London, 2003), pp.241-55.

4 For details of the expansion and modernisation of the Tatmadaw since 1988, see Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (EastBridge, Norwalk, 2002).


6 See, for example, Andrew Selth, 'Burma and Superpower Rivalries in the Asia-Pacific', Naval War College Review, Vol.55, No.2 (Spring 2002), pp.43-60.


14 Statistics on Burma's ethnic groups are drawn from The World Factbook 2002 (Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, 2002).


to draw up a new Constitution for Burma, but no progress has been apparent for a number of years.

19 Hla Min, *Political Situation Of Myanmar And Its Role In The Region*, p.71.
26 See, for example, Bertil Lintner, 'Distant exile', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 January 1993, pp.23-4; and the ARNO website at <www.rohingya.com>
27 For comparison, four per cent (3.8 million) of Thailand's 75.6 million people are recognised as Muslims. In the Philippines, five per cent (or 2.4 million) are Muslims in a total population of 60.7 million. Hefner, 'Islam and Asian Security', p.375.
29 Even now, these Muslims are sometimes referred to as Myedu, after the district in which they were settled. See, for example, Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma*, p.11; and Zam Zam, *Situation Report: Myanmar 1998* (Privately printed, Rangoon, 1998).
31 The origin of the term Pathi is unknown. The term Kala was originally used by Burmese to describe natives of the Indian subcontinent. Over time, and in different forms, it came to embrace all foreigners. Kala is now used as a derogatory term, however, and is greatly disliked by those Burmese so described. Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma*, pp.6-7.
The origins of the word Zerbadee, which first appeared in a British census in 1891, are also obscure, but may be related to a Persian phrase, meaning 'against the wind'. See Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma*, p.33.


The coastal regions of Arakan and Tenasserim were taken in 1826, the rest of Lower Burma was ceded to the British in 1852 and the Burmese capital of Mandalay fell in 1885.


There is no agreed explanation of the name Rohingya. One authority believes it derives from ‘the mixed Bengali, Urdu, and Burmese language that was the language of their poetry and songs of Arabic and Persian origins’ (Taylor, ‘Myanmar’, p.215). Others believe it derives from Rohang, an old name for Arakan (SA, ‘Myanmar’, in Farzana Shaikh (ed), *Islam and Islamic Groups: A Worldwide Reference Guide* (Longman, Harlow, 1992), p.165). Yegar states that it means ‘the compassionate ones’, but cites another claim that it is a corruption of the name given to Muslim soldiers who settled in Arakan after its conquest by the Burmese king in the 18th century (Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma*, p.25).

For details of this Buddhist kingdom, and its Muslim characteristics, see for example Jos Gommans and Jacques Leider (eds), *The Maritime Frontier of Burma: Exploring Political, Cultural and Commercial Interaction in the Indian Ocean World, 1200-1800* (KITLV Press, Leiden, 2002).

The latter stages of the Arakanese kingdom were marked by the activities of Muslim Bengali and Afghan soldiers known as Kamans (after the Persian word for a bow). They were subsequently exiled to Ramree Island, off the Arakan coast, where their descendants still live. In some Burmese records the Kamans are listed as a distinct Muslim group. See, for example, Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma*, p.24; and Zam Zam, *Situation Report: Myanmar* 1998.

Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, pp.19-70.

Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, pp.20-1.

One of the Ministers assassinated with Burmese independence hero Aung San in 1947 was a Muslim. When Independence was granted in January 1948 there were 30 Muslim Members of Parliament, including two Cabinet Ministers. A third Muslim Minister later joined them.


‘Muslims bear full brunt of Myanmar’s oppressive rule’, South China Morning Post, 17 May 2003.

Many Rohingyas refused to accept FRCs, and were left without any identification papers at all, a problem that later came to haunt them when the regime instituted its military campaigns against ‘illegal immigrants’. Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, p.56.

Paisal Sricharatchanya, ‘Some are more equal’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 October 1982, p.27. Under the new regulations, ‘associate citizens’ were offspring of marriages between communities, and the marriage partners of ethnic Burmans. ‘Naturalised citizens’ were the offspring of ethnic groups who entered Burma as immigrants during the period of British colonial rule. See also Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, p.62.


The latest example of this problem is the destruction of Kyandaw Muslim Cemetery in central Rangoon. This act was publicly condemned by the US government, prompting a vigorous response from the SPDC’s chief spokesman. See International Religious Freedom Report 2002, and Hla Min, Political Situation Of Myanmar And Its Role In The Region, pp.72-3.


According to Human Rights Watch, in most years more than 5,000 Burmese Muslims make the haj to Mecca by their own means. Two hundred more go as part of an official Burmese delegation, arranged by the military government. In 2002, only the 200 officially endorsed pilgrims were permitted to make the trip. See Crackdown on Burmese Muslims, Human Rights Watch, July 2002.


See, for example, Fink, Living Silence, p.219.

Similar pamphlets appeared in 1988 and again during the 1990s. See Fink, Living Silence, pp.225-6; and Crackdown on Burmese Muslims.


The USDA was the organisation believed responsible for the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade in June 2003.


‘Southeast Asia’s Muslims on the Spot’.


Fink, Living Silence, p.225.

‘Muslims bear full brunt of Myanmar’s oppressive rule’.


Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, p.59.


The Rohingyas call the Rakhine Moghs, from the Portuguese, meaning pirate.


Mattern, ‘Burma’s brand of apartheid’, p.31.

See, for example, Fink, Living Silence, p.127.


Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 (Silkworm, Chiang Mai, 1999), p.241.


Asia Watch, Burma: Rape, Forced Labour and Religious Persecution in Northern Arakan.


It has long been rumoured in Burma that one reason why Ne Win imposed harsh measures against Arakan after 1962 was because some Rohingyas had upset his business plans after the Second World War. While Ne Win was well known for pursuing such personal grievances, the measures taken by his regime against the Rohingyas reflect more complex motives.


'Rohingya Solidarity Organisation', *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism* (Jane's Information Systems, Coulsdon, 2002).


The memberships of these groups were predominantly Rakine and hill tribe. Lintner, *Burma in Revolt*, p.482. See also Asia Watch, *Burma: Rape, Forced Labour and Religious Persecution in Northern Arakan*, p.3.

Lintner, *Burma in Revolt*, p.482. The TNPA was a tribal organisation led by former CPB cadres.


The earliest training camps date back to 1975, making them, in the eyes of some observers, 'Asia's oldest jihadist training camps'. See Alex Perry, 'Deadly Cargo', *Time*, 21 October 2002, p.44.


Selth, *Burma's Armed Forces*, p.41.
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105 ‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.

106 While most of these arms have probably come from Thailand and Cambodia, some may have been acquired through sympathetic Muslim groups from arms markets in Pakistan. See, for example, ‘Burmese rebels reported eyeing Afghan arms’, Bangkok Post, 17 October 1994.

107 ‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.


111 ‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.


113 There is some confusion over these names. The HuM was originally formed from members of the HuJII. The two groups later merged to become the HuA. However, they reverted back to the HuM after the US designated the HuA a terrorist organisation. Essentially, the members of HuA, HuJII and HuM are cut from the same cloth.

114 ‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.

115 ‘Facts about the Rohingya Muslims of Arakan’.


117 ‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.


121 See, for example, ‘Afghans training Burmese freedom fighters’, p.85.


123 ‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.

124 Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.24, No.3 (December 2002), p.460. In an interview in June 2003 with the BBC Correspondent cited by Abuza, this author has confirmed that such a statement may have been made by CNN, but not by the BBC, as claimed. Abuza’s article contains other errors in its treatment of Burma.
For example, it mistakenly identifies the Kachin ethnic minority as Muslim, rather than Christian. It only refers to ‘three Muslim-based guerrilla movements in Myanmar’. One named is the Ommat Liberation Front, which has long been defunct. The RSO is not one of those groups listed.

Correspondence with journalist in Bangkok, June 2003.

‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.


Asia Pacific Media Services Ltd, 1 October 2002, cited in Steinberg, ‘Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?’.

Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p.204. See also Paul Watson, ‘Militant’s case casts doubt on Pakistan’s resolve’, Los Angeles Times, 6 April 2002. No evidence was presented by Gunaratna to support this statement.


‘Muslim Militants Form League In Southeast Asia’, Baltimore Sun, 21 November 2002.


Perry, ‘Deadly Cargo’, p.43.


This statement was made by Al Santoli, ‘Democracy undermined’, Washington Times, 27 June 2003. No evidence was given to support this claim.

There is also some confusion between the Tabliq movement and a number of other Muslim organisations which either have the same name, or use the word "Tabliq" as part of their name.


Peter Chalk, 'Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.10, No.2 (Summer 1998), p.129. There has long been a lively (and inconclusive) debate about what constitutes a terrorist, and a terrorist attack. For the purposes of this paper, use of the term is confined to the popularly held view of terrorism as premeditated acts of violence against non-combatants, usually by non-state actors, for wider political purposes.

Chalk, 'Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia', p.129. See also Peter Chalk, 'Terrorism spreads to Southeast Asia', Jane's Intelligence Review - Pointer, 1 April 1998, p.1.

Interview with exiled Burmese dissident, Bangkok, April 1995.

It has been suggested that the Buddhist convictions of the insurgents have prevented them from engaging in terror campaigns. This may be true in individual cases, but not all insurgent groups have been Buddhists. Also, it could be argued that Christian and other insurgent groups would have the same moral standards. The harsh tactics used by the Burma Army (most of whom are Buddhists) in its counter-insurgency campaigns also suggests that this line of argument is seriously flawed.

The Tatmadaw also boasts an elite Israeli-trained counter terrorist unit, but there is no record of it ever being employed in a counter terrorist role. See Selth, Burma's Armed Forces, p.87.

Selth, Burma's Armed Forces, pp.309-12.

See, for example, Frank Downs, 'Myanmar and North Korea: New Links Between Old Enemies', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol.25, No.6 (August 2003).


Some doubts have been expressed about the 'letter bombs' sent to Burmese missions in Singapore, Japan and Malaysia in November 2002. The devices were described by Singaporean officials as relatively harmless. Also, expatriate groups have pointed out that a bomb found in the Burmese embassy compound in Tokyo in 1989 had in fact been planted by a senior member of the embassy staff. See, for example, Aung Zaw, 'Responsibility for Bombs Lies with the Junta', The Irrawaddy, 5 November 2002.

See, for example, 'KNU [Karen National Union] denies Rangoon junta allegation of involvement in Pyu bomb blast', Democratic Voice of Burma (in Burmese), 17 May 2003.


See, for example, ‘Terrorism Threat Survey 2002’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 2002, p.8. There is no evidence to support the claim that the UWSA is backed by the Chinese armed forces. Santoli, ‘Democracy undermined’.


Ironically, the US has also been found to be in non-compliance. See David Crawford, ‘German officials fault US on money-laundering woes’, Wall Street Journal, 18 June 2003.


Steinberg, ‘Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?’ The US embassy in central Rangoon is part of a block of commercial and official premises, without any defensive perimeter. It opens immediately onto a busy street, across from a public park. As demonstrated by the attack against the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998, such offices are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack.

This paragraph is drawn largely from Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (US Department of State, Washington, 2002), p.16.


No attempt seems to have been made to reconcile this statement with Burma’s earlier letter to the UN, in which it cited the challenges posed by drug trafficking groups.

Steinberg, ‘Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?’.
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‘Rangoon, Washington Signal Continued Hostility’.


After being granted refugee status by the UNHCR, the student had enrolled at a university in the US. Naw Seng, ‘War on Terror Hits Democracy Movement’, The Irrawaddy, 28 August 2002.

Steinberg, ‘Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?’.


‘Government of Myanmar Pledges to Continue Cooperation in War on Terror’.

Maung Maung Oo, ‘Terror in America, Backlash in Burma’.


See, for example, ‘Against Muslim Rebels Trained by Taliban and in Mideast Camps’; and Naw Seng, ‘Exiled Muslims deny Taliban connections’, The Irrawaddy, 9 August 2002.


‘Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism.

See, for example, David Steinberg, ‘US needs a serious Burma policy’, International Herald Tribune, 17 June 2003.

Powell, ‘It’s time to turn the tables on Burma’s thugs’.
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Andrew Selth