THE COMPLEXITIES OF DEALING WITH RADICAL ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
A case study of Jemaah Islamiyah
Brek Batley
“Security initiatives alone will not address radical Islam. Western policy, transnational crime, endemic corruption and stagnating economies are now as much to do with Islamic extremism as weapons smuggling and fundamentalist boarding schools. The question is not whether we are able to eliminate *Jemaah Islamiyah*, but rather how best to manage radical Islam in general.”

Brek Batley
THE COMPLEXITIES OF DEALING WITH RADICAL ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
A CASE STUDY OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

Brek Batley

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ABSTRACT

The struggle against extremist Islam in Southeast Asia has gathered momentum. The progress and conduct of the Bali bombers' trials in Denpasar have been remarkable. Regional security authorities have increased cooperation to locate and detain further suspected militants. Talk of joint-border patrols, regional terrorism centres, increased airport security, police training and new terrorism legislation are all forward steps in the fight against radical Islam in Southeast Asia. However, the challenges facing the region are complex. The attacks on the island of Bali, and more recently on the US-owned JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, were not isolated cases of irrational lunacy. The perpetrators were highly trained, highly motivated and truly believed in the righteousness of their actions. Such radicalism is not only based on selective Quranic interpretations, but also on a verdant mix of political and social grievances, some of which are no longer solely regional in nature. Western policy, transnational crime, endemic corruption and stagnating economies are now as much to do with Islamic extremism as weapons smuggling and fundamentalist boarding schools. Using the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network as a case study, this paper comprehensively explores the range of problems facing Southeast Asia in the management of radical Islam.
"In this great Islamic society Arabs, Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Moroccans, Turks, Chinese, Indians, Romans, Greeks, Indonesians, Africans were gathered together - in short, peoples of all nations and all races. Their various characteristics were united, and with mutual cooperation, harmony and unity they took part in the construction of the Islamic community and Islamic culture. This marvellous civilisation was not an "Arabic civilisation," even for a single day; it was purely an "Islamic civilisation." It was never a "nationality" but always a "community of belief."

Revered Islamic fundamentalist, Sayyid Qutb
from his book Milestones (1978)

Cited in John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the name of Islam,
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brek Batley specialised in Indonesian language and Asian Studies at the University of New South Wales and the University of Indonesia. He has worked in redevelopment programs in post-civil war Guatemala and has travelled extensively throughout Muslim Southeast Asia and parts of the Middle East. As part of the Masters program in Strategic Affairs at the Australian National University, he undertook international terrorism studies with Clive Williams and Middle East studies with Professor Amin Saikal. He has recently published an ANU working paper entitled *The Justifications for Jihad, War and Revolution in Islam*. He currently works as an analyst at the Australian Department of Defence. This paper represents the author's views alone. It has been drawn entirely from open sources, and has no official status or endorsement.
AUTHOR’S NOTE

The August 2003 JW Marriott Bombing

Any hopes that Southeast Asia had largely regained control of the security environment following the Bali bombings have been completely dispelled by the events of 5 August 2003. The attack on the JW Marriott Hotel, one of Jakarta’s most secure hotels, has reportedly left at least 11 dead and over 140 wounded. While no groups have claimed responsibility, initial investigations indicate that this was another major attack by the Jemaah Islamiyah (Jl) network, with possible support by al-Qa’ida.

This latest bombing offers little new insight into the complexities of radical Islam in Southeast Asia. It does, however, confirm the broad conclusions of this paper, which assert that Southeast Asian governments are not only ill-equipped to deal with the short-term threat of Jl but, without a serious change in tactics, will be unable to deal with the even greater long-term challenges of radical Islam. That being said, the 5 August attack offers a new and enormous opportunity for key governments, politicians, community leaders and social organisations to refocus and strengthen their campaign against religious extremism. Just as the 2002 Bali attacks instigated a critical new wave of counter-terrorism thinking and initiatives, the bombing of the Marriott Hotel must be used for similar gain. Without this incremental momentum and evolution of counter-terrorism mentality, unpreventable Islamic-inspired suicide bombings will simply become a feature of the Southeast Asian political and security environment. While it is too early to determine whether an evolution in counter-terrorism commitment, tactics and capability will take place, the 6 August comments by Philippine’s President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo offer a chilling reminder of the gravity and long-term nature of the problem facing Southeast Asia. She simply warned that the “region must now learn to live with these threats from day to day.”

Brek Batley
10 August 2003
ACRONYM AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Philippines)
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIN Indonesian State Intelligence Agency
Brimob Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
DI Darul Islam (Indonesia)
EU European Union
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FDI foreign direct investment
FPI Islamic Defenders Front (Indonesia)
FTA free trade agreement
GAM Free Aceh Movement (Indonesia)
GMIP Guragan Mujaheddin Islam Pattani (Thailand)
ICG International Crisis Group
IIRO International Islamic Relief Organisation
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISA Internal Security Act
ISD Internal Security Department (Singapore)
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
KMM Malaysian Mujahidin Council (Malaysia)
KPPSI The Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law (Indonesia)
LJ Laskar Jihad (Indonesia)
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)
MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
NII Indonesian Islamic State
NPA New People's Army (Philippines)
NU Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia)
OIC Organisation of Islamic Countries
PAS Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Malaysia)
Polri Indonesian National Police
SLOC sea lines of communications
TNI Indonesian National Military
UMNO United Malays National Organisation (Malaysia)
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The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A case study of Jemaah Islamiyah

Brek Batley

Introduction

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has been accused of providing fertile ground for radical Islam and terrorism. The global Islamic revival of the 1980s, combined with the region's poor political, economic and social conditions following the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the fall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998, provided Islamic militants with new opportunities to promote their hard-line philosophies. Ongoing investigations following the September 11 attacks on the US, the October 2002 bombings in Bali and the latest car bombing in Jakarta have revealed the extent to which Islamic terrorism has operated unchecked in the region. Details of terrorist plots, bomb-making training camps, radical Islamic boarding schools, suspect Saudi charity organisations, and regional al-Qa'ida operatives continue to mount. The Bali bombings, while not representing the coming of Islamic militancy to Southeast Asia, have effectively unearthed the complex nature of the problem facing regional states. In an area home to almost one-quarter of the world's Muslim population, addressing radical Islam has proven extremely slow and problematic. While it is true that regional authorities have so far managed to locate and detain radicals, periodically discover illegal explosives, boost multi-lateral cooperation and prevent further mass-attacks, the likelihood of radical Islam posing a significant long-term threat is high. At the core of the issue is the sensitivity and difficulty involved in dealing with various Islamic interpretations, practices and structures and the ongoing impact of the West on the Muslim world. Equally significant is the immense range of political, social, economic and operational challenges faced by regional authorities. Whilst much has been achieved against Islamic militancy since the September 11 attacks, authorities in Southeast Asia are unlikely to overcome these complex challenges in the foreseeable future.

The most pertinent example of radical Islam's ongoing threat in Southeast Asia is the case of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the regional terrorist network allegedly seeking to establish a Daulah Islamiyah, an Islamic state covering Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. Established by
Indonesian nationals in Malaysia in the mid-1990s, but with a history of earlier links to Indonesian extremist movements, this broad network of Southeast Asian Islamic militants has proven difficult for regional and international intelligence agencies to fully uncover. Despite the global crackdown on terrorism, hundreds of JI members remain at large, most of whom are unidentified. JI leaders such as the late Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali) have combined a radical form of Islam, a wide range of professional terrorist trade-crafts, and significant ideological, financial and logistic support from the Middle East to challenge the current political environment in Southeast Asia. Currently, the network is widely-suspected of involvement in a series of bombings across Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, including most notably the devastating anti-Western attacks in Bali and Jakarta. Despite having suffered considerable personnel losses following the investigations into these attacks, the network and its strain of radical Islamic ideology seems likely to persist in the short to medium term.

The trials of suspected JI members in Denpasar continue to add to an already immense collection of research on the network’s history, development and modus operandi. This body of knowledge will undoubtedly be augmented by investigations into the Marriott attack. The question remains, however, as to why regional authorities have not been able to swiftly and effectively combat the JI network and, more broadly, radical Islam. Using Jemaah Islamiyah as a case study, this paper will examine the enormous complexities faced by authorities and local communities in the struggle against radical Islam. It will focus on four key factors. Firstly, it will outline the inherent strengths of JI’s network and operations, focusing on the group’s use of Islamic ideology, recruitment techniques, networking and operational methods. Secondly, the paper will explore the advantages offered for terrorists by Southeast Asia’s current operational environment, including key issues such as trans-national crime, under-performing local economies and weak security agencies. Next, the complications facing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be examined. Finally, the paper will look briefly at the respective challenges faced by four key governments, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and the USA.
The complexities of dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia

The Strengths of the JI Network

Recent studies of radical Islam in Southeast Asia have often emphasised the political, social and economic challenges faced by ASEAN member states, without offering sufficient recognition of the growing capability of extremist groups. JI’s attacks in Bali and Jakarta were successfully planned, coordinated and implemented despite tightened security in the region. For almost a decade, Singapore’s highly regarded Internal Security Department (ISD) remained unaware of a terrorist presence on its soil and, as at June 2003, had only managed to detain 32 of the approximately 80 identified Singaporean JI members. Indonesia, on the other hand, seems still unable to even determine the full extent of JI’s presence in its country. Using a combination of radical religious ideology, clandestine recruitment, extensive networking and professional trans-national operations, JI has created a formidable challenge for any security or intelligence authority.

Defending Islamic Interests

The religious ideology espoused by the JI network forms the foundations, goals and inspiration of the group and its elimination is singularly the most difficult challenge facing security and communal leaders. Members and associates supporting the JI leadership firmly believe in the religious validity and righteousness of their cause. They perceive themselves to be, and promote themselves as, the true defenders of the Islamic community. Establishing Islamic sovereignty, firstly locally and then regionally, is espoused as both a divinely justified and obligatory mission. This sense of unconditional religious legitimacy is shared among many radical groups in Indonesia and is perhaps best illustrated by a 2002 statement by the leader of Indonesia’s Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Habib Rizieq:

“If defending Allah is a terrorist act, if defending the Prophet is a terrorist act, if defending Shariah is a terrorist act, then we say to the world that we are all terrorists.”

The JI network shares this freedom fighter ideology and seeks to unite Southeast Asia’s 230 million Muslims in the defence of Allah. The general goal of establishing an ‘abode of Islam’, in which Muslims can carry out their lives within a truly Islamic framework (under Islamic law), is in fact well-supported in historical Islamic texts and traditions. It is also a legitimate religious and political aspiration. The problem for Muslim communities in the 21st century is that not all Muslims seek to live within such a framework and those who do disagree upon both its modern application and the means by which it should be achieved. This type of clash between traditionalists
and modern reformers lies at the heart of almost every religion. Radicals such as JI espouse the use of violence and, while a lack of consensus prevails within the global Islamic community on crucial issues such as the justifications for armed jihad and the ambiguous notions of ‘injustice’ and ‘oppression’, these groups will have a platform to promote their ideology. Indeed, leaders of the group have not needed to coerce people to fight for their cause; rather they have logically and systematically presented potential recruits with reams of selective evidence which, they argue, justifies the bearing of arms. To say that JI is irrational, manipulative or exploitative is an often shallow Western way of thinking that oversimplifies and misrepresents this very complex religious issue. Similarly, to approach JI as simply violent terrorists, without any attempt at dealing with their Islamic foundations, dangerously ignores the deep religious dimension of their struggle.

This radical ideology, more common in the Middle East and South Asia, is based upon an interpretation of Islam far removed from that of the predominant moderate Muslims of Southeast Asia, though equally as marketable. It is largely influenced by Saudi’s Wahhabist teachings. According to the leaders of JI, Islam must only be interpreted using the Quran, the holy book of Islam, and the hadith, the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. By choosing to give little credence to the interpretations of subsequent Islamic jurists and the social and political developments over the past fourteen centuries, JI has adopted the raw fundamentals of Islam that were conceived in, and suitable for, the barbaric warring conditions of the seventh century. John Esposito, one of the United States’ foremost authorities and interpreters of Islam, notes that Shariah, or Islamic law, in its raw form, clearly stipulates that it is a Muslim’s duty to wage war not only against those who attack Muslim territory, but also against polytheists, apostates and the People of the Book who refuse Muslim rule. However, if the interpretation and application of Shariah is modern, accommodating and respects human rights, unlike that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, it provides a legitimate challenge to the relatively modern and Western concept of the (secular) nation-state system. After all, Islamicised sultanates existed in the area long before the arrival of the Dutch, Spanish, English and Portuguese colonial powers and, still to this day, much of the legal system in Brunei is based on Shariah. However, gaining agreement among Muslims on both the necessity for, and modern-day application of, Islamic law seems likely to plague Southeast Asian Muslim communities indefinitely, not to mention the strong opposition to any such laws by the region’s non-Muslim populations.
The complexities of dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia

Not only does this ideology pose a profound challenge to regional governments, but also highlights the underlying struggle between moderate and radical Islam. As with most religions, (perceived) justification for the use of violence can be found in the holy texts. Few Muslims would deny the Prophet Muhammad sought to establish an Islamic caliphate and that he conducted many military campaigns in the ‘defence’ of Islam. Widespread agreement would also exist on the literal translation of Sura 8:39 of the Quran which states that Muslims should ‘fight (qatilu) against unbelievers until there is no dissension (fitna) and the religion is entirely God’s’ and Sura 9:5 which states ‘when the sacred months are past, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, and seize them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them in every place of ambush’.

However, moderate Muslims argue of the peaceful and evolutionary nature of Islam and that such verses must be interpreted in the wider context of the Quran and the circumstances of the period. Evidence might include verses such as Sura 2:190 which states that Muslims should ‘fight in the way of Allah against those who fight you, but do not attack them first. For God does not love the aggressors.’ The Coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network in Indonesia, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, highlights the underlying challenge facing Islam by stating:

“The only way for Islam to progress is by questioning the way we interpret the religion. To move in that direction, we need ... an interpretation of Islam that is non-literal, substantial, contextual, and in accord with the pulse of human civilisation.”

Achieving such a broad global consensus of interpretation in the short to medium term is highly unlikely, especially given that Sunni Islam lacks a central clerical hierarchy. Furthermore, the growing forces and effects of globalisation and modernisation will additionally complicate any such consensus. As a result, JI’s selective interpretation of Islamic texts and traditions gives the group an apparent religious legitimacy that will continue to challenge every Muslim community. The arrest, therefore, of every JI member in Southeast Asia will do nothing to address the fundamental foundations upon which radical interpretations are based. Indeed, the cycle of radical Islam would continue unchallenged.

Using the powerful nature of religion, JI philosophy has been able to transcend ethnicity and nationality, further complicating the task of regional authorities. Whilst the concept of establishing Islamic sovereignty in Southeast Asia has existed on a domestic level in the region for centuries, JI is one of the first groups to adopt a trans-national objective, by seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate not just in one country but across the region.
According to the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), the Darul Islam (DI) movement in Indonesia, which dates back to the 1940s, provides much of the foundations upon which JI has developed. The DI rebellions, which took place from the 1950s in Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Java, were seeking to establish an 'abode of Islam' in Indonesia. However, JI's apparent remodelling of DI's goals represents a far more ambitious plan which ultimately seeks to unite all Muslim communities in six regional countries. Whilst the means to achieve this ideal are radical, such an aspiration should not be considered irrational. Fundamentalist Islamic ideology, which maintains that religion rather than secularism or nationalism best serves the overall interests of Muslim communities, is simply contrary to current Western political evolution.

This transcendence of ethnicity and nationality has also allowed JI to take advantage of a growing Muslim consciousness in the region. According to JI philosophy, the inequality faced by Malay-Muslims in Singapore, the poverty and youth unemployment of Muslims in southern Thailand, the corruption of the ruling secular elite in Jakarta and the various Islamic struggles in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines are equally relevant to the wider Islamic community. An injustice against one Muslim is an attack on all Muslims. This means that Muslims fighting for Islamic interests in Ambon deserve the same recognition and support as their brothers in the southern Philippines and East Timor. The growing availability of the internet, satellite television, and affordable communications has exacerbated this dynamic. 'Local' issues are no longer isolated to one island, one ethnic group, or one state. With mounting evidence of Indonesian nationals being involved in the conflict in Mindanao, the Philippine government is increasingly aware of JI's ability to independently undermine any peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Just as local issues are now of regional concern, JI is of local concern. This ability to coalesce numerous nationalities to fight towards a more powerful religious ideal represents the truly pan-Southeast Asian nature of the JI network and the possible durability of its operations in the face of increased but uncoordinated security efforts.

However, the dynamic is not limited to a regional framework. JI has tapped into the global Islamic revival that gathered immense momentum in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The implications of this have been enormous. JI has broadened its religious focus to include Muslim grievances of a non-regional nature. The incorporation of anti-Western and anti-Judaist sentiment, largely as a result of its contacts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has magnified the complexity of the issue facing Southeast Asian governments. The leaders of JI explain that the 'injustices' faced by
Palestinian, Afghan, Chechen, Kashmiri and Iraqi Muslims require the attention and struggle of every Muslim. Using the same religious fundamentalism as groups such as al-Qa‘ida, JI members believe they are dutifully replicating the efforts of the Prophet who engaged in dozens of armed struggles to defend Islam against oppression, injustice and attack and, arguably, to increase the sphere of Islam, or the dar al-Islam.11 Defending Islam against this ‘cultural terrorism’ of Western influence and oppression in foreign Muslim lands has become critical in the minds of JI leaders. The ideological foundations of the network are therefore no longer of a solely Southeast Asian nature. Its goals and grievances are now intertwined with those of the wider Muslim world. JI is now part of, and a result of, the global Islamic resurgence which is largely centred on Middle Eastern affairs.

To be clear, the despair faced by Muslims in the Middle East forms one of the most influential and growing dynamics of twenty-first century radical Islam in Southeast Asia. Bali bombing coordinator, Ali Ghufron, alias Mukhlas, cited the death of “600,000 babies in Iraq” and “half a million Afghan children and mothers” as the motivator for the attacks that killed 202 “infidels”.12 Imam Samudra explained “I hate America because it is the real centre of international terrorism, which has already repeatedly tyrannised Islam.”13 ASEAN states are acutely aware of this sentiment. The US-led war in Iraq in 2003 led to a sharp tightening of security in Southeast Asia in a real fear of violent mass-protests and a JI retaliatory strike. Understanding the political, social, and often legitimate nature of these grievances is crucial to comprehending JI’s ability to portray itself as a true defender of both Islam and its oppressed populations.

The overwhelming hatred directed by JI and other radicals toward the Christian (and Jewish) West, though predominantly the US, is best understood as a reaction to a cumulative set of grievances over the past 150 years of Middle Eastern history. European colonialism, US-supported Israeli oppression, and US foreign policy, involving both direct and indirect intervention in the region, have effectively divided and oppressed the region’s predominant Muslim populations. In fact, the coming of European colonialism and the subsequent nation-state system to the region not only brought about the final blow to the Islamic empire, but also left a host of long-term territorial disputes and illegitimate and corrupt regimes in power. British (and UN) participation in the formation and initial protection of the state of Israel in Palestine was ‘humiliating’ for the Muslim world. Subsequent US foreign policy in the Middle East over the past 50 years has done much to serve US geo-strategic and economic interests and little to foster development and much needed reform in the region. This direct and
indirect involvement of the West, though predominantly the US, has unquestionably prevented the Middle East from shaping its own future.

The grievances of Middle Eastern Muslims resonate loudly throughout the Islamic world, and not solely among radicals. For this reason, much of the moderate Muslim world faced an enormous moral challenge in unconditionally condemning the September 11 attacks on the US. In Southeast Asia, JI presents itself as an organisation willing to act and willing to correct the injustices of the past and the oppression of the present. JI leaders make local populations aware that the three most holy sites in the Islamic world (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem) are subject to significant 'humiliation' or foreign control, largely based on policy from Washington. They inform teenage boarding students that the legitimate victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the Algerian national elections was unjustly overturned by secular forces and the subsequent death of over 100,000 Algerians attracted almost no interest from Washington, despite its global calls for democratisation. They convey the humiliation of Palestinians at checkpoints and the incredulity of Israeli settlers continuing to steal Palestinian land. They describe the difficulties facing the Saudi population whose corrupt and unrepresentative royal family is supported by the US for

*Expansion in the settlements of the West Bank*

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*Data not available before 1976

**Note:** The growth of settlements has slowed, but the settler population continues to expand.

its own energy and strategic concerns. And they assert that the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq was the result of Washington's policy yet again. For some Muslims, the choice is simple. Islam must respond. They reason that the use of force, including against civilians, is the only feasible way to undo Western policy in the Middle East and to change the West's general approach to the Islamic World. After all, this was the 'only language' that the superpowers understood in both Afghanistan and Somalia.

To a certain extent, Southeast Asian governments are helplessly stuck in the middle of this global dynamic. These states can no longer control the information flow that reaches their peoples. Perceived and often real injustices against Muslim communities on the other side of the globe can now render regional initiatives unworkable. The struggle against radical Islam in Southeast Asia is therefore as much about unilateralism in the Middle East as it is about explosives smuggling through northern Malaysia. Together with the support of major powers, ASEAN nations, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, will consequently need to play an active and long-term role in managing global Islamic issues in order to be able to deal comprehensively with 'local' issues. However, in the short to medium term at least, such commitment to non-regional issues is extremely unlikely given the enormity of the domestic challenges facing ASEAN member nations, including national elections in 2004 in most of the region's key states. Furthermore, JI's local aspirations must be kept in perspective. The notion of establishing Islamic sovereignty in the region existed well before the emergence of anti-Western sentiment and will continue long after US and Israeli 'dominance' has subsided. A solution to the ongoing injustices of Palestine will not spell an end to radicalism in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, non-regional friction in the wider Islamic world is now inseparable from not only the daily lives of a growing number of moderate Muslims in Southeast Asia but also the recruitment methods of JI and future radical groups.

One of the most crucial methods to help prevent new generations from joining groups such as JI is to determinedly undermine the religious foundations upon which radicalism is based. Radical ideology and interpretations must be presented as a misrepresentation of Islam. This is not a simple task and regional governments are well aware of the sensitivity of the issue. The Quran and the Prophet are both sacred and are largely beyond objective criticism in Muslim countries. Some governments hold genuine fears that any perceived criticisms of Islam could be political suicide and could spark mass civil unrest. Similarly, statements by the US President or the Australian or Singaporean Prime Ministers criticising Islamic interpretations would not only reinforce the radicals' jihadist approach but
also infuriate sectors of the moderate Muslim community. Indeed, Western states must develop greater appreciation of the complex and pervasive nature of Islam’s role in society and that any perceived pressure to mould such societies along strictly Western formulas may not be appropriate. In fact, most Western leaders would be better placed reviewing their own policies and approach towards the Muslim world rather than publicly commenting on the ‘manipulation’ of Islam by militants. Indeed, biblical references by President Bush during statements on both the war on terror and policy in Palestine does as much to convince the American people that the ideological dimension of this war is in fact religious as it does the people in the Muslim world.14

The key allies in the ideological fight against radical Islam are therefore local players, such as village chiefs, Islamic scholars, business leaders and school teachers, all of whom have the ability to manage moderates and fundamentalists before they can become radical. However, to-date, there has been little effort by either the government or the community to collectively undermine radicalist ideology, and any action will take years to show results. For Islamic or political figures to declare that the Bali bombings were wrong, though Ba’asyir and his followers have the right to their beliefs (or even worse, these figures not saying anything at all), is not only condoning the bombings, but allowing for a dangerous new generation of terrorists. In fact, in this new political environment, public statements by key religious leaders condemning Islamic-inspired car bombings will have little influence on the wider community without the implementation of new and creative education and public relations programs. These information campaigns must educate Muslim audiences on the dangers of literal interpretations and on the ‘ unholy’ use of violence. They must also stress that not all injustices faced by Muslim communities are the result of Western-inspired anti-Muslim plots. The effective management of religious sentiment relating to the Iraq war, particularly in Indonesia, shows some promising signs for the future. However, in order to provide long term structural empowerment for the region’s key local figures, Southeast Asia needs to further develop its own democratic norms and values. Indonesia’s experiment with democratisation and decentralisation and Malaysia’s and the Philippines’ future management of their hard-line Islamic communities are therefore of immense significance.

International religious bodies, such as Islamic charities, revered universities, foreign boarding schools, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) are equally crucial in the struggle against radicalism. These institutions have an enormous potential to influence the ideological posture of Muslim communities in Southeast Asia. However, their
commitment to denounce and combat Islamic extremism to-date has been minimal and almost nothing has been done on a collective scale. In this regard, the evolution of Islam and its peoples is largely beyond the control of Southeast Asian governments and will ultimately be guided by not only these foreign bodies, but also their host governments such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, both of which have done little to undermine extremism. The comprehensive management of radicalism can therefore only be achieved from within the Muslim community, with global Islamic support. If not, radicalism and groups such as JI will retain indefinitely a sense of religious legitimacy and appeal.

Importantly, the threat of radical ideology spreading in Southeast Asia should not be overstated, as it is very unlikely to gain a significant foothold among the region’s mostly moderate Islamic communities. However, as the devastation of the Bali bombings so vividly illustrated, only a small number of radicals are needed to inflict massive casualties, especially if they regard the civilian population as a legitimate enemy. With weak central governments, poor local governance, massive numbers of internally displaced communities and continuing poor economic conditions in the region, including up to 40 million people unemployed in Indonesia, these radicals are assured of a receptive audience.

Recruitment and Indoctrination

In a region long dominated by ethnic and religious struggles, the concept of defending the greater good of Islam is extremely marketable. JI needs only an extremely small number of followers, who believe in the justification for violence, to be able to implement its operations. The group has achieved this with ease. Given the solely religious nature of the network, it is of little surprise that religious institutions have been used to recruit members. In fact, questioning of detained JI suspects has revealed that most of the group’s members have been recruited and indoctrinated through Islamic boarding schools (pesantrens), Islamic high schools, (madrasahs), Islamic study groups (halaqahs), militant Islamic training camps, religious battlefields, and Islamic charities. In fact, almost every Indonesian in custody suspected of involvement with JI has either studied under Ba’asyir or in a Ba’asyir-affiliated school. It should be emphasised, however, that the vast majority of these institutions have absolutely no relationship to extremism or the preaching of hatred. Indeed, mosques form a crucial part of the social fabric and Islamic schools represent a vital component of national education systems and, without them, governments would be hard pressed to fill the void. Indonesia alone has over 20,000 Islamic boarding schools. However,
it only takes a handful of radical schools or mosques to produce hundreds of potential terrorists. This is simply a question of management and control.

Understanding the history of the group's primary recruitment and indoctrination methods is crucial. Under the clerical guidance of JI leaders Ba'asyir and Sungkar, two key schools were established in Southeast Asia. The Al-Mukmin school near Solo in Indonesia was established in 1973, in what many describe as an effort to continue DI's struggle for the creation of an Indonesian Islamic State (NII). In 1985, having fled Suharto's repressive government policies, the leaders set up the second pesantren, Luqmanul Hakim, in Johor, southern Malaysia. Over the past three decades, these two schools, together with a network of affiliated pesantrens established or run by alumni students, have provided JI with a web of members and sympathisers that span the region. The numerical size of JI is therefore impossible for security authorities to establish with any degree of certainty, especially given the likelihood of sympathisers or 'sleepers' being easily activated into operatives. The Al-Mukmin school alone has educated and trained over 3000 graduates, many of whom have become Islamic preachers in other areas of Indonesia. This extended family was the means by which JI associates were able to launch the synchronised nation-wide bombing campaign in Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000 and the October 2002 attacks in Bali. Amrozi, Abdul Rauf, Andri Octavia (alias Yudi), Ali Imron and Mukhlas, all detainees in the Bali bombings, received their training in Al-Mukmin, Luqmanul Hakim, or Al-Islam, the Ba'asyir-affiliated school in Lamongan, East Java. Similarly, Asmar Latinsani, the alleged JI suicide bomber at the Marriott Hotel reportedly studied under Ba'asyir at Al-Mukmin.

Militant Islamic training camps and battlefield experience have had an enormous reinforcement effect. They have served as the final and most profound stage of indoctrination and skill acquisition for militants. The training and fighting undertaken by dozens of JI's senior members in Afghanistan remains the most critical factor in their complete ideological commitment to violence. Militants learnt not only that superpowers could be defeated but of the injustices experienced by the wider Muslim world. Recent conflicts in the Philippines, the Malukus and Poso have ensured the same ideological dedication of junior recruits. Middle Eastern funding through charity organisations such as al-Haramain has simply helped increase the pool of willing mujahidin recruits. This has predominantly come in the form of the building of mosques dedicated to the intolerance of Wahhabism and the funding of students to attend hard-line universities such as Al-Jamia Al-Islamia University in Medina.
Using this combination of recruitment methods, JI has been able to build a network that boasts a mix of skills. Whilst their religious beliefs may be narrow, member skill sets are broad. Imam Samudra is an IT specialist. Yazid Sufaat is a US-trained biochemist and former Malaysian military captain. Amrozi is a mechanic. Waemahadi Wae-do, the suspected Thai JI operative, is both a practising doctor and professional passport forger. Singaporean JI member Mas Selamet Kastari is an aviation technician. These skillsets of members were further augmented by militant camps. Most offered explosives and small arms training as well as a forum for selecting the best students for JI membership.

Hard-line Islamic boarding schools remain one of the key issues in the recruitment and propaganda debate. This is not simply a view of often paranoid Western media reporters. It is in fact a view still held by JI themselves. In mid-July 2003, Indonesian police reportedly discovered JI documents in Semarang which clearly identified dozens of Javanese pesantrens and a host of religious preachers to be targeted for JI association. Of greater concern, however, is the religious and political sensitivities that surround these institutions and make action against them mostly slow, soft or ineffective. Many schools and their leaders are still exempt from the intense scrutiny of governmental, security and even religious authorities and the implementation of proactive measures to comprehensively manage such schools will be difficult.

Inadequately monitored schools, most of which are private, allow radicals and fundamentalists to convey anti-Christian, anti-Judaism, anti-US, and anti-secular messages to students 24 hours per day. Graduates leave JI-affiliated schools condemning the secular nation-state and seeking the establishment of Shariah law. Western nations, particularly the US, are held responsible for the growing impurity of Muslim societies. Furthermore, paramilitary training in arms and combat operations has also been provided at some schools to give students the means to defend Islam against the 'non-believers'. The freedom of managers to diverge from the 'official' government syllabus and turn to more radical materials and doctrines is a direct result of a lack of governmental funding and a weakening of central governance. JI, for example, is reported to have adopted many of the teachings of contemporary reviver figures such as Sayyid Qutb, who was the inspiration for many of the 1970s revolutionary groups, and Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Qutb, who recast the world into black and white polarities, argued that it was the divine commandment of every Muslim to establish Islamic government, even if this required armed measures (see Annex B). Ba'asyir promotes this same
bipolar view of the world to his students, claiming that “Allah has divided humanity into two, into the followers of Allah, and the followers of Satan” (see Annex C).

Given the greater affordability and availability of pesantrens, especially outside urban centres, many parents of lower socio-economic origins see the schools as a viable alternative to government education. While secular schooling will remain the most popular form of education for the vast majority of Southeast Asia’s Muslims, poor economic development will contribute to the grass-roots appeal of pesantrens. Importantly, this does not mean that poverty is the sole contributor to radicalists’ recruitment. JI bomb expert Dr. Azahari Hussin, who still remains at large, was one of several JI members who had undertaken post-graduate education in the West and was in fact one of five JI members who lectured at the University of Technology (UTM) in Johor, Malaysia. It does indicate, however, the likelihood that groups such as JI will continue to exploit the dire economic and conflict-prone state of the region to recruit personnel. Economic strategies by authorities will therefore help to undermine the appeal of radicalism and to reduce the number of susceptible recruits, but they will not fully stamp out the religious foundations of radical ideology.

JI’s use of small Islamic study groups, or *halaqahs*, to promote jihadist philosophy and recruit operatives also deserves close attention. Again, it is important to emphasise that the vast majority of *halaqahs* have no association with militancy. However, their close-knit nature has allowed JI to recruit expendable low level operatives largely impervious to penetration by security authorities. Membership of such groups was often based on long-standing personal relationships, alumni networks, shared-jihadist experience, or personal recommendations, further illustrating the difficulties facing authorities in penetrating such groups. In other cases, however, *halaqahs* were simply the next step of initiation into JI philosophy, following a fiery religious presentation to a general mass audience. Meetings would often be focused on the plight of Muslims in regional conflict zones such as East Timor and Ambon, though they would also allow JI leaders to promote the jihadist teachings of radical figures and the suffering of Muslims worldwide. Jihadists were often recruited using this forum to serve in groups such as *Laskar Jundullah* and *Laskar Mujahidin* in the battlefields of Poso and Ambon.22 Indeed, the ‘oppression’ of Muslims at the hands of Christians in Ambon would have been promoted as another case of the wider Christian-Judaist alliance moving to destroy Islam.

In Indonesia, one particular *halaqah* effectively became a JI operational cell. Under the spiritual guidance of Imam Samudra, the ICG reports, Yudi,
Rauf, Agus Hidayat, and Iqbal formed a study group which was later assigned the task of robbing a goldsmith's store to partly fund the Bali bombings. Similarly, the former leader of JI's Singaporean operations, Ibrahim Maidin, recruited a small network of devotees by using halaqahs to personally vet and select students who showed a passionate interest in the plight of Muslims worldwide. Almost all of JI's members in Singapore, the majority of whom were educated middle-class men, were recruited in this manner. This process took approximately 18 months for each student and managed to escape the attention of Singapore's highly regarded ISD for almost a decade.

That both pesantrens and halaqahs were able to promote jihad in local Muslim conflict zones is perhaps one of the most dangerous long-term dynamics for the region. Recruitment drives were often based on powerful video images of 'persecuted' Muslims in Ambon and Poso. This highlights the need for regional governments, most notably Indonesia and the Philippines, to undertake the difficult task of establishing long lasting peace agreements in current conflict zones and ensuring current agreements are effective and sustainable. The breakdown of the peace agreement in Aceh and the latest spate of violent attacks in Mindanao are not good news in the broader fight against radical Islam. A stable region without disgruntled Muslim communities will play a significant part in eliminating the appeal of radical Islam. A region without religious battlefields and their necessary training camps will undermine the ability of JI to indoctrinate and train new waves of recruits. This cannot be overstated. JI's loss of Camp Abu Bakar in the Philippines was a huge blow to the network's current and future capability. Unless another such camp has been established, JI's complete control and development of its members will be limited. Dealing with outstanding sectarian and sovereignty issues, many of which have remained unresolved for decades, must therefore form part of a grand counter-terrorism strategy adopted by governments to combat future recruitment. Dialogue and compromise must be promoted as solutions to disputes, not the bearing of arms.

Reducing state-funding for pesantrens or madrassahs, particularly in Indonesia, will not eliminate radical Islam. In addition to undermining the education system, schools would likely become even more susceptible to Wahhabist funding. Indeed, the growth of Wahhabism in Cambodia can be directly attributed to Saudi and Kuwaiti financial support. Barring all Middle Eastern 'development' funding is equally as inappropriate and damaging. Modernising private Islamic schools by ensuring that more balanced curriculums are offered, including subjects such as Mathematics and Science, will go a long way to not only reducing the spread of intolerant
ideologies, but also preparing students for more gainful employment. Securing the funding to do this and implementing it without destroying the schools’ cultural and religious heritage is an enormous long-term task. In the short term, however, registering and monitoring all religious schools across the region will prove essential. Locally managed education and public information campaigns on the dangers and impropriety of religious intolerance will prove just as influential as governments having the legal capability and political willingness to immediately close down schools promoting or condoning violence.

It is important to remember that recruitment methods by JI and other radicals will probably adapt to the changing security environment. Security authorities are well-aware of the key role played by Islamic schools in recruiting and training personnel, though they realise that JI has attracted members through a variety of different channels including universities. Indeed, Malaysia has already closed the *Luqmanul Hakim* pesantren and Cambodian authorities have quickly closed the radical *Um al Qura Institute* and expelled its teachers from the country. However, Indonesian National Police Chief, General Dai Bachtiar, accurately acknowledges the sensitivities of these religious issues, citing the investigation, detention and trial of Ba’asyir. In October 2002, he noted that, despite the mounting evidence of Ba’asyir’s involvement in terrorism, the religious leader was part of a “high level of Indonesian society”. Indeed, both Ba’asyir and Sungkar reportedly attended the same Islamic boarding school, *Gontor* Pesantren, as likely Presidential candidate, Nurcholish Madjid (aka Cak Nur) and Hasyim Muzadi, Chairman of Indonesia’s biggest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Moreover, current Vice-President Hamzah Haz is a close acquaintance of Ba’asyir. In a land where respect for religious scholars and the elderly seems to be far more culturally significant than in the West, officials have rightly taken a measured and highly transparent approach in their investigation, which in previous cases has often erroneously been interpreted as a lack of will on the part of Jakarta.

Overall, the capability of regional governments to eliminate the appeal offered by radical ideologies to potential recruits will determine the longevity and scale of radical Islam in Southeast Asia. This requires not only community management of Islamic schools and mosques, but also effective government action to try and address some of the broader causes of terrorism and not merely the symptoms. That key members of JI reportedly took oaths of personal allegiance, or *bai’ah*, to Ba’asyir, only serves to reinforce the futility of dealing with terrorism once it is established. The death penalty may provide some short term relief for authorities and grieving families, but it must not be confused as a long-term solution. In this regard, local
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communities, businesses and governments, together with the assistance of key figures such as sporting and media celebrities, must take steps to undermine the claim by radicals that they are the sole defenders of Islam and that non-believers "always work hard to oppose Islam". This, however, becomes extremely difficult when Southeast Asian Muslims see television footage showing ongoing 'targeted' Israeli assassinations, US-made Israeli tanks demolishing Palestinian houses, unilateral and 'illegal' invasions of Muslim lands by essentially Western coalitions, and 20 months of unlawful detention of Muslims in Guantanamo Bay. The West must therefore work more wisely with the Muslim world so that key leaders in Islamic countries are better placed to manage their peoples. In the meantime, while complete indoctrination and training of new members is becoming increasingly difficult, JI and its successor organisations will unquestionably retain the ability to recruit new operatives.

Networking and Support Mechanisms

Perhaps the most significant strength of JI is its ability to tap into existing Islamic sentiment and infrastructure so as to develop an extensive regional network of members, associates and support mechanisms. As discussed earlier, this has been achieved through the conduit of radical Islamic ideology used in pesantrens and other religious forums, including foreign educational institutions and jihadist battlegrounds. Personal contacts lie at the heart of the JI network.

Following the movement of Al-Mukmin members to Malaysia in 1985, JI was able to take advantage of Malaysia's openness to all things Islamic. During this period in Johor, JI established an enormous range of contacts among radical Islamists throughout the world that remains active to this day. The group formed its most important support lines into the Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Afghanistan. Sungkar, and later Hambali, who both reportedly spent several years in Afghanistan, established crucial connections with al-Qa’ida and paved the way for other members to undertake both mujahadin training and fighting abroad, as well as religious studies in foreign institutions. Many of those who undertook such training became highly capable members of operation cells, while others became part of a broader network of associates. Whilst these opportunities further radicalised the group to the extent that Ba’asyir and Sungkar incorporated many ideologies espoused by al-Qa’ida and other extremist groups, JI has preserved much of its own identity and goals. With few exceptions, JI personnel are simply sympathisers of al-Qa’ida, not members. Fundamentally, JI remains a product of Southeast Asian political and social conditions. As a result, any successful regional counter-terrorism
operation against al-Qa’ida or Middle Eastern funding channels will mark neither the elimination of JI nor the elimination of JI’s religious appeal. Conversely, the elimination of JI from Southeast Asia will not mark the end of al-Qa’ida’s regional presence.

However, the support offered by al-Qa’ida to JI has significantly augmented the group’s ability to conduct complex trans-national operations. By working internationally, JI and other groups in the region have been better equipped to achieve their goals. The planned December 2001 attacks against Western interests in Singapore underline this point.29 Despite JI conducting much of the groundwork for the attacks, the final planning and implementation stages were to be coordinated by al-Qa’ida operative Mohammad Masour Jabarah, alias Sammy, who was sent to Singapore in October to complete this task. Al-Qa’ida was to fund the operation and, according to detained al-Qa’ida operative Omar al-Faruq, the plan also included the dispatch by al-Qa’ida of four Arab suicide bombers to carry out the attacks. Interestingly, 10 months later, JI was able to provide its own suicide bombers for the Bali bombings and conduct the operation with seemingly limited tactical support from bin Laden’s group.

This form of assistance has come at a price. Indeed, al-Qa’ida’s ability to graft itself onto other groups is one of its greatest strengths, and the JI network would have been regarded as a key addition. JI personnel have given logistical support to a number of al-Qa’ida plots, including Hambali’s arranging of planned meetings in Malaysia for the September 11 attacks on the US and possible facilitation of other meetings in Malaysia for the attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen.30 Hambali, for example, reportedly organised working papers for key al-Qa’ida operative Zacarias Moussaoui, which falsely outlined Moussaoui’s employment with a Malaysian company, so that he could travel to the US.31 The Malaysian JI network is alleged to have established at least four front companies for the channelling of al-Qa’ida funds, human resources and weapons and explosives procurement.32 It also seems possible that JI’s incorporation of Western targets has been in exchange for al-Qa’ida technical and operational training, so as to enable larger and more sophisticated operations as evidenced in Bali.33 Without these deep support channels from Middle Eastern radicals, JI would almost certainly have failed to develop the extensive arsenal to which it now has access.

Following the commencement of the war on terrorism, this al-Qa’ida-JI relationship is currently proving to be one of JI’s key strengths. Given the continued marginalisation of its operations on a global level, bin Laden’s group has probably sought an increased role for JI on a regional level. For
al-Qa'ida, Southeast Asia represents one of the few zones still suitable for high-impact attacks on significant Western targets. With the continuing arrests of such key figures as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the limitations on al-Qa'ida's decision-making process will likely magnify the autonomous role of the JI leadership. Statements made by the chief of the FBI's anti-terrorist financing unit also support the potential for an increased role for the JI network. He claims that al-Qa'ida has been forced to channel funds away from the Middle East and towards Asia as a result of the crackdown on illegal money flows since September 11, 2001.

The role of jihadist combat experience in the growth and strength of the JI network can again not be overstated. Without the jihadist experience in Afghanistan, the southern Philippines or Indonesia, JI would almost certainly not have evolved into the networked force that it represents today. The shared experiences on Muslim battlefields have served as a long-lasting bond among jihadists, from which JI can subsequently rely upon for support in its operations. These 'support cells' continue to offer JI key logistical and funding assistance while not necessarily being part of the immediate JI family. Security authorities have hence discovered the difficulties in uncovering the layers of JI personnel and associates. Using a medium to long term perspective, a global commitment to post-war Afghanistan and Iraq will prove just as important as preventing foreign nationals from training and waging jihad in Kashmir. Building or maintaining working relationships with countries such as Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan and Algeria must be considered part of an overall long term strategy to understand and manage Islamic militancy.

JI's struggle to defend Muslims throughout Southeast Asia also provides the group with the advantage of being able to enlist support from other Islamic extremist groups within the region. In Indonesia alone, dozens of extremist groups including FPI, Laskar Jihad (LJ) and Laskar Jundullah, purport to be 'true' defenders of Islam. Whilst the likelihood of JI conducting fully integrated operations with most of these groups remains low, the potential for indirect networks and support infrastructure is high, as illustrated in JI's use of Laskar Mujahidin to provide combat training for recruits in Poso and the Malukus. The sale or concealment of weapons, explosives, fake documentation and personnel could also be facilitated by such like-minded groups. If JI were given the chance to expand, it would undoubtedly seek to fund and support local groups, just as al-Qa'ida was doing, and continues to do, on a global scale. Even without such an opportunity, increased regional security measures may effectively compel the network to forge greater operational alliances with other extremist groups.
The case of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), an umbrella political organisation seeking the implementation of *Shariah* law, deserves separate attention. The MMI was formed in 2000 by Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual head of JI who also was elected as the head of MMI. The organisation has 38 branches across Indonesia, most of which are located in Bali, Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara. The ICG concludes that MMI shares clear personnel links with the JI network and has reportedly held joint meetings. Many argue that the MMI is simply the political extension of JI. In effect, JI has successfully created a web of terrorists, a group of legitimate well-respected Islamists, and a body of ardent supporters. It is this combination of personnel and strategies that complicate the work of security authorities. Any repressive action against the seemingly legitimate MMI organisation would spark memories of the hard-fisted tactics of the Suharto regime. Indeed, debating the establishment of Islamic law through legitimate channels should be fully encouraged, thus reducing the sense of injustice felt by some proponents of the law.

Muslim struggles in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have offered common ideological ground for JI to interact with other regional groups. The most supportive evidence of JI's networking through the region is its initiation in 1999 of an informal alliance called *Rabitatul Mujahideen* (RM). This alliance, which reportedly sought to share resources in training, funding and procurement of arms, brought together Philippine's *Moro Islamic Liberation Front* (MILF), the *Malaysian Mujahidin Group* (KMM), Indonesia's *Laskar Jundullah*, various Acehnese rebel organisations and a number of other groups from Thailand and Burma. Whilst this alliance seems never to have been fully developed, it displays again the group's capacity and determination to undertake complex trans-national operations.

The RM alliance also highlights two further networking complexities facing security authorities. Firstly, the inclusion of a Thai jihadist group as one of only three groups on RM's central committee emphasises the key role of Thai radicals in JI's overall operations. With a history of lawlessness and Muslim separatist ambitions, the country's poverty stricken south offers prime territory for the support of JI operatives and operations. The June 2003 arrests of three suspected Thai JI members in the southern Thai province of Narathiwat largely confirm JI's operations in Thailand. The detention of two suspected Thai JI members in Cambodia and the presence of a group of radical Thai Islamic teachers also in Cambodia further suggest the significance and extensiveness of Thai involvement in the JI network. Secondly, the inclusion of a Burmese Muslim movement in the RM alliance not only indicates the scale of JI's extended contacts, but also stresses the need for a coordinated region-wide approach by authorities to prevent Burma
or the former Indo-Chinese states becoming safe havens, areas of operational planning, or easy attack targets. Seeking to prevent further persecution of Burma’s Rohingya Muslim population by Yangon might now take on added significance for regional security authorities.

**Operations**

JI’s extremely secretive structure, planning, coordination and trans-national operations have proven highly professional. Both the Bali attacks and the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings, which involved coordinated attacks in 38 locations, illustrate JI’s ability to conduct relatively sophisticated operations. The fact that authorities across the region are still unable to determine the number of JI operatives remaining at large attests to the network’s operational secrecy. Growing evidence of JI involvement in the most recent attacks in the southern Philippines, highlights the ability of the group to continue to plan and conduct smaller-scale attacks, despite arrests of members and the tightening of security in the region. The probable JI bombing of the Marriott Hotel, arguably one of the most secure hotels in Indonesia, indicates that the militant network can no longer be regarded as simply a short term threat.

JI is based on a cellular structure which differentiates it from many of the guerrilla outfits in Southeast Asia, and ensures that it is highly suited for trans-national urban operations. The ICG and the Singaporean Government have comprehensively outlined the formal organisational structure of JI, which is reported to include up to nine layers of subordination across four different geographic zones or Mantiqis (refer Annex A). This organisational structure underlines the protected levels of management within the JI network, especially in the top echelon. Penetrating these layers, other than at the lowest levels of operational cells and expendable foot soldiers, has taken much time for regional security authorities. Identifying the informal networks and the funding and command channels has proven even more challenging. In early February 2003, only three of the 19 people arrested directly in relation to the Bali bombings had been identified as JI members. However, the April, June and July 2003 arrests of over 40 JI suspects, which included several mid-level leaders, combined with likely arrests associated to the Marriott attack, will contribute crucial information to security authorities’ understanding of the militant network, particularly in Indonesia.

The level of professionalism, determination and discipline displayed by JI operatives has arguably been of a higher degree than that shown by many of the region’s security personnel. From the time of recruitment, members are inculcated into a culture of secrecy. Those involved in operations are given code names and communicate using code words. Members often
have multiple aliases, which are changed regularly, and local JI networks are rarely privy to the real identities of visiting members.\textsuperscript{39} Samudra alone had 11 aliases.\textsuperscript{40} Communication channels are highly sophisticated in terms of detection avoidance. Ambiguous or veiled mobile phone text messages and emails would be standard procedure, with both phone numbers and email accounts being changed regularly. These terrorists retain the advantage over the majority of regional security agencies, most of whom are already over-extended and simply cannot keep up. Operations are also kept highly compartmentalised, ensuring that expendable low-level operatives are the most likely to be identified. This pattern of secrecy also ensures that the arrest of members from one particular operational cell will not quickly allow for the discovery of other cells. Whilst Ba'asyir probably knew of the Christmas Eve and Bali attacks, it is highly unlikely that he had any involvement with the implementation of the operations.\textsuperscript{41}

JI's trans-national component is the key to its operational effectiveness. Unlike many other extremist groups in the region, JI is not limited to one community, island or nation. The group's known core membership is comprised of Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, and Singaporeans, many of whom have been involved in planning, training and attacks in countries other than their own. Malaysian operative Taufik Abdul Halim, for example, is alleged to have participated in the August 2001 Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta, in retaliation for attacks made on Muslims in Ambon. More significantly, however, the Bali bombings were funded by radicals in Afghanistan, partly planned in Thailand, and perpetrated by mostly Indonesian nationals, some of whom were recruited in Malaysia and trained in the Philippines. The Marriott attack will probably reflect a similar degree of trans-national complexity.

The relationship shared between JI and the MILF clearly demonstrates the regional complexities of radical Islam and the operational depth of JI. Key JI member Fathur Rahman Al Ghozi was the main liaison officer between the two groups, as well as the primary demolition expert and explosives trainer with the MILF.\textsuperscript{42} MILF operative Saifulla Yunos also liaised directly with his counterparts in JI. As a key ally, the MILF provided JI combat training and facilities at Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao in return for funds. Hundreds of JI operatives would have trained here. As an example of the relationship, the JI network provided funds and operational planning assistance for the December 2001 attacks in Manila.\textsuperscript{43} According to the Indonesian police, training was also provided by the MILF in return for JI attacks on Philippine government targets. One of the first examples of this type of arrangement was a JI retaliatory attack on the Philippine ambassador's home in Jakarta in August 2000, following a clamp down on
the MILF by the Philippines government. The problem in the Philippines now is that JI can undertake independent operations in the country’s south that undermine the government’s attempt at peace negotiations. Finally, it is likely no coincidence that one of the four bombs detonated on the evening of 12 October 2002 was detonated outside the Philippine consulate in Manado, North Sulawesi, again supporting the argument of a close alliance between JI and their ‘oppressed’ brothers in the Philippines.

The professional management of JI funds has been equally significant and equally elusive for regional security authorities. Much of JI’s funding appears to have been received via legal sources including charities, non-government organisations (NGOs), legitimate businesses and mosques. Substantial sums of money have been transferred personally throughout the region, though informal systems of money transfers from the Middle East, including the Islamic hawala banking system and charitable religious organisations, have also played a role in the group’s financial processes. In addition to occasional illegal operations to obtain money, such as the 2002 goldsmith robbery which partly funded the Bali bombings, JI also operates an economic wing at regional and local levels to generate long-term sources of funding for operations and training. These businesses are allegedly required to contribute 10 per cent of their total earnings to the group. Inactive JI members in Australia were also alleged to have sent significant amounts of funds back to Indonesia. Al-Qa’ida figures as a major source of external funding, to the extent that the official police summary of Mukhlas’ interrogation states “Jemaah Islamiah’s jihad operations were funded by al-Qa’ida”. The al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi based charity which has been used by al-Qa’ida to provide funds and training to the Abu Sayyaf and MILF, is also alleged to have funded JI operations, thereby further attesting to the global nature of terrorism infrastructure. Indeed, the Malaysian and Singaporean authorities allege that, since 1996, the JI network has received at least Rupiah 1.35 billion from al-Qa’ida.

Finally, JI’s overall operational tactics and strategy poses one of the greatest problems for security authorities. JI uses a long-term framework. Ba’asyir, for example, informed an Australian Muslim audience that they should seek the establishment of Islamic law “even if it’s 100 years from now”. Such patience, however, does not mean that JI will ultimately achieve its goals, but rather that Ba’asyir and his supporters will seek to prevent short-term gains affecting longer-term sustainability. This is best illustrated by two aborted missions in the Philippines during 2001 in which Hambali sought to attack Israeli and US interests. Much like al-Qa’ida, JI is prepared to wait for the most opportunistic moment to conduct a large-scale attack on a symbolic target, or targets, rather than conduct a series of easier less
significant strikes. This sense of patience and grandiosity provides for a lethal combination, as witnessed in Bali.

The tactics employed by JI differ to most other groups in the region and allow JI far greater flexibility and destruction. Despite the Bali bombers’ apparent amazement at the success of their operation, viewing the attacks on the nightclubs as simply a ‘lucky’ strike would overlook the significant tactical advantage held by JI. Indeed, the attack on the Marriott is sufficient evidence of this. Terrorism at any level is difficult to prevent. However, JI’s modus operandi differs from that of other regional groups. The network is not seeking to engage in political negotiation which permits it greater offensive freedom. JI is also prepared to inflict mass-casualties upon civilians, which serves to expand its attack methods and targets. Also, given JI’s access to use of suicide bombers who offer greater ‘success rates’ in operations, JI will retain the upper hand against authorities. Finally, the network’s potential target set is enormous, including, but not limited to, political, diplomatic, military, civilian, economic and ‘symbolic’ targets of a Western, Christian, Chinese, Israeli or secular nature. The task of defending all of these potential targets is simply impossible.

JI’s attacks and operations do not involve expensive equipment or weapons. The main Bali bomb, for example, is reported to have required only six primary components: dual-use chemicals; filing cabinets; concrete cable; a detonator; a mobile phone; and a van, all of which were readily available and relatively cheap. JI has chosen to use ammonium nitrate (a common agriculture fertiliser) and potassium chlorate as its main explosive sources. Whilst a licence is required to purchase ammonium nitrate in Indonesia, for example, its use is widespread among farmers and fishermen. Chemical companies can also be set up as a means to obtain the product; however, as discovered in the Bali bombing case, there are also existing chemical stores willing to falsify official receipts. Whilst al-Qa’ida maintains its relationship with JI, the use of more expensive or complex weapons, such as an attack using chemical, biological or radiological weapons (CBRW), remains a possibility. The June 2003 arrest of a Thai national trying to sell radioactive material on the open market in Bangkok attests to the reality of the threat. However, more troubling for security authorities is the success rate offered to JI by the use of more ‘conventional’ and simple methods such as truck bombing or the use of transportable weapons, including shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) which are available on the black market for less than US$15,000. The July 1993 discovery in Semarang of 30 bags of potassium chlorate, four boxes of TNT, 11 shoulder-launched rockets and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, suggest that JI will continue to use more accessible materials. Moreover, corruptible military personnel can act as
key conduits to increasing access to conventional weaponry and know­how. The September 11 attacks also showed that box cutters, combined with initiative and sophisticated planning and training, can be used to inflict mass destruction. With minimum funds, JI will retain the element of unpredictability.

JI has also proven adaptable to the changing security environment. Beginning with remotely detonated devices on anti-Christian targets, as witnessed in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, JI then expanded its target sets to include Western diplomatic and defence interests using suicide bombers from outside the region. As a result of the security crackdown following September 11 and the uncovering of the 2001 planned strikes in Singapore, JI readjusted and incorporated ‘soft targets’, such as the nightclubs bombed in Kuta and the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. The likelihood that at least one local suicide bomber was used in both the Bali and Jakarta attacks may indicate an additional shift in attack methods, representing the first use of locally sourced bombers by JI, or any other group in Southeast Asia. Preventing attacks by non-state actors on soft targets, particularly if undertaken by suicide bombers, represents a serious challenge to any capable security authority, as witnessed by the continuing devastation in Israel. Finally, the reported July 2003 discovery of a JI list of targeted Indonesian political figures for assassination may indicate a further shift in both targets and modus operandi. Regardless of any significant increase in the capabilities of regional intelligence authorities, terrorist networks will effectively retain the tactical initiative.

With key operational planners and explosives experts still at large, JI clearly retains a dangerous capability. These leaders are already deeply indoctrinated, unlikely ever to surrender their arms and fearless of the death penalty. The attack on the Marriott Hotel will not be their last. That the Marriott bombing occurred during one of the most obvious trigger periods, which included increased nation-wide security for Amrozi’s sentencing, Ba’asyir’s trial and the annual sitting of the Indonesian national parliament, emphasises that a counter-terrorism approach in Southeast Asia cannot depend on security measures alone. More concerning for security authorities is the increasing evidence that JI or any future off-shoot organisation would continue militant operations irrespective of the arrests of key leaders. This emerging dynamic reinforces the futility of a counter-terrorism approach focused on the detention of Hambali, Dr Azahari, Dulmatin, al-Ghozi Zulkarnaen or any other prominent JI figure. While their arrests will be important advances against the immediate JI threat, they will prove of minimal value in the long term fight against radical Islam. Ultimately, Islamic extremism will remain dynamic. Personalities will change, and
tactics will evolve, based on the successes and failures of both local and foreign terrorist operations. Tightening security at key locations and increasing the capability of regional intelligence authorities may prevent some attacks, but they will not prevent all.
The complexities of dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia

27

The Operating Environment of Southeast Asia

One of the most critical factors contributing to the inability of regional governments to deal with radical Islam is the current nature of the region’s physical and security environment. For the most part, Southeast Asia currently offers domestic terrorists an effective support and operational platform free from intense government scrutiny. These freedoms are a direct result of the region’s geography and lax border and immigration controls. However, issues of even greater significance include the poor living conditions of Muslims in the region, existing networks of illegal crime, established Middle Eastern influences, and the multitude of challenges facing security authorities and regional governments.

The Geography of Southeast Asia

Firstly, Southeast Asia’s geography is conducive and in fact favourable to terrorists’ operations. Rugged interiors and thousands of kilometres of unpatrolled coastlines offer enormous scope for radical groups to conduct activities. Authorities in Indonesia and the Philippines alone must patrol over 91,000km of coastline. Isolated locations, where government control is either weak or virtually non-existent, are plentiful. The MILF, for example, controls 10 per cent of the island of Mindanao. These represent safe havens for refuge, training, and operational planning. Following the closure of the MILF’s Abu Bakar training camp in Mindanao, the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in mid-2002 identified Borneo as a key area in JI’s training operations. Closing camp Abu Bakar effectively dispersed JI members deeper into the Southeast Asian environment.

As security tightens in maritime Southeast Asia, the former Indo-Chinese states and Burma will require far greater scrutiny to ensure that all safe havens are eliminated. The May 2003 detention of suspected JI operatives in Cambodia should come as little surprise. War-torn Cambodia’s 600,000 strong Cham Muslim population, which reportedly includes over 30,000 adherents of the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect, represents fertile ground for extremist ideology. While it is unlikely that JI will seek to establish a permanent presence in places such as Vietnam and Laos, an increasingly dispersed JI network may require new areas for refuge or support. Given Laos’ extremely mountainous topography (90 per cent of terrain is above 180 metres), recent security authorities’ reports of radioactive material being stored in Laos for sale in Thailand is of enormous concern. Similarly, while Vietnam does not have a significant Muslim population, its 3,444km of coastline, heavily forested Chaine Annamitique mountain range, and its government’s recent moves to support its tourism sector, make it a possible future base for support operations. Australia, with a Muslim population of
over 450,000, is also not exempt. Given the country’s inclusion in JI’s reported organisational structure and recent revelations of JI operations in several of its major cities, Australian intelligence authorities must ensure that its substantial interiors and extensive coastline also are not exploited by JI.\textsuperscript{56} However unlikely, Japanese cult\textit{Aum Shinrikyo}’s use of Western Australian farmland for chemical weapons experimentation warns of the possibility.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Country & Length of coast km & Area of land km\(^2\) & Pop. 1998 (millions) & Pop. 1998 (% of total) \\
\hline
Brunei & 161 & 5765 & 0.3 & 0.06 \\
Cambodia & 443 & 181,035 & 11.4 & 2.26 \\
Indonesia & 54,716 & 1,904,569 & 203.7 & 40.42 \\
Laos & Nil & 236,800 & 5.0 & 1.00 \\
Malaysia & 4,675 & 329,758 & 22.2 & 4.40 \\
Myanmar & 1,930 & 676,578 & 4.4 & 8.81 \\
Philippines & 36,289 & 300,000 & 75.1 & 14.9 \\
Singapore & 193 & 618 & 3.2 & 0.63 \\
Thailand & 3,219 & 513,115 & 61.1 & 12.12 \\
Vietnam & 3,444 & 331,689 & 77.6 & 15.40 \\
\hline
Total & 105,070 & 4,479,927 & 504.0 & 100.00 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Length of coastlines, area of land, population}
\end{table}


The archipelagic nature of Southeast Asia will also continue to be exploited by radical outfits, not only for training and planning but also to launch attacks. Sea-based strikes, as already employed by the \textit{Abu Sayyaf} group in the southern Philippines, will likely become more common, as will maritime-based trans-national crime. With largely ineffective or over-stretched navy fleets, Southeast Asian nations must do more to safeguard their maritime channels from attack. Intelligence authorities have already uncovered a host of planned attacks on Western naval and shipping interests in the region, including plans against several US naval ships in Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian waters. A large-scale maritime attack on a ship or port in the Malacca Straits, which at its narrowest point is only 2.5 kilometres wide, seems almost inevitable. This is a highly strategic sea-lane that carries one third of the world’s maritime trade, 80 per cent of
Japan’s oil, and is the major approach to the port of Singapore which hosts approximately 150,000 visiting ships per year. Hundreds of these are US naval vessels. The three other important and highly vulnerable shipping lanes are the straits of Sunda, near Jakarta, the straits of Lombok and the straits to the east of East Timor. A successful and large-scale attack in these waters, though particularly in or around Singapore, one of the world’s busiest ports, would not only have an enormous impact on Southeast Asia’s economy but also send shock waves through the global economy. JI is well aware of this.

**Porous Borders and Weak Immigration Controls**

The porous nature of the region’s borders, combined with weak immigration systems, have played an important role in providing terrorists with largely unchallenged movement. The importance of tourism to Southeast Asian economies has led to countries offering easy access visas. Most countries in the region cannot afford to expend the security resources needed to fully control their extensive borders, particularly maritime ones. Indonesia, for example, has a navy of 117 vessels, though less than a third are fully operational. The social complexities of the region’s border and immigration problems are just as significant. Most countries of the region are highly inter-connected at a grassroots level as a result of displaced persons, ethnicity, legal and illegal immigrants, trade, and tourism. In Malaysia, for example, despite Kuala Lumpur’s crackdown in mid-2002, there are estimated to be well over half a million Indonesian and Filipino immigrants in the country. In 1996 alone, 550,000 illegals were uncovered in Malaysia, over half of which were Indonesians. Large expatriate communities are common in the region’s bigger cities. In the southern Philippines, for example, there is a large Indonesian community in Davao and General Santos City. Furthermore, Southeast Asia is also home to an enormous number of displaced persons, including an estimated 1.6 million Burmese refugees in Thailand. Illegal immigration is not new to the region. This immense traffic flow makes it difficult, though not impossible, for authorities to track suspected extremists.

Radical militants are fully aware of the shortcomings of the region’s border controls. Augmenting security personnel and X-ray facilities at international airports will do little to curb the illegal activity taking place at many of the region’s land and water borders. Endemic corruption and institutional inadequacies will not be eliminated overnight. While many countries in the region have tightened visa requirements since September 11 and the Bali attacks, key illegal travel routes and networks still exist.
North Sulawesi, East Kalimantan and the nearby Malaysian province of Sabah are important transit points between Malaysia, the Philippines, the conflict zones of Eastern Indonesia, and Singapore. JI and a host of other groups continue to use this area to smuggle human resources, arms, explosives and cash. It was not surprising that key Bali bombing suspects, Mubarrok and Ali Imron, were located and arrested on the remote island of Berukang in East Kalimantan. In March 2003, Sabah was identified by Malaysian Police as the location of a discovery of an undisclosed amount of weapons and explosives, strongly suspected to belong to JI. During January and February 2003 alone, the Malaysian Police claim to have intercepted half a dozen Islamic militants returning from explosives training in the Philippines to Malaysia through its northern waterways. News of the Indonesian Navy adding an extra 160 service people to its maritime border with the Philippines and purchasing an additional 22 new warships are positive steps, though human intelligence in the area will prove to be the biggest aid to security authorities.

The much-travelled Sumatra-Riau Archipelago-Singapore path also remains significant. Two particular islands, Bintan and Batam, have been exploited by extremists. Both islands are popular crossing points for the thousands of Indonesians travelling to Malaysia in search of legal (and illegal) work. Bintan Island, a popular Indonesian holiday resort island, has boats leaving daily for Singapore and ports throughout Indonesia. It is a regional travel hub that has long been used by illegal elements seeking refuge in Indonesia or access to Singapore and the Southeast Asian mainland. However, the February 2003 Indonesian arrest of key JI operative, Mas Selamat Kastari, on Bintan Island has not yet instigated the significant changes needed on border control in the archipelago for fear of disturbing business and tourism income for both local and national economies.

The Malaysia-Thailand land border has also been placed under the spotlight by Singaporean authorities. It is largely unpatrolled and caters to an estimated 40,000 border crossers every weekend. Hambali allegedly made frequent use of the waterway and, with growing evidence of a significant Thai network of JI members, safe passage through the border crossing would have been crucial. Plans for the Bali bombings were decided on in a February 2002 meeting in Bangkok, and a key exchange of funds for the bombings was conducted one month later at a bus terminal in the country's south. The Malaysian-Thai Regional Border Committee, which is made up of the militaries of both countries and agencies such as immigration, police and customs, needs to show a greater willingness to curb illegal activities on the border. However, with Malaysian tourists
representing the second largest component of Thailand’s tourism income, in an industry which is the largest single foreign exchange earner for Thailand, a reduction of the current freedom of movement across the border is bad news economically. The recent revelation, however, of JI plans to bomb diplomatic and tourist sites in Bangkok, seems likely to be the only catalyst capable of turning Thailand’s denial into concerted action.

The Economic Conditions of Muslim Southeast Asia

Radical Islam is as much about religion as it is about the failure of domestic political economies. Poor economic conditions for the majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia have ensured the continued existence of anti-government and anti-establishment sentiment. While poverty does not cause terrorism, it exacerbates underlying and pre-existing grievances. Radical Islamists are easily able to tap into this negative sentiment while adding a religious dimension that further fuels tensions. Nationalist sentiment can often therefore be redirected and channelled into Islamic expression. This subsequently allows for militants to spread their own ideology and to manipulate the cognitive processes of potential recruits. Shariah law does not separate religion from the political sphere and calls for its implementation are as much a reflection of radicals’ interpretation of the Quran as a statement on the current socio-economic management of Muslim societies.

The latest economic figures offered by the CIA suggest both the depth of Muslim discontent upon which groups such as JI can draw and the real and perceived socio-economic injustices against Muslim communities upon which radical preachers can unite. In Muslim dominated Indonesia, 27 per cent of the population, or 60 million people, are below the poverty line. The nation’s struggling Muslim population are further angered by the fact that ethnic Chinese in Indonesia represent only three per cent of the population, yet are suspected of controlling over 50 per cent of the country’s economy. In the Philippines, the number of those under the poverty line is estimated at 40 per cent, though this estimate climbs to over 50 per cent in rural areas. The provinces in the Muslim dominated south have the country’s lowest literacy rate and life expectancy. In Thailand, the five Muslim dominated provinces have an average income of at least 7,000 baht less than those of neighbouring Buddhist-dominated provinces. In Singapore, ethnic Malays, comprising only 15 per cent of the population, complain of being passed over for the better jobs in favour of the country’s ethnic-Chinese dominated populace. The apparent wealth disparity between Muslim and other ethnic groups (not to mention the West) has provided ammunition for Islamic preachers who also cite the growing gap between rich and poor.
The continuation of such parlous economic conditions, combined with the region's host of unresolved conflicts, many of which have involved decades of open hostilities, ensures that the current operating environment in Southeast Asia favors radical militants. It also has dangerous long-term consequences. This dynamic is best surmised by Amina Rasul-Bernado, a senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace:

"Together, poverty and conflict perpetuate a vicious cycle. Poverty fuel(s) conflict - by magnifying the sense of marginalisation and exclusion. Conflict, in turn, aggravate(s) poverty - through its effects on people, institutions and the economy. Thys they create the very conditions for their (own) continuation." 67

Many in Indonesia, the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia feel that Islam is one of the few things of which they can still feel proud. This has a crucial stabilising effect and should not be discouraged. However, with some governments still suffering from the financial crisis of 1997, much of the social and economic welfare of many Muslim localities has been left to community-based Islamic organisations. Of course, this does not breed radicalism. However, it does reinforce the notion among many moderate Muslims that Islam is the sole entity willing and able to defend their interests.

Such conditions, therefore, advance the position of groups such as JI, which argue that communities of Islam are more effective than secular states. In this context, Indonesia's experiment with political and fiscal decentralisation and the Philippine's management of the Moro people in its south play an enormous role in determining the longevity of radicalism in Southeast Asia. Sustainable development and poverty reduction will be critical in minimising the conditions that breed extremism. Government departments of education, employment, public welfare, health and finance must therefore all contribute to the defence and welfare of Muslim (and other religious) communities. However, most of these key departments continue to face severe financial limitations. The performance of regional economies and polities will therefore be partly dependent upon the ongoing and future commitment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, other foreign aid donors, and foreign investors.

Southeast Asian Criminal Networks

Southeast Asia has long been home to an extensive web of illegal activity. The region boasts a large supply of illegal weapons, both imported and locally produced. In 1998, the Philippine government identified 330,000 weapons outside of official government control. 68 Cambodia has long been
recognised as a key centre for arms smuggling, with long standing connections both within and beyond the region. Southeast Asia also provides a haven to an extensive network of drug trafficking and organised money laundering. Myanmar and Laos are two of the biggest cultivators of opium poppies in the world and drug use and trafficking is increasing in the Philippines. Despite increased efforts in the war on terror, arms shipments, money laundering, kidnapping and other illegal activities have remained largely uninterrupted, particularly throughout the 23,000 islands of the Philippines and Indonesia. Furthermore, maritime Southeast Asia has the world's highest incidence of piracy and has seen a marked increase in the number of attacks over the past five years. Illegal immigrants and workers represent another major problem. In Malaysia, for example, it is estimated that there are more than half a million Indonesians and Filipinos working illegally while, in Indonesia, over 750,000 women or children are reportedly traded every year. In many cases, these illegals have been smuggled in by syndicates suspected of working with employers, immigration officials and government officials to circumvent immigration laws. The smuggling of materials and products, such as logging, sugar and sea sand, is another key contributor to the region's black economy.

Such criminal infrastructure contributes to radical Islamic operations in a host of ways. Firstly, it gives radical operatives easier and more protected access to a wide range of resources, including explosives, weapons, forged documents and human and financial smuggling operations. Secondly, it means that security resources that could otherwise be directed towards counter-terrorism operations are heavily committed on these 'criminal' matters. The current Thai police operation against domestic drug traffickers is the most obvious example. But perhaps most importantly, criminal networks undermine the functionality of state systems and institutions. As Asia-Pacific strategist Alan Dupont argues, trans-national criminal operations "distort international economic trading patterns, infiltrate and suborn political, business, judicial and military elites and transform power relationships to the detriment of good government and the rule of law". Such criminality not only exacerbates corruption but also political instability. And in some cases, notably in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, security services are in fact heavily involved in domestic and trans-national crime, and have little to gain from changing the status quo. Overall, such criminal networks have an enormous security-degrading effect that terrorists will continue to exploit.

Again, the importance of Thailand in these illegal operations is paramount. The country has long been a Southeast Asian centre for people smuggling, gun-smuggling, document forging, and it hosts a large black
economy. Suspected Thai JI operative Waemahadi Wae-do, arrested in southern Thailand in early June 2003, admitted to organising fake passports for JI. Less than a week later, a Thai national was arrested for trying to sell radioactive material in Bangkok. The Thai government assesses that over 100 million baht in drug money is laundered annually through financial institutions in Thailand.\textsuperscript{71} The US$10 million of annual American aid, used mostly for anti-drug military training, needs to be accompanied with effective long-term programs to counter entrenched corruption amongst authorities at all levels. Without this, the strong nexus between local criminal networks and international terrorism will remain uninterrupted. Overall, the willingness and commitment of Thai law enforcement agencies to deal comprehensively with these networks will play a small but significant role in the broader struggle against trans-national extremism.

**Long-standing Links to the Middle East**

Southeast Asia maintains centuries old political, trade and religious links with Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. These ongoing links offer key advantages to radical Islamists. Firstly, it is important to note that many of the traders who spread Islam to Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, originated from what is now Yemen. These ancestral ties are still strong and personal networks remain important. Al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden is of Yemeni descent, as are JI leaders Ba'asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar, FPI leader Rizieq, and LJ leader Thalib. With so many Indonesians of Arabic descent leading the country's main Islamic radical groups, these hard-liners have an influence far beyond their proportion of Indonesia's population. And, given Islam's Arabic origins, many Southeast Asians accord Arabs a special status. It is little coincidence that so many of al-Qa'ida's plots over the past decade have involved operational planning meetings in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{72} These linkages to the Arabian peninsula also help to explain the growing concern among some Southeast Asian Muslims about the plight of their 'brothers' in the Middle East. The management of this small but influential population of Islamic leaders of Arabic descent will be crucial in the overall management of domestic Islamic sentiment.

Citizens of Middle Eastern origins are common in many Islamic communities throughout the region, as are visiting family members, religious leaders, academics and business professionals from the Middle East. Urban centres such as Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya and Kuala Lumpur are host to not only thousands of native-citizens of Arabic descent but also a range of events which attract many visiting Middle Easterners each year. This situation allows for locals to provide welcome cover for visiting radicals,
such as al-Qa’ida leader Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a Kuwaiti national of Pakistani ancestry, who passed himself off in Manila as a rich businessman from Qatar. Such protection for Middle Eastern counterparts allows the region to play host to experts in terrorism and maintain crucial contacts. Furthermore, increased Saudi missionary activities since the 1970s have been widely suspected of playing a key role in the financing of various regional groups. Indeed, Middle Eastern funded NGOs, such as the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), are common throughout the region and have provided enormous resources in the construction of mosques, pesantrens and places of worship. Most of these then provide an avenue for the propagation of Saudi Wahhabist teachings and further personnel networking. In Cambodia, for example, the 28 Islamic teachers expelled from the Um Al Qura Institute in May 2003 for inciting violence were from Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt and Thailand.

 Millions of Southeast Asians work in the Middle East, including over 800,000 Filipinos in Saudi Arabia alone. This expatriate community has taken advantage of well-established informal remittance systems such as the hawala system to send home billions of dollars annually. The annual pilgrimage to the holy sites in Mecca and Medina, undertaken by an increasing number of Southeast Asian Muslims, represents another opportunity to establish contact with Muslims from all over the world. These are not small numbers of Southeast Asians undertaking the haj; they often number in the hundreds of thousands. Educational opportunities, including scholarships, in the Middle East are also pursued by thousands of Muslim students. This exposes students to a host of other radical ideologies and allows them the opportunity to develop a network of world-wide contacts. FPI leader Rizieq studied for several years in Saudi Arabia and Abu Sayyaf leader Abdurajak Janjalani allegedly studied in Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The leader of the MILF, Hashim Selamat, studied at Cairo’s famous al-Azhar University where he was inspired to clandestinely organise a core group of Filipino Muslim students to undertake a revolution in the Philippines upon their return. These early contacts, mostly established through open and legitimate forums, have proven invaluable for many of these radicals’ later endeavours.

Managing these extensive linkages will prove crucial. Globalisation has meant that regulating sermon content in the mosques of Jakarta can be greatly undermined by radicalism in Bangladesh, Yemen and Pakistan, especially given the rise of the internet and global Arabic television stations such as al-Jazeera. States can ill-afford to terminate all funding by overseas Islamic charities and NGOs. Indeed, such a proposal is nonsensical. However, resources must be allocated to ensure that they are
comprehensively monitored and that their activities are transparent. Reports of Brunei seeking to establish itself as a key financial and banking centre for the Muslim world further highlight this point. Proper administrative systems must be put in place to manage Southeast Asian students overseas. Many of these initiatives are already underway, however, they take time and financial resources, as well as extensive cooperation with Middle Eastern and South Asian states. Offending the region’s small but influential Arabic community in the process would do more harm than good.

Regional Security Authorities and Bilateral Relations

The capabilities of most of the counter-terrorism forces in Southeast Asia are limited. Capability shortfalls, poor funding, inadequate wages, competing agendas, heavy commitments, endemic corruption and ineffective coordination procedures plague most of the region’s security and intelligence bodies. Singapore, and to a much lesser extent Brunei, remain exceptions. Many agencies, particularly those in the former Indo-Chinese states, require advanced training to be able to coordinate efforts with their counterparts in other countries. However, coordination throughout the region is still in its infancy, with governments so far largely unable to develop effective long-term mechanisms to join security efforts against radical militants. Intense rivalries often exist between security agencies both on a domestic and regional level. In Cambodia for example, as recently as 1998, two of its country’s armies were engaged in open conflict against each other.

Indonesia serves as the best example of the depth of law-enforcement problems facing numerous governments in the fight against radical Islam. Its security authorities have a history of exploiting tensions for their own political and financial gain. Destabilisation and civil unrest is periodically promoted, supported or conducted by the Indonesian military (TNI) and other agencies in a bid to justify continued security operations and official funding, as well as to maintain lucrative protection rackets. Both TNI and Polri are reported to receive only 30 per cent of their funding through official channels. Following the August 2002 armed attack on US personnel near the Freeport Mine in Papua, widely suspected as the work of TNI’s Special Forces (Kopassus), evidence emerged that the mining company had paid in excess of US $11 million over the past two years to TNI for protection. Since 1999, raids on central Jakarta bars and clubs by the militant FPI group have allegedly been tacitly condoned by Polri to support their own protection rackets. In 2001, during ethnic clashes in East Kalimantan, TNI and Polri’s Mobile Brigade (Brimob) were engaged in violent clashes of their own that resulted in the deaths of several officers. These two security forces, criticised by many observers for not trying to stop ethnic clashes, had fought for control
of a refugee evacuation boat on which fleeing civilians were forced to pay bribes for a berth. This incident was just one of at least 90 inter-agency clashes during the previous 24 months, mostly over control of illegal activities. Furthermore, in 2000, TNI was widely suspected of supporting, or at the very least condoning, the murder of Christians in Ambon at the hands of the Laskar Jihad. The arrest of fugitive Tommy Suharto further reveals Polri's potential for non-compliance. Though apparently knowing of his whereabouts for almost a year, Polri had refused to act, probably as a result of vested interests. Indonesia, as with many of the countries in the region, faces profound challenges in the implementation of its domestic law enforcement.

The JI network has benefited from such incompetence and corruption. Three recent cases are worthy of note. The miraculous July 2003 escape of key JI operative al-Ghozi from one of the Philippines most secure buildings was an enormous setback for regional authorities and underlined that any new security training must come hand in hand with a corresponding change in professional culture and mentality. Similarly, the alleged suicide of JI’s Jakarta Chief Ichwanudin (aka Asim) while in Indonesian police custody in early July 2003 represents a monumental failure for regional security efforts. Asim, who reportedly grabbed a rifle, loaded it and killed himself while being handcuffed and under close surveillance, offered the best chance for Indonesian authorities to have thwarted the Marriott attack. Finally, the July 2003 military rebellion in Manila, in which mutineers claimed entrenched corruption at all levels of state and weapons laundering by the military to radicals, not only undermined the authority of the state, but also offered prime material for JI operations and recruitment. These cases show that no amount of foreign aid or technology will quickly overcome these entrenched institutional shortcomings.

Importantly, Islamic-based terrorism in Southeast Asia represents only one of a number of major security challenges facing authorities. This is often overlooked. Every state in the region is still dealing with unresolved domestic, ethnic or religious issues, many of which are perceived to represent a more ‘clear and present’ danger to domestic stability. Territorial disputes, including that in the South China Sea, have remained open wounds that continue to affect intra-regional relations. The Indonesian security forces, already grossly over-stretched, continue to regard separatism and social upheaval as bigger threats than international terrorism. The latest outbreak of violence in Aceh, following the collapse of the December 2002 peace agreement, will ensure that Indonesia’s focus and full commitment on counter-terrorism will be limited. Military and security analysts in Thailand are focused on the Thai-Burma border, which was on the brink of war in
mid-2002, while its police forces are often diverted to the anti-drug war. The Philippine military has been largely devoted to eliminating the mostly criminal activities of the Abu Sayyaf group in the country's south, as well as having to deal with the ongoing threat posed by communist terrorists of the New People's Army (NPA), a campaign now waged for over 30 years. Meanwhile, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are still dealing with a host of internal issues as a result of decades of civil conflict and upheaval.

Reform, refocus and retraining of security authorities will take time and will require the technical and financial assistance of foreign states and organisations. Human intelligence will largely drive the security dimension of the struggle against radical Islam. This often requires many years of work and resources before results are visible. And, given the trans-national nature of Islamic terrorist activities, it depends on an enormous amount of information sharing and cooperation, concepts which are still in their infancy in the region. However, the June 2003 arrests of JI suspects in Thailand, following information obtained through Singaporean authorities, further highlight a growing cooperation. Improving endemic corruption is also pivotal in this battle. Given that the greatest corruption in the region takes place at the top echelons of the military and politics, corruption is best considered as a cultural phenomenon and not simply a reaction to poor wages. Contrary to popular belief, addressing such corruption takes generations, not overnight reform packages. Education and training of security services will be largely dependent upon the will of outside players such as the European Union (EU), Australia and the US. Human rights atrocities committed by security forces in the past, however, complicate this much needed international commitment, as does the possibility that newfound skills or foreign military equipment will simply be used against local political adversaries instead of terrorists.

Furthermore, relations among Southeast Asian nations are poor. Bilateral relations in the region have been dominated by historical tensions. Open conflicts, unsettled disputes and decades of distrust have limited cooperation among regional states to deal with trans-national terrorism, which is simply one of the newest security issues in the region. The January 2003 break in diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Thailand best illustrates the insecurity, fragility and shallowness plaguing intra-regional relations. A Cambodian film star sparked violent anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh due to her comments to the media on a controversial issue of Thai-Cambodian sovereignty. Furthermore, the Malaysian government's effective expulsion of up to half of the 900,000 registered Indonesian workers in its country in August 2002 with little warning further highlights the lack of established
and useful dialogue in the region. Malaysian-Singaporean relations are regularly sidetracked by heated exchanges on issues such as water supplies and key sovereignty matters, including most recently over Pulau Batu Puteh. Increasing numbers of disputes over illegal-fishing in Southeast Asia is also complicating political relations and cooperation.

The JI leadership seems acutely aware of these bilateral and multi-lateral tensions. As part of its strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate, the network identified the traditionally flammable relations shared between Singapore and Malaysia as the most potentially destabilising element in the region. By fuelling these tensions, the JI leadership sought the overthrow of the Malaysian government which, they argue, would provoke an ethic-based revolution, transforming Malaysia and the rest of the region into an Islamic state. This was an elaborate plan, yet based on real sensitivities. These underlying tensions, common to so many Southeast Asian countries, continue to hamper bilateral cooperation and undermine any possible role for ASEAN, the region’s primary cooperative forum.
The Role of ASEAN

As the region’s primary forum for multi-lateral dialogue and cooperation, ASEAN plays a crucial role in combating the double edged sword of radical Islam and terrorism. While ASEAN was never intended to act as a security forum, this is effectively one of the roles now needed of it. Given the trans-national non-state threat of groups such as JI, governmental cooperation is a fundamental prerequisite for a successful anti-terror campaign. Despite the increase in bilateral and multi-lateral security cooperation initiatives throughout the region since September 2001, ASEAN remains unable to deal fully and effectively with this issue. As discussed earlier, relations between ASEAN member nations are dogged by a long history of interstate political animosities. Since its inception, ASEAN’s firm adherence to the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and its tendency to avoid challenging issues has guided the organisation’s operations. Little has changed. Compounding the problem, cooperation is further hindered by the real fear held by regional governments that increased cooperation on counter-terrorism may lead to the revealing of security-related capabilities and weaknesses. Indeed, these very weaknesses have been exploited by trans-national terrorists who refuse to operate within the region’s traditional nation-state boundaries.

The Bali bombings, however, brought about a fundamental change in the region. ASEAN has long depended on Indonesian leadership to maintain the organisation’s relevance and influence. The devastation witnessed in Bali, and now Jakarta, has resulted in key Indonesian leaders publicly calling for action against terrorism. This has significantly contributed not only to the increasing success of Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts, but also to the growing regional commitment against Islamic militancy. Indeed, counter-terrorism cooperation was one of the main discussion points at the annual ASEAN Summit meeting in Phnom Penh in November 2002 and has featured as a key topic at subsequent senior-officials meetings. The 2002 summit produced both a new Declaration on Terrorism and the signing by Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand of an agreement to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation through intelligence sharing and border control. However, the importance of Indonesian leadership within the ASEAN forum remains central. Given the current domestic problems facing Jakarta, Asia-Pacific strategist Paul Dibb believes that Indonesia is unlikely to reassert itself as the region’s de facto leader for at least another 10 years.77

Other recent initiatives are also worth a brief mention. These include a February 2003 meeting in Jakarta between officials from the various ASEAN
states' police forces, a 3-day workshop in January 2003 in Manila (which
was attended by all ASEAN states as either signatories or observers to the
new anti-terror pact), Malaysia's establishment of a Regional Counter-
terrorism Centre, and a range of bilateral Memorandum of Understandings
(MOUs) and declarations on anti-terrorism cooperation, including with non-
regional members such as Australia, the US, China and the EU. The August
2002 US-ASEAN Joint Declaration, which calls for signatories to freeze the
assets of terrorist groups, strengthen intelligence sharing and improve border
patrols, was one of the first major steps for the region in the war on terror.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the principal security forum for the
wider Asia-Pacific region, has also implemented several initiatives, including
the first inter-sessional meetings of senior officials on Counter-terrorism
and Trans-national crime in March 2003. Importantly, only once united
ASEAN cooperation is established can broader frameworks such as the
ARF, ASEAN-Plus-Three (with Japan and South Korea) and US-ASEAN
Dialogue and ASEAN-China summits become most effective. The success
of the joint Australian Federal Police-Polri investigation in Bali highlights
one of the important contributions that can be made by non-regional players.

Cooperation has also improved at an operational level, yet remains
inadequate. Information-sharing particularly from Singapore, has led to
the arrest and, in some cases, deportation of suspected JI operatives.
Singapore has also allowed officials from the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, US and Australia access to its detained JI members for
interrogation purposes. Continuing arrests of Indonesians in the Philippines
will further test operational level cooperation in the region. The sending of
witnesses to Jakarta to testify in the trial of Ba'asyir continues to face
constitutional problems from various states. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral
extradition treaties are also still lacking in the region, underscored by
Singaporean JI member Kastari who currently faces only immigration
charges in Indonesia despite growing evidence against him in Singapore.
Unlike the smooth exchange of intelligence between the United Kingdom
and the US, language and cultural problems persist between ASEAN states.
In a troubled region where an agreed definition of 'terrorism' still remains
elusive, public declarations on cooperation and joint-operations may prove
more difficult to implement or maintain in the longer term.

While it is too soon to assess the impact on ASEAN of the Marriott attack,
the organisation's lack of determination, unity and effectiveness against
radical Islam are likely to remain in the short to medium term due to a mix of
factors. The current consensus approach adopted by ASEAN ensures that
hard-hitting anti-terrorist initiatives remain difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve. The admission of four new members (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma) over the past decade has further paralysed ASEAN's decision-making ability. Consensus looks almost impossible on issues such as an increased security role for the US in the region. A lack of inter-operability among counter-terrorist forces also compounds the problem. Any unified approach will be hampered by the variance of jurisdictions under which primary counter-terrorism functions are conducted among ASEAN member states. Furthermore, all of the states possess vastly different levels of counter-terrorism expertise, with the former Indo-Chinese states requiring significant training and funding. Proposals to establish joint police, intelligence, military task-forces will require major reforms, funding and training among the relevant bodies, a process unlikely to be completed in the next 5-10 years.

Just as significantly, counter-terrorism in the ASEAN forum is still considered a secondary issue. Given the parlous state of most economies in the region, economic security and growth is regarded by most ASEAN member nations as the key priority facing Southeast Asia. The 1997 crisis served as a security warning to the region that severe economic disruption to any one state can no longer be fully isolated. Furthermore, economic reconstruction following the financial crisis is now critical to political stability. However, by seeking to present a positive image of the region to prevent any further loss of foreign direct investment (FDI) or tourism dollars, governments have avoided a complete and public acknowledgement of the scale and long-term threat of radical Islam. This is no more evident than in Thailand, where some key leaders still maintain that the country is unlikely to be the target of an attack. The economic impact of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) only further complicates the struggle against religious extremism. Moreover, maintaining secure trade or aid links with the US, despite anti-US public sentiment in some countries, remains an overriding factor in most regional governments' considerations. Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia all depend on the US market for at least one fifth of their exports. Also, the financial stability of Japan, already showing signs of weakness, will affect its major aid recipients in the region: Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Cambodia. The economic future of Southeast Asia is now, more than ever before, linked to that of Japan and the US. Importantly, if Southeast Asia fails to attract these sources of investment, the subsequent economic instability will provide further fertile ground for terrorism and radical ideologies. Religious extremism would become more entrenched.
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SE Asian Total 20,370 23,705 29,597 27,647 19,495 16,189
China 33,787 35,849 40,180 44,236 43,751 40,400
Developing countries 104,920 111,884 145,030 178,789 179,481 207,619
World 255,988 331,844 377,516 473,052 680,082 865,487

SE Asia as % of world total 8.0 7.1 7.8 5.8 2.9 1.9
SE Asia as % of Dev. countries total 19.4 21.2 20.4 15.5 10.9 7.8

Sources: Southeast Asia Affairs 2001, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Chio Siow Yue, Singapore, p.38

Similarly, the growing economic influence of China is considered to pose more dangerous consequences to the region than the threat of terrorism. Prior to the Asian economic crisis, ASEAN states attracted twice as much FDI as did China. These figures have now been completely reversed, leading the ASEAN group to work towards more practical economic integration amongst its members. According to Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 80 per cent of Indonesia’s exports compete with those from China. In combating the economic threat of China, ASEAN is devoting enormous resources and attention to the establishment of a free trade agreement (FTA) with China, which would create the world’s largest free trade area. There is also growing talk about an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which would turn ASEAN into a single market free of tariffs and restrictions. This focus on re-establishing the region’s economic prosperity has resulted in radical Islamic terrorism being viewed simply as a passing obstacle to achieving such goals, rather than a long-term threat of its own.
International terrorism may simply represent yet another challenge faced by ASEAN over the past decade for which it has no effective answer. The organisation's inability to provide adequate management or response to the Asian financial crisis, the devastating 1997-98 bush fires originating in Kalimantan, and the 1999 violence in East Timor have led many to believe that the group is facing a real crisis. Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar has stressed that ASEAN has to "reinvent itself and demonstrate its relevance". One cannot overstate the need for the group to demonstrate its relevance in developing a region-wide and multi-dimensional strategy to deal with the current spread of extremist ideology. ASEAN must not only seek non-regional assistance to strengthen law enforcement capacity, but must also continue to secure vital social development aid from the UN, EU, ADB, Japan and other donors. Raising living standards will be as important as developing new security measures. And just as significantly, ASEAN must seek to coordinate key policies of its member states. After all, it was the lack of political coordination in the 1980s between Indonesia and Malaysia that caused the growth, internationalisation and radicalisation of the JI network.

While ASEAN's continued focus on economic security will play a key role in eliminating potential support for radical ideologies, it will not be enough to drive radical Islam from the region. Over the next five to ten years, ASEAN's internal complexities are likely to render both reactive and proactive counter-terrorism initiatives highly superficial. Furthermore, it would seem equally likely that ASEAN will continue to focus on conflict management, namely a de-escalation of violence, rather than conflict resolution, thus leaving radical Islam to fester indefinitely. More calls for action and more working groups will continue to dominate the ASEAN forum. However, in this context, the most likely catalyst that will transform largely hollow ASEAN rhetoric into firm, effective measures will be more attacks in more member states. Though, of course, even a greater regional commitment does not necessarily guarantee a solution to the problem of radical Islam.
Key States in the fight against Radical Islam

Indonesia

Due to its size and geopolitical weight, Indonesia holds the key to regional security in Southeast Asia and deserves considerable analysis. The Indonesian archipelago comprises 40 per cent of the region’s population and landmass and sits upon some of the most important sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the world.\textsuperscript{80} The stability of the entire region, particularly Singapore and Malaysia, is inextricably linked to Indonesia’s progress on separatism, ethno-religious conflicts, economic development, reform, radical Islam and terrorism.

\textit{Religious Persuasion}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Buddhist 1\%
  \item Sunni Muslim 88\%
  \item Hindu 2\%
  \item Roman Catholic 3\%
  \item Protestant 5\%

\end{itemize}

\textit{Ethnic Makeup}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Javanese 45\%
  \item Sundanese 14\%
  \item Coastal Malays 7.5\%
  \item Madurese 7.5\%
  \item Other 26\%

\end{itemize}

Indonesia, however, has often been accused of being one of the weakest links in the fight against radical Islam. Muslim fundamentalism and militancy has found a small foothold in the confused politico-economic situation prevailing since the 1997 financial crisis and the 1998 fall of the repressive Suharto regime. Islamist groups such as MMI, which were previously contained under Suharto, have now been able to gain political representation as a result of the country's fragile experiment with democracy. Radicals too have had the opportunity to expand their support base and embark upon ambitious strategies. The difficult challenge so far in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, has been the balancing of secularism, political Islam and the need for tighter security. The support of Indonesia's predominant moderate Muslim population in all initiatives undertaken by Jakarta is essential to the ongoing stability of the nation. Governmental, security and judicial authorities can therefore ill-afford to take any action against terrorism that would be interpreted as anti-Islamic for fear of alienating the country's peaceful majority.

Nonetheless, Indonesia has made significant progress on this issue. The Bali bombings instigated a major shift in the thinking of the Indonesian public, political elite and security authorities. The January 2003 statement by Police Chief General Da'i Bachtiar that JI "planned and executed" the Bali bombings comes following almost 12 months of Jakarta denying the existence of JI in Indonesia.81 Furthermore, in addition to passing retrospective anti-terror laws and proposing amendments to existing criminal law, the Indonesian government permitted Australian, US and British investigators to work on Indonesian soil to investigate the nightclub bombings. Importantly, Indonesia has not shied from arresting foreign nationals in addition to local suspects. On the public front, the continuing large scale arrests of domestic extremists, combined with their alleged confessions, have led to a greater public acceptance of the existence of indigenous Indonesian terrorism. While conspiracy theories are still common in mainstream Indonesia, there is a growing public willingness to deal with indigenous terrorism. Polri's ongoing cooperation with its Western counterparts has so far attracted little criticism from the Indonesian masses. Furthermore, a February 2003 survey by the on-line version of Tempo magazine, Indonesia's leading news magazine, found that 60 per cent of respondents believed Ba'asyir had approved the Bali bombings.82 This largely contradicts earlier fears by security officials that Ba'asyir's ongoing detainment might lead to wide-spread civil unrest.83 That Ba'asyir launched a law suit against Bachtiar for unlawful detention illustrates the new-found freedoms of Indonesia's political and judicial system and the greater complexities facing Indonesian authorities.
Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri has been criticised widely for her slow response to the terrorist threat. Whilst her popularity is still relatively high, she remains conscious of her government’s vulnerability. The January 2003 riots across the country against President Megawati’s price hikes on fuel and services resulted in her effectively reversing the decision. With few significant policy initiatives in her first two years in office, Megawati is widely seen as an indecisive and cautious leader unable to provide Indonesia with the firm leadership needed to maintain the momentum of the ‘reformasi’ period. She has been both unable and unwilling to form a serious policy agenda on many of the country’s domestic challenges, including corruption, separatism, reform, economic stagnation, and transnational terrorism. With regard to far-reaching counter-terrorism initiatives, her options are limited. Giving too much power and responsibility to TNI or the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN) could undermine her own power base, especially since the military continues to play an enormous role in local and national politics. Strong action against radicals, without evidence, also runs the risk of offending the entire Islamic community, including her crucial moderate supporters. Prior to the Bali bombings, radical groups such as FPI and LJ issued her warnings against taking an un-Islamic stance. MMI cautioned that she was “playing with fire” and risking major social turmoil. Jakarta’s caution on the issue prior to Bali has been described by some as complacency, though it could also equally be considered as measured and the lesser of two evils.

The future of counter-terrorism initiatives and cooperation in Indonesia will be partly dictated by the forthcoming national elections, scheduled for mid-2004. The political manoeuvring by the nation’s leading political, religious, military and intelligence figures is to continue over the next 12 months and will affect the country’s commitment to counter-terrorism. President Megawati faces pressure from her grass roots constituency, as well as Islamic political parties, to maintain her measured and proportionate approach against Muslim radicals. While the exclusively Islamic political parties in Indonesia obtained less than 20 per cent of the votes in the last election, Muslim political influence is far stronger than the numbers suggest. Although these parties are unlikely to significantly improve their political position in 2004, economic or political mismanagement by Megawati or any future successor would likely strengthen Islamic ideology throughout the entire country. Ultimately, Megawati must simultaneously defend the Islamic interests of Indonesia while also retaining the support of the international community, which has been growing since the success of the Bali investigations. In the lead up to the elections, Megawati is likely to avoid taking any controversial policy decisions on Islamic extremism,
especially if such policies are publicly interpreted as being the result of Western pressure. For that matter, the elections are likely to be dominated by domestic and economic issues, leaving broader counter-terrorism issues as a distant concern. And ironically, given the political dynamics in Jakarta, even if Megawati was to order a further crackdown on Islamic radicals, there is no guarantee that the police or military would be willing or able to cooperate, just as the TNI proved unwilling to implement former President Wahid’s January 2000 public orders to stem the flow of jihadists to Ambon.86

The political jostling of Megawati’s rivals also has a significant effect on the influence of radical Islam in the region. The GOLKAR party, with which her party has formed an alliance, would take political advantage of any perceived excessive action by Megawati against Muslim communities, any ‘anti-Muslim’ action taken by Megawati and perceived to be at the behest of the US or Australia, or for an alliance perceived as too close to the US. Islamists such as Vice President Hamzah Haz and Amien Rais would publicly denounce Megawati for such action. In 2002, Haz sent messages of sympathy to Islamic radicals in Indonesia in an attempt to cement his own Islamic credentials and popular support. He visited both Ba’asyir and LJ leader Jafar Umar Thalib, despite calls for their arrest, and referred to them as “true Muslim Brothers”. Since the Bali attacks, he has taken a more moderate approach, though still represents a public relations threat to Megawati’s approach to counter-terrorism. Some of the other possible players in the elections currently hold key positions related to counter-terrorism and internal security, which further threatens Indonesia’s commitment against radical Islam. However, both BIN Chief, Lieutenant General Hendropriyono, and the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono, are yet to indicate their intentions on running in the elections.

The dynamics of Indonesia’s relationship with the West highly influences domestic politics and thus Jakarta’s position on counter-terrorism. Many anti-US or anti-West demonstrations in Indonesia have a tendency to transform themselves into violent anti-government protests. The 2003 non-UN sanctioned war in Iraq, for example, has done little to garner popular Muslim support in Indonesia on counter-terrorism cooperation with the West. It has in fact significantly undermined Megawati’s and moderate Muslim groups’ delicate public position with the US on the war on terror and has delayed the return of much-needed FDI into the Indonesian economy. As well as providing further ammunition for fundamentalist preachers, the war has also increased the incentive for regional terrorists to launch an attack in sympathy of their Middle Eastern brothers. At the core
of the problem, Western motives for countering terrorism are still suspected by many Muslims as being anti-Indonesia or anti-Muslim. This underlying anti-West suspicion extends well beyond Indonesia’s Muslim community. Following the attacks in Bali in 2002, the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, with a combined membership of over 60 million, condemned terrorism and radicalism. However, perceived anti-Muslim undertones of current counter-terrorism measures, including operation *Iraqi Freedom*, new US visa regulations and intense public scrutiny of Islamic education and financial systems, could easily lead to a withdrawal of crucial moderate support. The balancing act for regional and foreign governments is extremely difficult.

The rhetoric and actions of the US, Australia and other Western nations must therefore take into close consideration the internal dynamics of key countries in the Islamic world such as Indonesia. A prolonged or violent occupation of Iraq, for example, might enflame not only Muslims in the Middle East but also those in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Makassar and beyond, relegating President Megawati to the sidelines. Similarly, cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives between the West and Indonesia cannot be seen to be at the behest of Western states, as this could be popularly interpreted as evidence of further ‘oppression’ and ‘imperialism’, seeming only to reinforce the jihadist mindset. Both Indonesia and the West must aim to build a cooperative relationship that ultimately enhances Indonesia’s long term capability to prevent radicalism and not just one that seeks to provide reactive short term security initiatives.

The performance of Indonesia’s security authorities has been plagued by incompetence, poor funding, corruption, factionalism, inconsistencies and competing agendas, many of which were highlighted earlier. Interservice rivalry among authorities dealing with terrorism has also handicapped effective responses to radical Islam. In the initial weeks following the Bali bombings, traditional rivals BIN, Polri and TNI sought to use the investigations as a means to increase their own funding and influence. Their records on action against radical Islam are mixed and their future commitment against religious extremism cannot be taken for granted. In 2001, TNI and Polri allowed Yemeni suspects to flee Indonesia. Conversely, BIN and Polri fully cooperated with Western officials in the arrest and deportation of al-Qa’ida operative al-Faruq. Regardless, East Timor’s successful separation from Indonesia has ensured that separatist movements, particularly those in Aceh and Papua, will consume most resources of Indonesia’s security forces for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the breakdown of the peace agreement in Aceh undermines counter-
terrorism efforts against radical Islam. Ultimately, terrorism is perceived by authorities to represent a risk to the safety of the nation's citizens, whereas separatism is considered the more grave threat to the country's territorial and national integrity.

Passing anti-terrorism legislation in the Indonesian parliament is still highly controversial. In a country where military and policing authorities have long abused domestic security laws, many Indonesians are legitimately fearful about the granting of any new powers to its intelligence or security authorities. Talk of new security measures and legislative amendments following the Marriott attack is a justifiable point of concern for not only Indonesian-based human rights groups, but also the wider Islamic community which, like other religious groups, fear that such powers could be directed against them yet again. Mahathir's use of the ISA in Malaysia serves as an apt warning. Under Indonesia's new retrospective laws following the Bali attacks, some suspects can be questioned for up to six months, intelligence reports can be used as evidence in court and investigators allowed to intercept mail and tap telephones.88 Furthermore, many Indonesian observers cite the repressive tactics used by government authorities in the 1970s as responsible for giving birth to the JI network. A return to such hard-line suppression, they argue, would only strengthen the position of domestic religious radicalism and provide even more fertile conditions upon which other clandestine anti-government groups would grow. Under these ISA-style laws, the Indonesian public will remain highly suspect of confessions gained from detainees. The country's security authorities have a long history of routine torture to procure confessions to 'facilitate' legal proceedings. Transparency and publicly available evidence in the trials of the Bali bombers and Ba'asyir will remain crucial to an effective offensive against radical militants in Indonesia and to satisfying the growing demands of human rights proponents.

Regarding anti-money laundering legislation, Indonesia still has much work to do. In a June 2003 report by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Indonesia, together with the Philippines and Myanmar, remained on the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs) list. Of the nine countries on this list, three were from Southeast Asia and two were from the Pacific, with Indonesia being one of the largest and most important. While radical Islamists will continue to focus on traditional Islamic funding channels, strengthening anti-money laundering legislation in Indonesia will have an immense impact on the entire region. In addition to limiting the options for terrorists, strict financial controls will help to undermine domestic corruption and trans-national drug trafficking. However, new legislation alone is not enough. Indonesia will need to commit
to an enforcement policy, which may conflict with vested interests. Indonesian regulators, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors will also require substantial training and funding to be able to effectively investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The country’s Independent Anti-Money Laundering Commission will need significant resources and professional, highly-trained staff to make any notable impact. While Indonesia is beginning to make progress on these issues, effecting long-term changes to entrenched systems and mentalities will take years. Promoting the rule of law and funding governmental capacity building remains a primary step.

Radical Islam can also still find a breeding ground in Indonesia’s education system. The state of funding for pesantrens and madrassahs is still dire. At senior school level, a madrassah student is currently supported by the government to the extent of 133,430 rupiah per year, while a public school student receives 1,019,025 rupiah. With almost six million madrassah students in Indonesia every year, this represents a dangerous pool of potential corruptibility. Furthermore, the late-January acquittal of LJ leader Thalib sent a dangerous message to like-minded Islamic preachers. Thalib was found not guilty of inciting hatred and violence in the Malukus, despite evidence to the contrary. While the outcome of the current trial against FPI leader Rizieq will also be critical, none will be more monumental and far-reaching than the trial of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. If he is publicly found to be part of a terrorist organisation, the ripples through every mosque and pesantren in the country will help to undermine the growth of radical Islam. More broadly, this stresses the need for educational and judicial reform to receive the same degree of attention and support as political and economic reform in Indonesia.

Finally, using a longer term perspective, the Indonesian government must prove to its Islamic community that they are well represented and defended. To achieve this, Indonesia must seek to eliminate the opportunities for hard-line Muslims to exploit the internal political and security situation. Allowing the issue of establishing Islamic law to be discussed in a democratic forum in 2002 and 2003 was a crucial step to appeasing every domestic fundamentalist. The fact that it was rejected before even reaching parliament attests to the minority status of fundamentalist support. Furthermore, the securing and sustaining of peace agreements and autonomy packages in Indonesia’s conflict zones, the redevelopment of its economy, its move toward fiscal and political decentralisation, and the balancing of relationships with Western allies are all key issues in Jakarta’s fight against militant ideologies. Jakarta will need to make more of a concerted effort to deal with the broader and deeper problem of radical Islam, rather than simply seeking the arrest
of those associated to the Bali and Marriott bombings, or any other future
attacks. However, the outcome of the 2004 elections is unlikely to provide
Indonesia with a sufficiently visionary or capable leader able to implement
long term whole-of-government solutions. This type of commitment may
only come following continued or more catastrophic terrorist attacks in
Indonesia and beyond, that attracts the commitment of the Islamic and global
community.
Philippines

The second most important regional player in Southeast Asia's struggle against radical Islam is the Philippines. There is extensive evidence of the country's connections to radical Islam both within the region and beyond. Most pointedly, the 1995 al-Qa'ida plot to bomb 11 American planes, which aimed to kill 4,000 people over 48 hours, was hatched in Manila. With ongoing religious-fuelled secessionist movements centred in the south of the country, combined with a dire economy and the continuing terrorist threat posed by the communist-based NPA, the Philippine government is facing a formidable challenge. High profile prison escapes and armed military rebellions do little to ease this burden. The implications for the wider region are immense if Manila cannot maintain social, political, and economic stability in the Muslim dominated south.

Religious Persuasion

![Pie chart showing religious distribution]

Ethnic Makeup

![Pie chart showing ethnic distribution]

This ethnic struggle for separation in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago has been waged for almost three decades, though it can be traced back to issues relating to Spanish colonialisation of the Philippines 400 years ago and to Manila's efforts to assimilate the Muslim-majority areas of the south. Currently, most of the religious-fuelled violence is being perpetrated by two radical Islamic groups, the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF. Whilst the Abu Sayyaf began a genuine independence campaign in the late 1980s, the group has recently become more of a criminal entity, conducting kidnapping operations for ransoms. The problem for authorities, however, is that some Muslims in the region still perceive the group as acting in the defence of Islamic interests. This means that crack-downs on the Abu Sayyaf, whilst justified, might be conveyed by radicals in other nations as a crack-down on Islam, especially given US military involvement. The MILF, on the other hand, is solely focused on the establishment of an independent Muslim state. Whilst the group has been prepared to enter 'negotiations' with the government, as witnessed by the latest March and June 2003 talks in Malaysia, it is not willing to settle for any result short of independence. The Davao Consensus of 1996, for example, which created a limited Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), is considered by the group to be unworkable. Given that the government currently refuses to grant full independence, any negotiations will continue to stall and a military offensive will become, or remain, the most probable solution. However, the MILF's wide support base, estimated at over 10,000 militants, and the continuing success of its guerrilla style warfare, will ensure that any military option becomes both bloody and drawn out. The ramifications of both these scenarios for the entire region are profound.

Groups such as JI will use ongoing conflicts in the south as one of their key sales tools and training and support mechanisms. The marketability of armed jihad and radical ideologies becomes significantly higher if susceptible recruits are presented images of perceived oppression and injustices against their fellow Muslims. Mindanao is quickly becoming a key source of militant Islamic inspiration for Muslims throughout the entire region, replacing the struggles in Poso and Ambon in Indonesia. An ongoing conflict in the southern Philippines will provide other domestic and regional terrorists with training facilities, jihadist experience and arms smuggling networks. As outlined earlier, the southern Philippines remains one of the most important players in the supply of explosives and arms to criminals and terrorists throughout Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the unresolved conflicts have also facilitated the arrival and penetration of foreign groups such as al-Qa'ida and their affiliated funding channels from Saudi Arabia. This is particularly dangerous. Just as Muslims in Indonesia are concerned
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about the plight of their brothers in the Middle East, Muslims from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia will continue to take a close interest in the southern Philippines. Their influence should not be underestimated. Furthermore, a successful operation against al-Qa’ida or JI in the region will not resolve the Moro dispute in the Philippines, nor will it stem the flow of non-regional support for the militants. Importantly, just as al-Qa’ida radicalised JI operatives, JI has the capacity to radicalise and internationalise local issues. Conflicts can therefore be escalated quickly, or at least sustained indefinitely. Peace agreements can be undermined. The escalation and sustainability of the conflict in Ambon can be used as a pertinent example of the impact that one jihadist battleground can have on an entire nation and region.

Like Indonesia, the archipelagic nature of the Philippines places enormous stress on the resources of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other associated law enforcement agencies. The Philippine air force and navy are under-serviced, antiquated and unable to patrol effectively the southern region of the Philippines; nor can they guarantee the safety of foreigners in the region. The fast tracking of the navy modernisation program, combined with the recent US pledge of a further US $356 million to train and equip the AFP, will be of much help. However, groups such as the Abu Sayyaf will continue to exploit the weakness of security authorities and the extensive nature of the region’s waterways to launch attacks and to evade detection. In the short to medium term, the more the Philippine government invests in a military solution, the less financial resources can be devoted to the underlying issue of retarded economic development.

The issue of development aid and projects is also proving to be highly problematic. In fact, some Muslims in Mindanao argue that the pursuit of development projects since the implementation of the 1996 Davao Consensus has proved more harmful than beneficial. Indeed, if an overly ambitious development project is embarked upon with insufficient funding, its failure will lead to the further disintegration of the hopes of local communities. Mismanagement or corruption in such projects will also further aggravate the community. The selection of projects to be undertaken is crucial. If the primary needs of the community are not met, large, symbolic developments may again prove to be more detrimental to the will and psyche of the people. The RAND group concludes that most social and economic development projects undertaken between 1996 and 2001 in the 14 provinces and 9 cities covered under the Davao Consensus have had a minimal effect on inhibiting terrorist activity in Mindanao. This means that over 10 million people,
many of whom are impoverished Muslims, have seen little change in the status quo. Furthermore, pockets of Muslims in the south have also argued that some projects have done more to benefit the Christian populations, thus cementing their faith in the efforts of radical elements. However, it must be reiterated, successful development projects alone will not eradicate the Muslim grievances of the south nor the calls by radicals for more Islamised communities.

Finally, the role of the US in the Philippines continues to be a sensitive issue that complicates counter-terrorism cooperation and initiatives. Many Philippine citizens still hold memories of US colonial rule and the subsequent US support of the Marcos regime. As a result, the Philippines maintains a clause in its constitution preventing US troops from engaging in combat operations on its soil. While the Philippines continues to share the closest arrangement on counter-terrorism with Washington of all the ASEAN states, this constitutional clause has so far prevented US forces from conducting a large-scale campaign in the country’s south. Despite her announcement in late 2002 that she would not run for re-election in 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo is unlikely to engage the US in closer defence ties. Any such move would probably lead to greater political instability throughout the entire country, with even less likelihood of a solution to the wider ethnic grievances of the south.

The prosperity and security of the Philippines’ Muslim community will be a key factor in determining the success of next-generation radicals to spread their militant ideology. There are already signs of possible breakaway groups evolving from the MILF and the group’s penetration by JI. More broadly, disbanding the JI network will not eliminate the sympathy felt by many Muslims in the region to the ongoing injustices faced by their brothers in the southern Philippines. The AFP will need to avoid a bloodbath while winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim population, which in turn would aid every country’s battle against radical Islam. However, with elements in the AFP (like many of the militaries in the region) being widely suspected of supporting and profiting from interaction with criminal or insurgent elements, complete elimination of this violence looks unlikely in the short to medium term. More dangerously, however, Manila has been unable to design a clear strategy to deal with the issue and the outcome of the 2004 national elections is unlikely to provide new answers. The latest series of attacks in March, April and May 2003, causing almost 100 deaths, represent a continuing pattern of escalating violence that is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.
Malaysia

Along with Indonesia, Malaysia’s position as a majority Muslim country forms the basis for its key role in the regional fight against radical Islam. Though staunchly opposed to the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq, Prime Minister Mahathir has proven to be a strong bulwark against regional Islamic militancy. Over the past 18 months, he has arrested almost 80 suspected radicals, most of whom are ‘suspected’ of involvement in either JI or its affiliated Malaysian organisation, KMM. His government has ceased official funding for private religious schools, which covers over 70,000 students, most of whom are Muslim, has closed down the Luqmanul Hakim school in Johor, and has begun to monitor closely the sermons of some Islamic preachers. Furthermore, the government has tightened immigration regulations, which previously allowed automatic visa-free entry for citizens of those countries member to the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). Despite the potential for significant terrorist activity still existing in Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo, Kuala Lumpur’s hard-line on terrorism has proven very effective against reducing the immediate threat of an attack on the Malaysian peninsular by JI or KMM. Whether it can be sustained or will lead towards more crucial long term initiatives remains unanswered for the time being.

Malaysia’s role in the growth of radical Islam in the region over the past two decades highlights the importance the country plays in a regional strategy on counter-terrorism. Beginning in the 1980s, Prime Minister Mahathir’s desire to establish himself as the world’s leading moderate Muslim leader offered the fertile ground in which many international terrorism groups established a presence in Kuala Lumpur. It was, after all, during this period that the JI network in Johor was given the opportunity to grow and radicalise. More recently, the FBI has gone as far as saying that Malaysia was a “primary operational launch pad for the September 11 attacks”. Malaysia still represents a significant Islamic banking and financial centre. By virtue of being a predominant Muslim country, Malaysia’s potential to provide safe havens for radicals is one of the major security concerns for Singapore and, indeed, the rest of the region. Following increased action by Thai authorities against radicals in its south, one of Bangkok’s greatest concerns may come from radicals in northern Malaysia. And like Indonesia, Malaysia’s tough stance on radical Islam is crucial for the workability of any regional initiatives.

Despite the increased security, Malaysia remains vulnerable. The inability of the AFP to contain Islamic militancy in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, combined with a continuing lack of security cooperation
between Malaysian and Philippines authorities, has allowed the Abu Sayyaf group the opportunity to conduct two serious abduction cases in Sabah in as many years. With an estimated 200 KMM members still at large, both Malaysia and Singapore’s security will depend not only on the performance of their own security authorities, but also on that of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Attacks in Kuala Lumpur, Langkawi or Pinang, for example, could be largely planned, coordinated and launched from a neighbouring country.

**Religious Persuasion**

- Muslims (mainly Sunnis) 53%
- Traditional beliefs 2%
- Other 7%
- Christian 7%
- Chinese faiths 12%
- Buddhist 19%

**Ethnic Makeup**

- Malay 48%
- Indian 8%
- Indigenous tribes 12%
- Chinese 27%
- Other 5%

**Sources:** Data from CIA World Factbook 2002, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/Factbook/geos/my.html
The relationship between counter-terrorism strategies and domestic politics is demonstrated no better than in Malaysia. The country maintains a fragile ethnic balance between Malays and non-Malays. The political and economic sharing arrangements that have been in place for over 30 years have satisfied the Malay majority while also offering a small governing role to the Chinese and Indian minorities. However, Prime Minister Mahathir has exploited the current security environment to cement his own political position and that of his party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Using the ISA rules, he has been able to detain or discredit political rivals, most notably those from the pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), and has also sought to further secure the support of Malaysia's non-Muslim voters, most notably the ethnic Chinese. This has been going on for decades. He can ill-afford to be viewed as taking a light stance against Islamic militancy; yet he must continue to appease the country's Muslim majority. As mentioned earlier, the Singapore government alleges that JI had identified this ethnic divide as being sufficiently flammable to create a situation "conducive to overthrowing the Malaysian government and making Malaysia an Islamic state".95 To date, Mahathir has successfully managed domestic Muslim dynamics by voicing regular and harsh criticism of President Bush's policies in Iraq and Palestine and also adopting an increasingly Islamic position on domestic issues. Islam, however, still represents one of the few avenues for ethnic Malays to oppose the regime. Ultimately, however, Malaysia needs a more focused approach to domestic counter-terrorism rather than using shot gun tactics that are as much for internal political gain as security.

On the international front, Malaysia, like Indonesia, must balance the demands of its large Muslim majority while maintaining a considerable degree of international support and engagement. While it has so far suited Mahathir to take firm action against radicals, cooperation between Malaysia and the US is by no means assured for the future. Importantly, Malaysia's assuming of the OIC leadership in 2003 may play a role in the future of the country's, and indeed the region's, commitment to Islamic issues. It represents a key opportunity for Kuala Lumpur to work closely with key non-regional players and contribute to peace initiatives in Muslim conflict zones outside the region, as well as those within.

Ultimately, however, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who is scheduled to succeed Mahathir in October 2003, will determine the short-term future of Malaysia's political position on Islamic militancy. In this regard, he remains an unknown entity. However, his public comments following the 5 August Marriott attack, detailed below, are the most insightful and promising amongst all Southeast Asian leaders.
"... to successfully defeat the terrorists, one needs to know what makes his (a terrorist) heart beat and what feeds his anger ... Refusing to address the difficult political issues, be focused instead on punitive and military measures as if these alone can solve the problem but in fact, they can have the opposite effect ... This is not a call for capitulation. This is an appeal for honesty and political courage. Where the terrorists have a legitimate cause, we must address it, because if we don’t, the problem festers and multiplies."

While these comments may prove to be nothing more than political rhetoric, they do offer some hope for the future as they extend beyond the typical cliches used by regional and Western leaders such as radicalism being simply "a manipulation of Islam". However, given the likely power vacuum upon Mahathir’s departure, Badawi may find himself largely committed to the management of internal party politics rather than the struggle against radical Islam. Furthermore, the outcome of Malaysia’s general elections in 2004 will be the ultimate determinant of Malaysia’s future domestic and international role in the campaign against religious extremism. This medium to long-term commitment remains unpredictable.
The US faces a complex yet critical challenge in dealing with radical Islam in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, Washington has clearly identified Southeast Asia as a target in the war on terror, claiming that the region has the "world's highest concentration of al-Qa'ida operatives outside Afghanistan and Pakistan". On the other hand, it is extremely aware that the region represents a key pool of moderate Islam that needs to be courted as part of the global war on terror. Maintaining the public support and ongoing cooperation of these countries remains a key strategic objective. However, public sensitivities to US military involvement in the region run deep. Even its staunchest regional ally, the Philippines, does not permit US troops on its territory to conduct 'combat' missions. Any illegal or excessive use of American force by President Bush could create more problems than Washington could handle and would effectively alienate key allies in the war on terror. And, while these political machinations take place, Washington continues to receive intelligence warnings concerning its citizens and interests in the region. Indeed, the 2003 attacks on the US-owned and frequented Marriott Hotel can leave little confusion among analysts in the Pentagon and White House that US interests in the region are now one of the most coveted of Southeast Asian terrorist targets.

US dealings with the region take place within a complex socio-political framework. For several decades, a significant difference of opinion has existed between many regional governments and their peoples regarding the desired role of the US in the region. Whilst the vast majority of Southeast Asians do not support the violent tactics of extremists, many harbour serious concerns about an increased US military presence or political influence in the region. Citizens from Vietnam and the Philippines, for example, still hold vivid memories of US involvement in their own domestic politics. As discussed earlier, the global Islamic resurgence has meant that Muslims in the region are increasingly conscious of US foreign policy and military deployments not only in Southeast Asia, but also in other parts of the world, most notably Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Like the rest of the Muslim world, suggestions of a US-led 'war on Islam' resonate loudly through many of the region's media outlets. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Bali bombings, Indonesian media convinced a sizeable portion of Indonesia's population that the attack was part of a CIA conspiracy to engage Jakarta on counter-terrorism initiatives. Similar accusations were made following the Marriott attack. This popular suspicion, within both the Muslim and non-Muslim sectors, of a US ulterior motive in the region seems likely to continue.
Regional governments, however, have broader strategic considerations in their dealings with the US. Given that many of the countries in the region are now deeply dependent on US trade and aid links, they cannot afford to put Washington offside. The growing influence and perceived threat of China has also prompted regional governments to recognise the need for a continued US political and military engagement of the region. Balancing this fundamental clash between domestic public sentiment and political realities will ensure, in the short term at least, continued US engagement, though at a comfortable distance.

As a result, the Bush government is limited in its approach. President Bush cannot risk singling out the Muslim community, and his government cannot be seen to be pushing regional governments too hard. Both scenarios could potentially radicalise the region's moderate Muslims and undermine all efforts against the spread of radical ideology. Any excessive military or policing action by the US in the region could lead to greater instability, as well as enticing a new wave of recruits to radical causes. Indeed, groups such as JI are easily able to Islamicise local grievances, including perceived US oppression. The Pentagon recently hired a private research firm in Jolo, the southern Philippines, to gauge public opinion on a possible joint US-Philippine military operation. While the US' concern for the opinions of Jolo residents is commendable, the reality of radical Islam is that the research firm would have been better placed to survey broader Southeast Asian Islamic sentiment. Washington is also aware that by committing troops to the region, in whatever capacity, the US faces the real risk of them being the target of a terrorist attack. JI's planned attack on US personnel at the MRT train station in Singapore, in addition to a host of US naval and military installations, serves as ample evidence.

However, Washington has significant strategic concerns of its own. Southeast Asian SLOCs are critical to the movement of US military assets from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. In March 2003, for example, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia granted over-flight rights to US military planes travelling to the conflict in Iraq. Also, with China gaining growing influence in the region, the US needs to maintain working ties with ASEAN states in order to uphold the regional balance of power. If China does in fact develop into the threat that many fear, Washington is acutely aware that the ASEAN states would represent a vital strategic zone, just as they did during the Cold War years. An increasingly powerful China may also seek to reassert its claim in the South China Sea.

Indonesia is the most influential element of a US counter-terrorism strategy in Southeast Asia. Washington is aware that the stability,
development and political evolution of the largest Muslim country in the region is critical to not only the war on terror, but also the basic security environment. An unstable or disintegrating Indonesia would make the region even more unpredictable and would generate even greater demands on the US. A successful democratic experiment in Indonesia, however, would go a long way to discredit the claim that democracy may be incompatible with the political culture of Muslim countries.98 Facilitating Indonesia's return to the de facto leadership of ASEAN could also lead to the further development of democratic principles in the region as well as greater regional cooperation on counter-terrorism issues.

However, bilateral military relations between the US and Indonesia have still not been fully restored.99 By holding back US equipment, funding and training, Washington is seeking to encourage judicial reform and reduce corruption in Indonesia. However, it also means that a generation of Indonesian military officers will not have gained exposure to American values, thus effectively maintaining the cultural divide among some of each state's most influential figures. This also affects Indonesia's military capability. By not allowing crucial spare parts to the Indonesian Air Force, for example, Washington has effectively reduced Jakarta's ability to respond to internal security issues. In August 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a US$50 million anti-terrorism assistance package for Indonesia, including $400,000 to restart an exchange program for high-level military officers. More personal contacts and exchanges are needed to minimise the cultural and ideological divide and to maximise opportunities for developing better working relations. Indeed, such engagement is needed not just in Indonesia, but throughout the Islamic world.

The stakes for the US military in the Philippines are significant. Prior to the conflict in Iraq, the US military presence in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago was Washington's second biggest troop deployment in the war on terrorism. This is with very good reason. Returning peace to these Muslim communities in the Philippines will have an enormous impact on radical Islam throughout the region. The current US-aided campaign against the Abu Sayyaf, however, will not address the legitimate grievances of the Moro people. The Pentagon is acutely aware that a US-assisted campaign against the MILF, which has over 12,000 militants, may be reminiscent of Vietnam. It also runs the risk of attracting Islamic militants from across the region, if not further afield, and thereby effectively recreating the religious dynamism found in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Needless to say, the failure of any future US-assisted mission against the MILF would strengthen the jihadist mindset throughout all of Southeast Asia, just as it did on a global scale when the Soviets failed against bin Laden.
Washington is increasingly aware that a purely military solution to radical Islam will prove completely ineffective. One needs look no further than Israel's hard-line military approach which has left the country no closer to eliminating politically and religiously motivated violence than was the case thirty years ago. This is not to say that a military response to terrorism is flawed. Rather, such a strategy must not only be precision guided (causing minimal collateral damage), but it must also be accompanied by a host of diplomatic, political, economic and logistic measures. Further evidence that violence is the key to dispute resolution in Southeast Asia will only reinforce the terrorist mindset. In fact, without this multi-dimensional approach, the next generation of radicalists is sure to be born with each military strike.

The notion of a 'war on terror' in Southeast Asia therefore completely misrepresents the approach needed to undermine radical Islam. Washington's campaign must be multi-dimensional and cross-departmental and seek to discourage any use of force. Economic aid together with assistance on democratic, judicial and educational reform will prove exponentially more beneficial to the campaign against extremism than joint military offensives or security training in counter-terrorism. Addressing the root causes of terrorism is therefore an essential part of this overall strategy. However, the US should not and cannot be expected to suddenly and successfully address all the root causes of terrorism, particularly those of an ideological and socio-economic nature. These issues require a global commitment and decades of concerted efforts, not to mention funding. Nonetheless, any US-led campaign against radical Islam in Southeast Asia will fail if it is solely security focused.

The war on terror is essentially a war of perspectives. The US must re-embark on a public diplomacy campaign in key Southeast Asian states if it is to undermine radical Islam. According to US State Department figures, between 1993 and 1999, public diplomacy personnel were cut by 29 per cent and funding for overseas libraries and information resource centers by 39 per cent. Similar cuts were ordered in exchange programs and support for the teaching of English abroad. Funding must be redirected into these areas to help reverse the trend found in many Muslim countries of a growing hatred toward the US. Thailand's recent refusal of Washington's proposal that it be publicly named on the US list of key allies in the war on terror serves as ample evidence of the dire state of US public affairs. Importantly, improvements in the conduct of US public relations will only be able to achieve so much.
The role of US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, will remain as one of the most influential components of the radical Islam debate in Southeast Asia. Muslim communities in the region are no longer immune from the injustices and oppression of their brothers in far away lands. While most Southeast Asian Muslims will remain preoccupied with their own daily lives and others will denounce armed action, a small percentage will continue to take up the fight against perceived US, Israeli or other nations' oppression. Reconsideration of some US policies in the Middle East would almost certainly reduce the number of future armed jihadists. Following the outbreak of the second intifada in Palestine and the events of September 11, failing to acknowledge and act upon the role of US policy in the Middle East would be tantamount to enraging the Muslim world even further.

Let it be clear, radical Muslims may hate "our values", "culture" and even "our existence", as President Bush and other Western leaders maintain, but one of the primary reasons they have resorted to violence against mostly Western and Israeli targets and have attracted recruits so easily is a direct response to decades of US foreign policy. A comprehensive US withdrawal of support for Israeli occupation, which is considered by most objective international lawyers as illegal, and a reduction or withdrawal of its own troops and influence from some parts of the region would unquestionably undermine the ability of Southeast Asian Islamists to promote anti-US and anti-Western messages. This is not to say that it would eliminate all radicals from the region; as acknowledged earlier, the struggle against radical Islam is one of improved management, not extermination and, in any case, Southeast Asian radicals have independent fundamentalist goals.

However, as the sole global superpower, the US has new and complex responsibilities. In the words of the former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine in 1999, "the United States of America today predominates on the economic level, the monetary level, on the technological level and in the cultural area in the broadest sense of the word." He could have also added 'the military level'. In the eyes of some Muslims, this domination is maintained at the expense of the Islamic world, which, they assert, was once home to some of the world's richest cities and highest centres of learning. Countering such thinking, irrespective of its validity, will be difficult though crucial for the US. This may mean increased spending on public relations and aid programs as well as compromise, including the ceding of some of its global power back to the international system. However, unilateral military action in Muslims lands and unilateral withdrawal from global treaties, combined with 'confrontational' policies such as those seeking to contain Iran, support Israel and influence Saudi Arabia, will effectively
reinforce the attitude in the Muslim world that Washington is undertaking a new imperialist agenda. This is not to say that unilateral actions are always flawed or that Washington or the West be discouraged from influencing foreign states. Rather, for every perceived act of aggression, Washington will have to deal with a potential retaliation. And given current international political alliances, this reaction will likely come from the streets of the Islamic world not the governments. This breeds a dangerous cycle of which Southeast Asia is now part.

Amending perceived US policies of oppression and interference is not as simple as many assert. Dealing with the four million Palestinian refugees and the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian-based Israeli settlers is now an immensely sensitive and complex process. A withdrawal of Washington’s support for Israel is highly unlikely given the strength of the Christian-Judaist lobby in the US Congress. A withdrawal of US forces and influence from Saudi Arabia, and other key states, risks undermining some of the US’, and indeed the West’s, primary strategic interests in the region, including energy security and control of key SLOCs. Moves to strengthen democracy in the Muslim world also run the risk of empowering legitimate anti-Western political movements. However, such initiatives must ultimately be considered as crucial parts to a Southeast Asian (and global) counter-terrorism strategy as they would counter balance the marketability of Islamic militancy and help win the war of perceptions.

So whilst it is true that radical Islam can only be truly and effectively managed from within the Islamic community, it is also true that the success of the US campaign against religious extremism will be largely dependent on Washington’s overall foreign policy. In both Southeast Asia and beyond, US policy relating to Islamic terrorism must be based not only on short term threats to its citizens but also on the longer term need to undermine radical Islam. This will involve enormous resources and political will to address the dynamics and drivers of religious extremism and not merely the symptoms of al-Qa’ida or Jemaah Islamiyah aggression. Washington’s ability to build a relationship with the Muslim world based on increased trust and confidence will therefore be one of the key determinants to the level of popular support given to radical Islamic ideologies in Southeast Asia. However, recent demands by President Bush on the need for countries to be either ‘with us or against us’ only serve to reinforce the bipolar fundamentalism of revered Islamic radical Sayyid Qutb and his contemporary supporters such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. With President Bush still the front runner in the 2004 US elections, he may remain one of the key figures in the debate on radical Islam in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion

With an undisclosed number of operatives still at large, including some of the group's key leaders, Jemaah Islamiyah's willingness and capability to inflict massive casualties on civilian targets remain a serious threat to the region. The group's radical and selective interpretation of Islam is the critical foundation upon which its members are united. Members firmly believe that they are legitimately defending the interests of Islam and that Allah not only permits but also encourages the use of violence in this struggle. Using this ideology, JI has transcended traditional ethnic and national boundaries and has tapped into a rich vein of radical Islamic sentiment and support stemming from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East. Local Islamic schooling, regional jihadist battlegrounds, and foreign educational and combat experience have all contributed to developing a labyrinth of dedicated JI personnel willing to join the global Islamic struggle. More significantly, JI has the ability to attack an immense range of targets. This is a result of the breadth of the group's current grievances (including sentiment of an anti-West, anti-secular, anti-Christian, anti-Judaist and anti-capitalist nature), its trans-national composition, its depth of connections throughout the Muslim world and its non-negotiation approach. With new recruits seemingly in abundance, JI and radical Islam will continue to evolve. Terrorist tactics and strategies will remain both adaptable and unpredictable, suggesting that the threat of radical Islam is of a long-term nature.

The complexities of addressing this extremist threat are extensive. Southeast Asia's rugged geography, porous borders, existing criminal networks and Middle Eastern links make it a prime operational ground for radical Islamists. Despite ongoing arrests of militants, intelligence and security authorities face an enormous range of challenges. Capability shortfalls, poor funding, competing agendas, heavy commitments, endemic corruption and ineffective coordination will continue to inhibit the performance of these authorities. Non-regional assistance by actors such as the EU, the US and Japan will be critical in strengthening law enforcement capacity and helping to promote the rule of law. Coordination at an operational level between regional authorities is improving, however, many of these fragile relationships are still in their infancy and their durability will be tested over time. The contribution of ASEAN in developing regional security initiatives has so far been minimal and, given the ongoing challenges facing the organisation, it is unlikely to produce the results necessary for effective and comprehensive joint action.

However, security initiatives alone will not address radical Islam. Without acknowledging and confronting the root causes of religious
extremism, Southeast Asia will remain a dangerous breeding ground for radicalism. The bombings in both Jakarta and Bali, and the attacks of September 11, did not occur in a political and social vacuum, as so many Western leaders neglect to mention. The terrorists were rational actors fighting for political, social and religious goals, largely 'supported' by Islamic texts and traditions. Southeast Asian nations, though particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, will therefore need to develop a holistic approach to undermine the call by radicals that they are the sole defenders of the Islamic community. Indonesia's experiment with democracy and decentralisation, Manila's struggle against the legitimate grievances of the Moro people, and Malaysia's future management of its Muslim population are some of the key issues which will determine the long term viability of Southeast Asian radicalism. Should Muslim communities continue to feel deprived, alienated or marginalised, extremist ideology will persist. Judicial, educational and economic reform and poverty reduction are therefore crucial to the wider debate of minimising the conditions that breed radicals. However, in a region still to recover from the devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the subsequent fall of Suharto in Indonesia, it is also important to remember that radical Islam is just one of a host of challenges.

The two most explosive elements of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia are also the most difficult to address. Like all religions, Islam faces the challenge of modernity versus traditionalism. While it is true there is no longer just one type of Islam, as Southeast Asia's mix of animist and Islamic values shows, the Muslim world's ability to unite against Islamic radicalism will be critical. Not all fundamentalists are radicals and indeed JI's goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia is no more radical than the modern nation state system. However, the Quranic-founded belief by JI leaders and other groups that violence is permitted in such a struggle and that non-believers are disposable is radical. Sunni Islam's lack of a central clerical hierarchy is likely to ensure that such variance in Islamic values continues well into the future and that radical interpretations and aspirations continue to provide a sense of religious legitimacy and appeal. Southeast Asia's long-term stability will not only depend upon finding an appropriate place for Islamic values and traditions in its increasingly modern and globalised societies, but also on the ability of the moderate Muslim world to confront and discredit extremist interpretations.

However, of even greater concern for regional authorities is the ability of JI and other groups to tap into the global Islamic resurgence. Regional radicals have now adopted non-regional grievances that Southeast Asian
governments can do little to control. The political, economic and social affairs of Middle Eastern states and other Muslim lands are now as much part of the radical Islamic debate in Southeast Asia as are the local aspirations of regional militants. While most Muslims will remain preoccupied with their own daily lives, a significant few will continue to challenge perceived Western and Israeli aggression occurring in other parts of the Muslim world. The despair of the Palestinians at the hands of US-supported Israeli oppression and the direct and indirect role of the US in the internal affairs of many Middle Eastern states will therefore remain a crucial part to the management of extremist Islam in Southeast Asia. More broadly, Washington's management of the current unipolar American order will play a highly influential role in the overall direction of fundamentalist Islam.

Eliminating terrorism is impossible. However, it can be controlled and minimised. Whilst the success against the perpetrators of the Bali bombings has been remarkable, it does not secure the region from future attacks, as witnessed most recently in Jakarta. The lack of structures and initiatives to prepare for, and deal with, the medium to long-term presence of radical Islam is of most concern. The region remains highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global Islamic sentiment and to the ability of radicals to penetrate the hearts and minds of its populations. Addressing issues such as poverty, the lack of security coordination, corruption and weak governance are all vital parts to the counter-terrorism equation. But, without addressing both the underlying religious nature of radical Islam and the West's approach to the Muslim world, this cycle of terrorism will simply be perpetuated by new recruits and new organisations. The question is not whether we are able to eliminate Jemaah Islamiyah but rather how best to manage radical Islam in general. The answer to this question lies not only in the peoples and governments of the 10 ASEAN member states but also within the wider global community.
The strengths of the JI Network

1 According to Singaporean intelligence authorities, the JI network is formally organised along four geographical divisions, or 'Mantiqs', all of which coordinate closely on issues of explosives, training, weapons smuggling and other business ventures. Mantiqi 1 covers peninsular Malaysia and Singapore, Mantiqi 2 covers the island of Java, Mantiqi 3 covers Mindanao, Sabah and Sulawesi and is alleged to have close ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Mantiqi 4 covers Australia and Papua. The Singaporean JI leadership is subordinate to the Malaysian JI leadership, as is the Australian JI leadership to the Indonesian JI leadership. The groups in Singapore, for example, are led by a 'Qoaid Wakalah', or leader, who in turn reports to a regional 'Syurah', or consultative council, which is comprised of a few Malaysian-based senior members. A group has five functional units, or 'dakwah': Operations, Security, Missionary Work, Economy (fund-raising) and Communications, and typically has several 'fiahs', or cells, each with a specified function. Each cell usually comprises an average of four JI members, including the leader. While the above description serves as a guide to a probable JI structure, it is important to note that terrorist organisations are usually fluid and offer a degree of autonomy to operatives, especially in the face of intense pressure from security authorities. Similarly, the extended JI family, which is based on contacts made through Islamic boarding schools, foreign study or training and jihadist endeavours, is equally significant. This network of associates is unstructured and spans the entire region. See (1) Leslie Lopez, 'Southeast Asian Militants Aim to Create Islamic State', Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2002, (2) Singapore Government Press Statements, Ministry of Home Affairs, September and August 2002 and (3) The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003.

2 Most of the Singaporean JI members still on the run have likely found refuge in Indonesia, thus severely restricting the ISD's capability to locate and apprehend them. Dr Kumar Ramakrishnan, Jemaah Islamiah and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Threats and Responses, Australian National University Seminar, 10 March 2003.

3 'The Network', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, 28 October 2002.

4 The figure of 230 million is based upon 'official' statistics. However, Indonesia's Muslim population is probably far less than the official number of 190 million. This is a result of many animist-orientated citizens nominating Islam as their religion only because it is the easiest option.

5 Islamic law, or Shariah, provides a blueprint of the ideal Islamic society. It offers guidance for Muslims in both the political and social spheres. It is concerned not only with the regulations governing the five basic requirements for Muslims - the profession of faith, praying, zakat (taxes), fasting, and pilgrimage - but also with matrimonial law, family law, criminal law, drinking, inheritance, business, issues of war and peace and political activities. Islamic law, originally manifested dynamism, flexibility and diversity in its application. Over the centuries, its application became more rigid, with less room for varied interpretation. Modernisation and development in the twentieth and twenty first century has
further complicated its interpretation and implementation. For more information on Shariah and the controversy that surrounds it, see John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.

6 ‘People of the Book’ was at first restricted to Jews and Christians, but later extended to include Zoroastrians and other faiths. See John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.34.


10 DI opposed the newly formed Indonesian republic in favour of establishing an ‘abode of Islam’, or Darul Islam. The ICG alleges that the leader of the DI rebellion in West Java, Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo, is the primary political inspiration for Ba’asyir. See *Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia*, ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002, p.3.

11 This classical Islamic concept divides the world into two; the dar al-Islam, or the sphere of Islam, and the dar al-harb, or the sphere of war. The dar al-harb is regarded as being a land yet to be enlightened by the ways of Islam.


15 No official figures available. However, this is a conservative estimate.

16 The Al-Mukmin pesantren is also referred to as Pondok Ngruki, after the village where the school is located. Numerous Muslim teachers at the school had a history of DI involvement, such as Abdul Qadir Baraja who was the leader of the DI movement in southern Sumatra during the 1970s. Iqbal (alias Didin), who was arrested in connection with the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in West Java, was a key local contact for Hambali and a product of DI-affiliated pesantrens.

17 Schools which allegedly served as major recruiting grounds in Indonesia included the Hidayatullah pesantrens in East Kalimantan and Makassar, the Way Jepara pesantren in Lampung, southern Sumatra, the Madrasah Aliyah Darul Ilmi in Java, the Al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan, East Java and the Rancadadap pesantren in Curug, West Java. There are many cases of al-Mukmin and Luqmanul Hakiem alumni teaching at other schools. Ustadz Zakaria, for example, is the head of the Al-Islam pesantren and is also a 1992 alumni of Al-Mukmin. See Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, ICG, 11 December 2002.


19 The Christmas Eve bombing campaign included the delivery of 62 bombs to 38 churches or priests in eleven cities throughout Java, Sumatra, Lombok and Batam Island, most of which detonated around 9.00pm. The campaign, in which the military is accused by many of involvement, killed 19 people and injured 120.

20 Dr Kumar Ramakrishnan, Jemaah Islamiyah and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Threats and Responses, Australian National University Seminar, 10 March 2003.


22 Laskar Jundullah is the security wing of the Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law (KPPSI) and was created in September 2000 for military campaigns in Poso. Laskar Mujahidin is the umbrella group of armed forces associated to JI fighting in Maluku and Poso, the members of which have regularly been sourced from pesantren al-Mukmin.


24 In 1999, Maidin was allegedly replaced by Mas Selamat bin Kastari who has since been detained. Maidin was personally approached and recruited in 1988-89 by Abu Jibril (alias Fikiruddin), a radical religious preacher who frequently traveled from Malaysia and is currently detained under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act (ISA). See The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.10.

25 In Indonesia, fragile peace agreements have been signed in Central Sulawesi in December 2001 and the Malukus in February 2002. The December 2001 peace agreement in Aceh collapsed in May 2003. In the Philippines, the peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was signed in 1996, though has given way to a spate of new violence by the group’s successor, the MILF.

26 ‘The Network’, Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, 28 October 2002.

27 According to the Singaporean government, these oaths were powerful compliance generating mechanisms. The government alleges that JI members were aware that breaking such an oath could invoke the outright condemnation of their fellow members and expose them to the powers of ‘divine retribution’. The
Sungkar later sent groups of JI members to Afghanistan to train with Al-Qa‘ida. Ibrahim Maidin, the alleged leader of JI’s Singaporean operations, underwent 20 days of military training in Afghanistan in 1993. JI associates Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Taufik Abdul Halim spent several years each in Pakistan. The Singaporean government alleges that, as a result of his time in Afghanistan, Hambali had personal access to Mohammad Atef (alias Abu Hafs), one of Osama bin Laden’s trusted aides. See The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003. Furthermore, Dr Rohan Gunaratna outlines that JI members have been trained in Jeruta and Khalden in Afghanistan; Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar in Pakistan; Negri Sembilan in Malaysia; Poso and Sulawesi in Indonesia; and Mindanao in the Philippines. See Dr Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Al Qaeda is replicating, Rejuvenating and Reorganising to Strike in the Region’, Straits Times, 13 September 2002.

In early December 2001, Singaporean authorities discovered advanced plans by JI to target Israeli, US, British and Australian diplomatic interests in Singapore. The attacks were to use 10 times as much explosives as that used in the 1995 Oklahoma bombing.


Terrorism analyst Zachary Abuza reports that the four companies were Konsojaya, Green Laboratory SDN BHD, Infocus Technology SDN BHD and Secure Valley SDN BHD. See Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 24, Number 3, December 2002, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore p.454.

It appears that al-Qa‘ida had hoped to use the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines to foment chaos in the region. From the early 1990’s, al-Qa‘ida reportedly trained the Abu Sayyaf in more sophisticated attacks intended for not only Philippine, but also Western targets. After several years, this arrangement was terminated, following ill-discipline on the part of the Abu Sayyaf members. A similar arrangement seems likely to have been put in place with JI from the mid to late 1990s.


Following Ba‘asyir’s arrest, Irfan Awwas has assumed the leadership of MMI. Much of the details of the RM alliance are still unclear. Three RM meetings were held in Kuala Lumpur between late 1999 and mid-2000. The KMM, or Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, is sometimes also referred to as Kumpulan Militant Malaysia. See Maria Ressa, ‘The Quest for Southeast Asia’s Islamic ‘Super’ State’, CNN.com, 30 August 2002.

The Central Committee comprised of JI, MILF and possibly the Guragan Mujaheddin Islam Pattani (GMIP).
38 For further information on growing evidence of continuing JI operations in the
Philippines, see May and June 2003 reporting of *Straits Times* at http://
straitstimes.asia1.com.sg


40 ‘The Bali Confessions’, Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, December
2002.

41 According to information gained from interrogations of those detained in the Bali
bombings, from 2000 onwards, it is alleged that Ba’asyir as the *Imam*, or religious
leader, of JI, had to give his approval for any JI attack. See Richard Paddock,

42 Al Ghozi was arrested in January 2002 in the Philippines for possession of
Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January

43 The attacks, which involved five bombs being detonated almost simultaneously,
may have been funded by al-Qa’ida, in which case JI was simply the means by
which the money was transferred. Hambali and a JI assistant flew into Manila
three weeks prior to the operation, allegedly to help with operational planning.
See ‘The Bali Confessions’, Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia,
December 2002.

44 According to the Head of the FBI’s anti-terrorist financing unit, Hambali had
directed JI members to set up NGOs as fronts to raise funds. See Felix Soh,
‘Terrorist Funds Find Path to S-E Asia’, *Straits Times*, Singapore, 22 March 2003,
accessed on 23 March 2003 at www.muslimnews.co.uk.

45 According to the Singaporean government, the JI network in Singapore served as
a critical source of funds for the wider organisation. In the early 1990s, many
Singapore JI members had to contribute about two per cent of their monthly
salaries, while in the latter half of the 1990s, the amount was raised to five per
cent. There were others who gave a fixed sum monthly. Apparently, 25 per cent
of the funds raised would be given to the Malaysian JI and another 25 per cent to
the Indonesian JI. This money would be transferred personally to the Malaysian
JI, who in turn would transfer funds to the Indonesian JI. Singapore Government

46 *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, Singaporean Ministry of
Home Affairs, 7 January 2003.

47 Jason Tejasukmana and Simon Elegant, ‘Linking Bin Laden to Bali’, accessed on

48 Romesh Ratnesar, ‘Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist’, *Time Magazine*, 23
September 2002.

49 Approximately US$160,000. Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s
Southeast Asian Network’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 24, Number 3,
December 2002, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p.453.
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50 'The Australian Connections', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, June 2003.

51 On two occasions, once in December 2000 and the second in October 2001, Hambali allegedly travelled to the Philippines to select bombing targets. However, as a result of tight US and Israeli security he aborted the plan in favour of strikes in Singapore. See 'The Bali Confessions', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, December 2002.

52 Mukhlas allegedly confessed that, prior to the explosion, he had expected the impact of the bombs in Kuta to be limited to just the two nightclubs and not to have caused such significant collateral damage. See 'The Bali Confessions', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, December 2002.

53 The components used in the Bali bomb have still not been confirmed. Some reports indicate, for example, that plastic boxes were used rather than filing cabinets. Other reports include additional components. Regardless, the main Bali bomb did not require sophisticated or extensive components.

54 In preparation for the Bali attacks, Samudra allegedly recruited a separate cell of five suicide bombers, of which reportedly only one was later chosen for the attack. See 'The Bali Confessions', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, December 2002, and Romesh Ratnesar, 'Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist', Time Magazine, 23 September 2002.

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55 In February 2002, the CIA informed regional counterparts that MMI operatives were among those using the camp, including al-Faruq. See Romesh Ratnesar, 'Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist', Time Magazine, 23 September 2002.

56 Australia is reportedly included in Mantiqi 4, one of four geographical divisions of the JI network. See (1) The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.10, (2) 'The Australian Connections', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, June 2003, and (3) Annex A.


58 Joseph Liow, 'Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In search of solutions', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 25, Number 1, April 2003, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, p.49.

59 The Singaporean government alleges that the Philippines-sourced explosives for the planned December 2001 attacks in Singapore were to be transported from Mindanao to Manado, North Sulawesi, then to Malaysia and finally into Singapore via the Causeway. See The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.28.

61 Tempo Interactive, accessed on 28 Feb 2003 at www.tempo.co.id.

62 The meeting in Bangkok was attended by Hambali, Mukhlas, chief JI bomb maker Dr. Azahari Hussin, Noor Din bin Mohammad Top, Zulkepli bin Marzuki and Wan Min bin Wan Mat. See 'The Bali Confessions', Sally Neighbour, Four Corners, ABC, Australia, December 2002.


68 Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 24, Number 3, December 2002, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore


72 Al-Qa’ida held meetings in Southeast Asia to plan the September 11 attacks, the strike on the USS Cole in Yemen, the foiled plot in Manila to hijack 11 passenger jets, and various attacks throughout Southeast Asia.

73 The IIRO was forced to close down its Philippine office in 2000.


75 Ibid., p.413.
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One such plan included blowing up a fresh water pipeline into Singapore and subsequently blaming it on Malaysia. *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.11.

Paul Dibb, 'Indonesia: the key to South-East Asia's security', *International Affairs*, Volume 77, Number 4, October 2001, p.829.


Key States in the fight against Islam

Indonesia's key geographic location ensures that most ships transiting the region must pass through one of four major chokepoints: the straits of Malacca, Sunda or Lombok, or possibly the straits to the east of East Timor. For further reading see John H Noer, *Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia*, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1996.


Ba'asyir has been detained by Indonesian authorities since 18 October 2002 and is currently being tried on charges of treason and immigration violations.


In 1999, 20 Islamic or Muslim-linked parties participated in the elections, securing 37.1 per cent of the total votes. However, approximately only 17 to 18 per cent of these votes were for exclusively Islamic parties.


In October 2001, TNI reportedly uncovered a 15-page JI document in Solo entitled 'Operation Jibril' calling for the simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia but reportedly kept it secret because the military faction that found it was opposed to intelligence cooperation with Washington. The plan was to carry out synchronised attacks on American embassies and installations in December 2001 in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Yemenis planning to blow up the US embassy had reportedly stayed with LJ members. The Indonesian police stalled in the investigation of the Yemenis, thus allowing them time to escape. See Gaye Christoffersen, *The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Centre for Contemporary Conflict, March 2002.

Figures are averages and supplied by the Department of Religious Affairs. See ‘Jakarta Describes Parlous financial situation of Islamic Education System’, Kompas, 13 November 2002.

The predecessor to the MILF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was a main player in the secessionist movement until it signed a peace agreement with the government in 1996.

As far back as the mid-1980s, Osama bin Laden’s brother in law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, reportedly established links with MILF personnel during his stay in the Philippines. Similarly, following contacts made in Afghanistan, the Abu Sayyaf group began receiving al-Qa’ida support.


Gaye Christoffersen, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Centre for Contemporary Conflict, March 2002.

This is an estimate of the Singaporean government in January 2003. The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.11.

The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.7.


Since 1992, restrictions have existed on International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for Indonesia and in 2000, as a direct result of the TNi’s role in the violence of East Timor’s independence process, the US banned weapons sales and direct military assistance to Indonesia. Washington has intimated that the ban would be lifted if Indonesia achieved better progress on East Timor human rights trials and the investigations of the 2002 Freeport Mine attack, which is also suspected to have involved TNI personnel. So far, however, the Indonesian tribunal established to investigate the East Timor cases has acquitted 12 of the 18 military figures accused, while the remaining 6 have received only short sentences. Approval for new funding is currently awaiting a decision by the US Congress.

ANNEX A

JI Organisational Chart - Singapore

Sources: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 January 2003, p.10.
ANNEX B

Paving the Way (1955) - Essay by Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian Islamist theorist who is widely regarded as the father of modern fundamentalism. His teachings form the basis of much of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s ideological viewpoints.

"Those who say that Islamic jihad was merely for the defense of the "home land of Islam" diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life....This is not the Islamic point of view, and ...[it] is a creation of [the] modern age and is completely alien to Islamic consciousness. What is acceptable to Islamic consciousness is its belief, the way of life which this belief prescribes, and the society which lives according to this way of life. The soil of the homeland has, in itself, no value or weight. From the Islamic point of view, the only value which the soil can achieve is because on that soil Allah’s authority is established and Allah’s guidance is followed; and thus it becomes a fortress for the belief, a place for its way of life to be entitled the "homeland of Islam," a center for the movement for the total freedom of man.

Of course, in that case the defense of the "homeland of Islam," is the defense of the Islamic beliefs, the Islamic way of life, and the Islamic community. However, its defense is not the ultimate objective of the Islamic movement of jihad but its means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters for the movement of Islam, which is then to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind, as the object of this religion is all humanity and its sphere of action is the whole earth...

There are many practical obstacles in the establishing of Allah’s rule on earth, such as power of state, the social system and traditions and, in general, the whole human environment. Islam uses force only to remove these obstacles so that there may not remain any wall between Islam and individual human beings, and so that it may address their hearts and minds after releasing them from these material obstacles, and then leave them free to choose to accept or reject it...
Today, too, we are surrounded by jahiliyya. Its nature is the same as during the first period of Islam and it is perhaps a little more deeply entrenched. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws is jahiliyya, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic thought are also constructs of jahiliyya! This is why the true Islamic values never enter our hearts, why our minds are never illuminated by Islamic concepts, and why no groups of people arises among us equal to the calibre of the first generation of Islam.

This is why in the early stages of our training and education for the Islamic movement we must remove ourselves from all influences of the jahiliyya in which we live and from which we derive benefits. We must return to that pure source from which the first generation derived its guidance, free from any mixing or pollution. Only from it can we reliably derive our concepts of the nature of the universe, the nature of human existence, and the relationship of these two with the Perfect, the Real Being, Allah Most High. From the Koran we must also derive our concepts of life, and our principles of government, politics, economics, and all other aspects of life...

We must also free ourselves from the clutches of the jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili traditions, and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics, is not a worthy partner for compromise. Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we may later change the society.

Our foremost objective is to change the practices of the society. Our aim is to change the jahili system at its very roots - this system which is fundamentally in variance with Islam and which, with the help of force and oppression, is keeping us from living the sort of life demanded by our Creator.

Our first step will be to raise ourselves above the jahili society and all its values and concepts. We will never change our own values or concepts in the slightest order to make a bargain with this jahili society! We and jahiliyya are on different roads are on different roads, and if we take even one step in its company, we will lose our goal entirely and lose our way as well...

Jahiliyya wants to find an excuse to reject the Divine system and to perpetuate the slavery of one man to another. It wants to divert the power of
Muslims from the work of establishing the Divinely ordained way of life so they will not go beyond the stage of belief to the stage of a dynamic movement. It wants to distort the very nature of this method – the method in which Islamic belief matures through the struggle of the Islamic movement to develop the details of the Islamic system through practical implementation and to promulgate laws designed to address practical problems and actual difficulties...

The purpose of *jihad* in Islam is to secure complete freedom for every man throughout the world by releasing him from servitude to other human beings so that he may serve Allah, who is one and who has no associates. This is what motivated the early Muslims to fight the cause of Allah. If they had been asked, “Why are you fighting?” none would have answered, “My country is in danger; I am fighting for its defense,” or “The Persians and the Romans have attacked us,” or “We want to extend our dominion and want more spoils.” They would have answered the same as Raba‘i ibn Amer, Huzaifa ibn Muhsin, and Mughira ibn Sh‘uba answered when the Persian general Rustum asked them one by one during three successive days before the battle of Qadisyya [when the Arab Muslims destroyed the Persian empire]: “For what purpose have you come?” Their answer was the same: “Allah has sent us to bring anyone who wishes from servitude to men into the service of Allah alone, from the narrowness of this world into the vastness of the hereafter, and from the tyranny of religions into the justice of Islam. Allah raised a messenger for this purpose to teach his creatures his way. If anyone accepts this way of life, we turn back and give his country back to him, and we fight with those who rebel until we are martyred or become victorious.”

No doubt Islam must defend itself against aggressors. Islam’s very existence as a general declaration of the universal lordship of Allah and of the freedom of man from servitude to any being other than Allah, its commitment to organize a movement with a new leadership after removing the present *jahili* leadership, and its efforts to create a distinct and permanent community based on divine authority and submission to the One God, Allah, are sufficient cause for the surrounding *jahili* society, which is based on human authority in some form or another, to rise against it in order to preserve itself by suppressing Islam. Clearly, under these conditions, the newly organized Islamic community will have to prepare itself for defense. The question of Islam liking or disliking such a situation is irrelevant, for it is imposed upon Islam. This is quite natural for two systems that cannot co-exist for long. Islam has no choice but to defend itself against aggression.
But still there is another more important fact. By its very nature Islam liberates human beings everywhere from servitude to anyone other than Allah. It cannot be restricted within any geographic or racial confines, because this would leave mankind in evil, chaos, and servitude to lords other than Allah.

Some enemies of Islam may consider it expedient not to take any action against Islam, if Islam leaves them alone in their geographical boundaries with some men lords over others and does not propagate its message of universal freedom within their domain. But Islam cannot agree to this unless they submit to its authority by paying jizya [tax paid only by non-Muslims], which will be a guarantee that they have opened their doors for Islam and will not put any obstacles in its propagation through the power of the state...

There is a great difference between this concept of Islam and the view that Islam is confined to geographical and racial boundaries and does not take any action except out of fear of aggression. In the latter, all its inherent dynamism is lost."

ANNEX C

Sermon by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in Solo, Indonesia on 18 October 2002

"Let us raise our voices in praise to Allah because only by his perfect law our souls may be saved. Only by his perfect law may our lives be perfected and have value. By law we mean understanding how to work hard to bring into being is all of Islam’s laws and to struggle for the implementation of Sharia law, defend Islam if it is attacked or pressured by its enemies. Within Allah, at this time of Friday prayers, I would like to explain the nature of Islam’s enemies.

Allah has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan. The party of God, and the party of Satan. God’s group, and Satan’s group. And God’s group are those who follow Islam, those who are prepared to follow his laws and struggle for the implementation of Sharia, that is [Hisbullah]. Meanwhile what is meant by Satan’s group is humanity which opposes Allah’s law, humanity which wishes to bring pressure to bear upon Allah’s law, and wishes to throw obstacles in the path of the implementation of Allah’s law. Hisbullah has character and enthusiasm to defend Sharia law. For Hisbullah Sharia law is more important than life itself. Sharia is priceless as compared to life itself. Life without Sharia is nothing. There is no worth to life, even more so wealth. Everything that is in the world, if it does not have Sharia, means nothing – it has no worth. Accordingly, for Hisbullah one must be prepared to forfeit one’s life for Sharia. Not only material possessions, family or happiness, one must be prepared to sacrifice life itself in the name of Sharia. Hisbullah are people who truly have the character, as explained by Allah [Arabic – Koran verse], Hisbullah is that, based upon one group of people who are beloved by Allah, and that group of people love Allah in return. Allah loves this group of people because this group of people diligently follow his law, and this group of people loves Allah because they derive enjoyment from following his law, and they feel the greatness of God.

The second quality of Hisbullah is, to those people they tolerate differences of opinion, they help each other, they love their families and they’re Muslim brothers and sisters as much as they love themselves. If their Muslim brother or sister falls upon hard times, they too will feel their
pain. Accordingly they work hard to help their Muslim brothers or sisters who have fallen upon hard times to overcome their difficulties. They do not embrace non-believers, they do not request the assistance of non-believers, even if the non-believers have more material wealth, weapons, power than they do. They will still consider themselves to be better, to be bestowed with more grace, than the non-believers. Don't be humble, you are great if you follow Allah's laws. Do not ever request assistance from non-believers, particularly in the implementation of Sharia, be clear in rejecting non-believers. There should be no tolerance towards the principles of non-believers. But clearly Hisbullah would rather free themselves of life than be lost in the world of non-believers. So are there behaviours and actions of the followers of Abraham that are appropriate for us to mimic Allah has stated within his law there are behaviours of the followers of Abraham that it is appropriate that the followers of Mohammed mimic. That is the third point. Abraham and his followers maintain a character towards non-believers. We would rather die than follow that which you worship. We do not want to cooperate. This is the workings of religion. We reject all of your beliefs, we reject all of your ideologies, we reject all of your teachings that are associated with social issues, economics or beliefs. Between you and us there will forever be a ravine of hate and we will be enemies until you follow Allah's law. This is Hisbullah in the context of dealing with non-believers. However, although Hisbullah enshrines this type of character, this is felt by non-believers as harsh, even Allah himself acknowledges. Mohammed will be stern with non-believers, and what is meant by stern here does not mean to pursue or hurt non-believers, what is meant is sternness in the sense of self confidence and the desire to not compromise even in a small way with respect to our faith as opposed to that of the non-believers. This is the character of Hisbullah. Brothers and sisters, Hisbullah in this sense does not mean we cannot make peace with non-believers, Hisbullah can live side by side with non-believers. We can live peacefully with non-believers, we can live and help non-believers in the matters of the world, on the proviso that those non-believers do not disturb the workings of Sharia law, as long as those non-believers do not place obstacles before the implementation of Sharia law and its proponents. Then Hisbullah are prepared to live side by side with non-believers, to be peaceful, to help each other in the matters of the world, on the condition that the non-believers are not allowed to disturb Sharia law, the implementation of it nor its proponents. This is the nature of Hisbullah. Hence the natural progression for Hisbullah, for Allah's party, is Jihad. The struggle to defend the law of God, the implementation of Sharia because Hisbullah believe that this life has no meaning without Sharia. The value of this life is nothing without Sharia. Because of this
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conviction they struggle, and this can begin very simply, to follow the laws of Allah, education, recitation of the Koran, worship and so forth, until the highest form of struggle, namely Jihad, a war to oppose non-believers who are in the process of standing against Islam. Because of this Hisbullah believe that life without Sharia has no meaning. If Hisbullah are defending Islam, there is no reason to attack. To win in eternal terms and to lose one's life is holy. This is the character of Hisbullah.

Brothers and sisters, why is this character called Jihad? Because the character of followers of Satan is always opposing Allah. Allah in heaven wills that non-believers grow to internalise the light of Allah and Allah will perfect that light, even though non-believers may be angry. Therefore the meaning of this verse underlines that the character of non-believers is such that they always work hard to oppose Islam. There is no non-believer who allows the development of Islam, who will allow Islam to be free, non-believers must work hard to threaten Islam and the laws thereof. This is the character of non-believers. Non-believers will always expend their wealth to impede the way of God, to impede the law of Islam. Non-believers will expend not insignificant sums to destroy Islam. This is the character of non-believers.

Brothers and sisters, there are even non-believers who in their efforts to attack Islam to extinguish the light of Islam, they use two methods. The first one is they embark upon a war of thought. The basic premises of Islam are changed so that Muslims themselves do not understand their own faith. Many Muslims do not comprehend their religion because its precepts have been interfered with by non-believers. Jihad on one hand is understood to be a war against one's own desires. On the other hand Jihad is described as evil and violence, murder. So Muslims then wrongfully interpret the meaning of Jihad, to the point where there are Muslims who are afraid of Jihad. If Muslims are afraid of Jihad, then they will be weak. Worship is interpreted as only prayer, so it is limited by prayer. And so forth in other instances. They endeavour with all their might so that Muslims will wish to compromise their worship, law and fraternise with non-believers. This is the target of non-believers. So that accordingly Muslims become soft and Muslims are soft because they allow themselves to compromise in the realm of Islam. Do not accept the invitation of non-believers who wish for you to become soft and what is meant by soft here is the desire to compromise with non-believers, the desire to adapt to non-believers, their clothing, their culture, if there is a need to drink alcohol, then to do so in the desire to compromise with them. This is what is meant by soft and this is the method of non-believers in their endeavour to attack Islamic thought.
Brothers and sisters... According to the example of the prophet Mohammed, Islam must be wedded to the government, to the nation, it must take in the law of the state – this was the example of the prophet. It must not be purely a personal matter. Don't follow the police, don't follow the nation, don't separate Islam from the nation, that is wrong. According to the prophet Mohammed, Muslims must adhere to Sharia law. We have human rights and liberal values and therefore we are free to be steadfast to the law of Islam. Whoever wants to pray, go ahead and pray, those who feel they do not need to, do not – both have the right to do as they wish and should not have their human rights impinged. This is the war of thought, this is the method which is used by non-believers.

If non-believers have the weapons capacity, the funding, then they will go to war against Islam. In the Koran Allah has said they will always wage war against you, they will always attack you as long as they have the capacity. Brothers and sisters Muslims, we now can feel the efforts of non-believers to threaten Islam. Jews and America are waging a war on Muslims in order that there are many participants, and those who do not wish to participate are attacked and those who wish to are given funding. Then in the process of waging war against Islam they use that which is mentioned in the Koran as values, they create a war wherein it is not clearly stated it is a war against Islam but they use a smokescreen which is currently being described as “terrorists”. The non-believers of America and the non-believers of Israel are currently developing the issue of terrorism, however what they mean by terrorism according to the definition of America, are all of the followers of Islam. All followers of Islam in this world are terrorists. Then they create Islamic organisations which are directed by terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda. Then in the case of Jemmah Islamiayah it is international terrorists, then people are sent in and once in, they are terrorists. This is the intent of non-believers in their framework to attack in their quest to destroy the vision of Muslims, this is what is currently going on including in our own country.

Brothers and sisters in the not too distant future there will be a constitutional law that will allow anyone to be arrested under the suspicion of terrorism. Any Islamic leader identified by America will be a terrorist and arrested. I myself in a short time will be arrested because I'm considered an international terrorist. If we examine the facts, it is clear that America and Israel are the terrorists. They have destroyed Palestine. They have attacked Somalia, Sudan and in the near future will attack Iraq with no clear cause – that is a terrorist. Israel has murdered the tribes of Palestine and has destroyed the houses of the tribes of Palestine without cause – that is a
terrorist. However the believers of Islam such as Osama bin Laden, the Taliban who steadfastly held to the law of Allah, with no evidence, America destroyed their houses with no cause – that is a terrorist. Indeed they destroyed the interests of America because America destroyed their interests and hence the war began. The desire of America is such that if you do not agree, we will wage war for our interests. The government of Indonesia right now is being directed by America to service its needs and the primary need of America is to bury Islam particularly in Indonesia. Therefore following on from this, America will be able to direct political and economic affairs in accordance with its own desires. Because of this, let us defend our religion, let us begin to defend our religion. If Islam is strong, then our country will be good. Our race will feel satisfaction, those who are Muslims and those who are not. They will live together and will together enjoy life. Hence our religion Islam, our nation and our country is currently being threatened by foreign races with all manner of libels, with the bombings in Bali, with explosions everywhere, all of those are the plots of non-believers whose aims are to weaken and profane the believers of Islam. Therefore, accordingly they can exert power over this country in order that it may be taken advantage of. Brothers and sisters let us hope for and be conscious of the defence of Islam, let us embark upon Jihad for Allah, let us struggle to implement the law of Allah and let us apply a unity within ourselves between all Muslims, and between Muslims and non-Muslims namely non-believers who exist in Indonesia, to defend together the interests of our country. Principally Muslims, we are convinced that the right workings of Islam will bring about a nation of good. Let us hope that Allah will bless us in this.”

Note: This text has been translated and edited by Four Corners, ABC.
Sources: Courtesy of Four Corners, ABC, Australia, accessed on line on 20 June 2003 at http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s711753.htm
ANNEX D

Statement: Jihad against Jews and Crusaders
(23 February 1998 - World Islamic Front)

[This statement was signed by Usama bin Ladin; Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.]

...The Arabian Peninsula [Saudi Arabia] has never - since God made it flat, created desert, and encircled it with seas - been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter.

No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them in order to remind you:

First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples.

If some people in the past have argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless.

Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded one million...despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbours.
Third, if the Americans’ aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews’ petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighbouring Arab state, and their endeavour to fragment all states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel’s survival and the continuation of the brutal crusader occupation of the peninsula.

All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulama have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the *jihad* is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam bin-Qadama in *alMughni*, Imam al-Kisa’I in *al-Bada’I*, al-Qurtubi in his interpretations, and the sheik of al-Islam in his books, where he said: “As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulama]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.”

On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following *fatwa* to all Muslims:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “And fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”

This is in addition to the words of Almighty God: “And why should ye not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)? - women and children, whose cry is: “Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!”

We – with God’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulama, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.
Almighty God said: "O ye who believe, give your response to God and his Apostle, when he calleth you to that which will give you life. And know that God cometh between man and his heart, and that it is he whom ye shall all be gathered."

Almighty God also says: "O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of God, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, he will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put other in your place; but him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things."

Almighty God also says: "So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith."

ANNEX E

Address to the Nation (September 11, 2001 - President George W Bush)

"Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, businessmen and -women, military and federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbours.

Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and quiet, unyielding anger.

These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation.

Terrorist attacks can shake the foundation of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for attack because we're the biggest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring of strangers and neighbours who came to give blood and help in any way they could.

Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington, D.C., to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those that have been injured and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.
The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight and will be open for business tomorrow.

Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business as well.

The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.

I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.

Tonight I ask for prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil for you are with me."

This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time.

None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night and God bless America.”

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