Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 110
The Korean Peninsula is the most serious flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region. Across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea, only 40 km from Seoul, South Korea faces a virtually fully mobilised, obdurate communist regime, with active armed forces of some 1.13 m personnel and a resolute nuclear weapons development programme.
South Korea now maintains the most intense signals intelligence (SIGINT) activity in the world, involving some of the most advanced SIGINT systems currently operational. Most of this activity is maintained by US SIGINT authorities and units, but South Korean capabilities for both independent and joint SIGINT activities have increased greatly over the past decade.
At the strategic level, South Korea is host to TR-1A/U-2R strategic reconnaissance aircraft, a link facility in the US Navy's Pacific high-frequency direction-finding and cryptologic net, and US Army SIGINT operations. But the depth of the SIGINT activity in South Korea lies at the operational and tactical levels.
Most of the US SIGINT agencies and units in South Korea have a direct historical lineage to units which were established during the Korean War. US SIGINT capabilities were completely amiss when North Korea invaded Soul Korea in June 1950 and when the Chinese Communists intervened in October-November 1950. They are now expected to provide some one to four days' warning of a North Korean decision to invade the South and some 12-16 hours' warning of an actual invasion. US Army SIGINT units took some 12 months (from June 1950 to July 1951) before they were able to provide effective support to the Eighth Army. They are now expected to provide essential targeting intelligence and operational support for counter air, strike and strategic interdiction operations immediately following the outbreak of war and to support subsequent battlefield operations.
This monograph describes the history of SIGINT activity in South Korea since 1950; the principal US SIGINT stations, deployments and operations; and the advanced battlefield SIGINT systems and capabilities currently operational in South Korea. It discusses the South Korean programme for increased self-reliance with respect to intelligence, and the impact of the crisis in mid-1994 over North Korean nuclear developments, when the possibility of war on the peninsula became very real. It concludes with a brief assessment of the ability of South Korea's SIGINT capabilities to satisfy current strategic and military demands.
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